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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is a treatise on the concept of 
exploitation both as an ethical and a technical concept. 1 
It examines and critiques different theories of 
exploitation to highlight their ethical and methodological 
assumptions, with a view to understanding 
problem: the relation between First and 
countries. 
These different theories fall into 
a particular 
Third World 
two broad 
categories: the liberal and the Marxian traditions. Hillel 
Steiner's theory2, which is paradigmatic of the liberal 
tradition, is shown to be quite problematic as a theory of 
exploitation in terms of both its internal coherence and its 
moral assumption. The underlying liberal moral assumption -
that there can be no exploitation so long as there is free 
exchange devoid of an interference by a third party - is 
suspect and is challenged by the theories in the Marxian 
tradition. 
This series of theories - Marx's classical theory, 
Arghiri Emmanuel's "unequal exchange," John Roemer' s game 
theory and Latin American based dependency theory - are 
shown to constitute different significant moments in the 
single, general Marxian theory of exploitation. 
1 
• 
These 
different moments, however, do seem to have different moral 
assumptions. I have tried to draw out what these moral 
assumptions are, and how the theories themselves relate to 
each other as different moments of a general theory. 
The basis for these conceptions of exploitation is the 
classical technical usage of the concept deriving from Karl 
Marx's "labor theory of value": workers in a capitalist 
society are "exploited" in that they expend more labor in 
production process than is embodied in the products they 
consume. 3 But Marx's classical theory is found to be 
inadequate because it does not treat First and Third World 
relations. Marx's model is developed strictly in the 
context of capital-labor relations. 
Emmanuel confronts this difficulty squarely. In his 
theory of "unequal exchange," Emmanuel applies the Marxian 
categories to First and Third World relations. Against the 
classical liberal stance deriving from the Ricardian "theory 
of comparative advantage," which advocates free trade as a 
vehicle of economic progress, 4 Emmanuel argues, using an 
abstract model of trade relations between two countries, one 
of which is developed and the other which is underdeveloped, 
that the underdeveloped country can both benefit and be 
exploited at one and the same time via free trade. 5 In 
other words, the consequence of free trade is "unequal 
exchange." However, with Emmanuel, one runs into the 
problem of the framework relying on the allegedly defective 
2 
labor theory of value and also, yielding certain 
mathematical anomalies. 
John Roemer refines th~ concept of exploitation 
without relying on the labor theory of value. He gives it a 
game theoretic definition: a class is exploited if, were it 
to withdraw, from the larger society with its per ca pi ta 
share of the wealth, it would be better off and the rest of 
society worse off. 6 In order to rule out bizarre 
counterexamples to his model, Roemer introduces the notion 
of "domination" as one of the principles of exploitation but 
this principle is left undeveloped. 
It is the developing of the notion of "domination" 
more concretely that leads to dependency theory. This 
theory represents a body of analysis, primarily by Latin 
American scholars, 
Third countries.7 
concerning the relation of First and 
One of its most controversial theses is 
the "development of underdevelopment," the thesis that 
"underdevelopment" is not a matter of "lagging behind" the 
more developed countries, but is a dynamic process resulting 
from certain interactions. Certain countries have become 
developed as a result of other countries having become 
underdeveloped. 
But in looking at dependency theory as a concrete 
model, we also have to look at developmentalism as an 
alternative explanation which could challenge the notion of 
"dependency."8 In a certain sense, developmentalism is 
3 
linked to the liberal tradition as its concrete realization 
in the context of First and Third World relations. It is a 
theory coming out of the liberal tradition in the same way 
that steiner' s is. In a way, it is a culmination of the 
liberal tradition in the same manner that the Marxian 
tradition culminates in dependency theory as its concrete 
realization in First and Third World relations. 
In the final section, developmentalism and dependency 
theory are evaluated in terms of two criteria in order to 
determine which of them makes more sense and is most 
fruitful in understanding the concrete situation of Third 
World countries. These criteria are: (i) how well the 
theory explains the data vis-a-vis alternative theories, the 
data being the current division of the world into the rich 
advanced countries and the poor underdeveloped countries; 
and (ii) the usefulness of the theory in formulating 
policies for Third World countries. I have used Ghana, an 
African periphery of the world capitalist system, as a test 
case in this evaluation. The tentative outcome reveals that 
dependency theory makes more sense than developmental 
theory. It is not incoherent; its ethical presupposition is 
reasonable and it does seem to give a better explanation 
about why the world is in the way it is. 
However, its critical weakness lies in the area of 
policy prescriptions. Its prescriptions which suggest that 
Third world countries ought to "delink," ought to "pull 
4 
out," ought to get rid of multinational corporations, ought 
to nationalize foreign enterprises, etc. are questionable as 
being "good advice," as Ghanaian experience shows. This 
practical weakness does not imply that developmentalism or 
neoclassical economic theory is the preferred alternative. 
In fact, attempts to apply neoclassical solutions have often 
resulted in disaster. The "Chicago Boys" in Chile is a 
case in point. I am compelled to conclude that there is 
really no good theory available that would explain what the 
underdeveloped Third World countries should do about their 
impoverished situation. This remains one of the most 
pressing, if unanswered, questions of our day. 
5 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CONCEPT OF EXPLOITATION 
A. Review of Literature 
The concept of exploitation is central to Marx's 
analysis and critique of the capitalist mode of production.l 
It has been a subject of renewed intense investigation among 
philosophers within the last decade and up until the present 
time. But before this time and particularly in the 1960s, 
there had been an almost total lack of attention to the 
concept of exploi ta ti on in the research endeavor of the 
Anglo-American philosophers. 
a subject heading in 
It is conspicuously absent as 
the available indices and 
encyclopaediae of this time period. As a subject heading, 
exploitation made its first appearance in The Philosopher's 
Index in 1973; in the Social Sciences Index in 1975 and in 
the Humanities Index in 1980.2 
The issue of exploitation started emerging as a 
problem in the Anglo-American thought within the last decade 
with a renewed interest in the reinterpretation of Marx's 
thought. Undoubtedly, the actual international economic 
8 
crisis, coupled with the questioning of the welfare state in 
the west, were not neutral in influencing the sudden surge 
of publications on substantial ethico-political problems 
during these last fifteen years. Philosophical discussions 
about the problem and the concept of exploitation are 
therefore also of utmost, immediate relevance for 
discussions about present-day world problems and vice-versa. 
The keen interest within moral and political philosophy in 
the concept of exploitation has left its indelible mark on 
the philosophical discussion of Marx's work. Since the last 
decade therefore, there have been a series of articles and 
whole books devoted to the fundamental theme of 
exploitation. What was originally non-existent in the 1960s 
has lately spread into the pages of such journals, as Social 
Theory and Practice, Journal of Value Inguiry, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Science 
and Society, Ethics, Philosophical Forum and Economic 
Journal, to mention but a few. These articles and books 
fall into two broad categories: those which are 
interpretations or expositions of Marx's thought, and those 
which have arisen as reactions to other provocative 
writings. In their diverse analyses of Marx's critique of 
capitalism as being exploitative, we find several recurring 
themes: arguments in favor of a non-moral interpretation of 
Marx's position, claims for the moral relevance of the 
concept of exploitation in Marx's indictment of capitalism, 
9 
10 
arguments concerning the relevance of the labor theory of 
value to Marx's indictment of capitalist exploitation 
and finally, reformulations of the concept of exploitation. 
For the purpose of our review of the relevant 
literature on exploitation, the different publications will 
be structured according to the following categories: 
1. those which deny that Marx condemns capitalism 
(capitalist exploitation) as unjust, on the one 
hand, and those which claim that he did so, on 
the other; 
2. those which deny the claim that the labor theory 
of value is necessary for Marx's charge of 
exploitation against capitalism and those who 
uphold this claim; 
3. those which reformulate the Marxian concept of 
exploitation and extend its areas of application 
and 
4. those which formulate and defend the existence of 
a liberal as opposed to a Marxian theory of 
exploitation. 
My survey of the literature will be mainly an 
11 
exposition of the relevant writings, since my interest in 
this review is to lay out the development of the concept of 
exploitation in the social thought of Anglo-American 
thinkers. But first, I shall present the theoretical 
background of this thought which seems to follow the general 
lines of Marx's account of capitalist exploitation. We find 
two points of view which are dialectically interconnected in 
capital I - the spheres of circulation and production. When 
we look at the sphere of circulation, we see that there is 
an exchange of equivalent values - wages exchange for labor 
power, and in the sphere of production, we see that workers 
have to work longer than the time which is necessary to 
produce the value of their wages. 
From the first point of view, the sphere of 
circulation, the workers sell their labor power as commodity 
to the capitalist who pays them the value of their commodity 
in the form of wages. The workers, Marx says, receive from 
the capitalist the full equivalent in value of what they 
sell, and so, no "cheating" has occured. Once the purchase 
of labor power has been effected, this commodity belongs to 
the capitalist as of right, and therefore, so does its use 
and the products arising from its use. 3 The purchase of 
labor power is also expressed from the worker's point of 
view: "As soon as his labor actually begins, it has already 
ceased to belong to him. 11 4 The capitalist has paid for the 
value of labor-power, and the fact that the use of the 
12 
latter now creates a greater value, this "is a piece of good 
luck for the buyer, but by no means an injustice toward the 
seller. n5 What motivates Marx's denial of any injustice in 
the wage relation is the formulation (from his Critique of 
the Gotha Programme) that "right can never be higher than 
the economic structure of society and its cultural 
development conditioned thereby. "6 Consequently, standards 
of justice are relative to particular modes of production. 
The only principles of justice which are appropriate to 
judging a particular mode of production are those that 
correspond to it. Thus, Marx claims, 
It is nonsense for Gilbert to speak of natural justice 
in this connection. The justice of transactions 
between agents of production consists in the fact that 
these transactions arise from the relations of 
production as their natural consequence . • . The 
content is just so long as it corresponds to the 
mode of production and is adequate to it. It is 
unjust as soon as it contradicts it. Slavery, on the 
basis of the capitalist mode of production, is 
unjust, so is cheating on the quality of commodities.7 
From the second point of view, the sphere of 
production, the workers, whose labor is the source of the 
value of the commodities, have to work longer than the time 
which is necessary to produce the value of the wages the 
capitalist has paid them. They perform surplus labor, and 
the surplus value created is appropriated by the capitalist 
as profit. The workers are exploited because their labor 
power creates a value greater than the value of the wages 
13 
they receive. The wage relation is not in fact an exchange 
of equivalents. Marx says it is "only illusory" and a "mere 
semblance" or "form" to claim that the capitalist advances 
anything in exchange for labor power.a It is an 
"appearance," a "mere pretence. 119 There is no true 
equivalence in the exchange, for the worker must perform 
more labor than that which is necessary to replace the value 
of the wage, and hence, Marx speaks of the surplus labor 
involved as having been done "gratis" for the capitalist 
and as "uncompensated" and he calls it "unpaid labor. 11 10 
The exchange is only an apparent one, since the capitalist 
contributes to it what has already been appropriated freely 
from the product of the worker's labor. As Marx puts it: 
The exchange of equivalents, the original operation 
with which we started, is now turned round in such a 
way that there is only an apparent exchange, since, 
firstly, the capital which is exchanged for labor 
power is itself merely a portion of the product of the 
labor of others which has been appropriated without an 
equivalent, and secondly, this capital must not only 
be replaced by its producer, the worker, but replace 
together by an added surplus. The relation of 
exchange between capitalist and worker becomes a mere 
semblance belonging only to the process of 
circulation, it becomes a mere form, which is alien 
to the content of the transaction itself, and merely 
mystifies it. The constant sale and purchase of labor 
power is the form; the content is the constant 
appropriation by the capitalist, without equivalent, 
of a portion of the labor of others which has already 
been objectified, and his repeated exchange of this 
labor for a greater quantity of the living labor of 
others.11 
These two interpretations which are present in Marx's works, 
especially the Capital, represent the character 
14 
of 
capitalist exploitation. It is with this theoretical 
background that the different writings have emerged. 
The earliest of these pioneering writings, which 
appeared in the early 1970s, are in the first of the 
outlined categories. These are accounts of exploitation 
given by Laurence Crocker in his "Marx's Concept of 
Exploitation" and Allen Wood in his "The Marxian Critique of 
Justice. 1112 Crocker believes the concept of exploitation 
has been neglected because it has been misinterpreted in 
terms of an injustice in the distribution of goods and 
services. Contrary to the prevailing notion, he argues that 
exploitation is a matter of undemocratic control of 
production, and he gives referential evidence in support of 
this interpretation. Wood examines the question as to 
whether exploitation understood in terms of the 
appropriation surplus value by capital, is a form of 
injustice within the capitalist mode of production. He 
argues that the appropriation of surplus value and the 
exploitation of labor are not abuses of capitalist 
production but belong to the essence of capitalism and 
therefore, are just. According to him, Marx does not 
condemn capitalism for being unjust. Justice is a standard 
by which each mode of production feudal, capitalist, 
socialist measures itself. The application of the 
standard of justice of some postcapitalist mode of 
15 
production to capitalist production is mistaken and 
groundless. 
While Wood's interpretation is to be linked to the 
sphere of circulation perspective, we find other writers 
appealing to the perspective of production. Wood's denial 
that Marx condemned capitalist exploitation for its 
injustice brought about various reactions which affirmed 
what he denied. Donald Van De Veer claims that it was 
Marx's concern for justice that made him "to condemn 
capitalist distribution as exploitation. nl3 He says 
exploitation involves the appropriation of surplus value 
belonging to the worker. Its abolition will occur in the 
higher phase of communist society with the operation of an 
equitable distributive principle: "From each according to 
his ability, to each according to his needs." In her own 
expository treatment of exploitation, Nancy Holmstrom 
elucidates Marx's concept of exploitation in order to 
explain why Marx believes exploitation to be an evil that is 
necessarily a characteristic of capitalism or any class 
society.14 She argues that exploitation is forced, surplus, 
unpaid labor, the product of which the producers do not 
control. Against Wood's position, Holmstrom claims that 
Marx thought exploitation to be evil and unjust because of 
the force and domination it involves. 
Gary Young in his "Justice and Capitalist Production: 
Marx and Bourgeois Ideology, " also claims to refute the 
16 
claim by Wood.15 He argues that Marx's writings show he 
thought capitalist production totally exploitative and 
unjust, and saw as a mystification, not the appe.al to 
justice, but the picture of capitalist production to be 
found in bourgeois ideology. Underlying Marx's critique of 
capitalist production as unjust is his thesis that the wage 
exchange is a false appearance which conceals the 
exploitation of the laborer by the capitalist. Ziyad H. 
Husami also argues that Marx condemns capitalism as unjust 
on account of its exploitative character which does not 
reward according to labor contribution and which is not 
oriented to satisfy human needs .16 He accuses Wood of 
confusing the explanation of surplus value phenomenon with 
the evaluation of it. He denies that standard of justice 
are relative to particular modes of production and 
consequently, claims that it is appropriate to employ 
postcapitalist standards of justice in criticizing juridical 
standards of capitalist justice. Richard Arneson elucidates 
Marx's conception of exploitation and states what is morally 
objectionable about exploitation as Marx understand it.17 
He maintains that exploitation in Marx's technical sense is 
not wrong by definition, but that according to Marx, 
instances of exploitation are in fact wrongful, because they 
violate the norms that people should get what they deserve 
and that people should not force others to do their wishes. 
In a final section, Arneson rebuts recent interpretations 
17 
that deny either Marx's allegiance to these norms or their 
centrality to his account of the injustice of capitalism. 
In his "Vampires, Werewolves and Economic 
Exploitation," George E. Panichas defines, analyzes and 
evaluates the truth of Marx's claim that capitalism implies 
economic exploitation.18 He argues that economic 
exploitation in the capitalist mode of production is class 
exploitation because it is workers as members of the working 
class who are economically exploited by capitalists as 
members of the capitalist class. Therefore, economic 
exploitation describes relationships which are qualitatively 
different from the relationships of simple exchange between 
freely consenting individuals. He sees economic 
exploitation, on Marx's criteria, to be immoral and unjust 
because it inhibits and denies human freedom to the 
economically exploited class. 
In a critical evaluation of all these accounts of 
exploitation, Allen Buchanan observes a lacuna in the 
positions of both Marx's critics and his defenders.19 He 
claims they have failed to take cognizance of the complexity 
of Marx's theory of exploitation because they have 
concentrated exclusively on his analysis of exploitation in 
wage labor. Therefore, they have neglected other 
exploitative relationships in capitalism and have failed to 
develop the connection between exploitation and alienation. 
To remedy this failure, Buchanan seeks to articulate the 
18 
connections between exploitation and alienation by arguing 
that the theory of alienation provides content for the 
concept of exploitation. 
It seems worthwhile at this juncture to take stock of 
what we have been doing so far in our exposition. What is 
the logic of the development of these various arguments? 
First, we have Crocker who claims that Marxian exploitation 
has been misunderstood. He contends that exploitation is 
not a distribution problem but it arises from a lack of 
control over production. Wood then comes along and makes a 
radical claim: that exploitation is neither an issue of 
distribution nor any other standard of justice, because Marx 
was not concerned with justice. Wood's claim sparked a host 
of critics to argue against this point of view. Arguing 
that Marx was concerned with justice, they claim that there 
is clearly a moral dimension to the critique of capitalism. 
Buchanan broadens the moral dimension by arguing that it is 
not just wage labor that is exploitative, but alienation 
that is pervasive in the whole society. 
Within the second category of exploitation 
controversies, there are three identifiable approaches, two 
of which are within the Marxian tradition and a third 
approach which is anti-Marxist. The two Marxist approaches 
are "the labor theory of value" and the "non-labor value 
theoretic" conceptions. The first approach emphasizes the 
necessity of the labor theory of value to the understanding 
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of the dynamism of the capitalist economic phenomena.20 
without this theory, it claims that Marx's indictment of 
capitalism as being essentially exploitative loses its 
force. The second approach abandons the labor theory of 
value, and argues that Marx's charge of exploitation against 
the capitalist mode of production can be sustained without 
the labor theory of value. The third approach claims that 
the labor theory of value is false and consequently, the 
Marxian theory of exploitation (which relies on it) is 
false. 
A representative of this latter approach is Robert 
Nozick who thinks that the falsity of the labor theory of 
value undermines completely Marx's notion of exploitation. 
Nozick in arguing against the labor theory of value, is 
representative of those contemporary economists and 
philosophers who are highly critical of the labor theory of 
value.21 First, he criticizes this theory through his 
employment of the notion of utility. He claims that a 
commodity has value because of its utility and the influence 
of market forces. The labor theory of value is false 
because the value of a commodity is not determined by the 
"socially necessary labor" required for its production. By 
relying on the defective labor theory of value, Nozick 
believes Marx's theory of exploitation is weakened: "With 
the crumbling of the labor theory of value, the underpining 
of its particular theory of exploitation dissolves. 1122 
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secondly, he argues that if Marx's notion of exploitation 
means contributing more labor than one gets back, then the 
society which undertakes investment for the future and the 
subsidization of those unable to work would be exploitative. 
These two tasks, Nozick believes, cannot be accomplished 
without the creation of surplus product which the workers do 
not receive back. He claims that since there are situations 
in which the society may require some investment and 
subsidization, Marx's theory of exploitation is meaningless 
and absurd. 
Shih Yuan-Kang criticizes Nozick's critique of Marx's 
labor theory of value and exploitation. 23 He claims that 
the "use value" or utility of a commodity is not sufficient 
as an explanation of exchange value.24 For a thing to be a 
commodity, it has to have an exchange value. Instead of 
being concerned with the source of the value of a commodity, 
which is Marx's interest, Yuan-Kang says Nozick was 
concerned with the use-value or utility of a commodity in 
satisfying human wants. He claims Nozick has misconstrued 
Marx's intention and therefore, his analysis of Marxian 
exploitation represents a misinterpretation of Marx's 
theory. Anthony A. Smith likewise examines Nozick's 
critique of Marx's labor theory of value and exploitation, 
and concludes that he (Nozick) does not have sufficient 
grounds for rejecting Marx's position.25 Smith argues that 
exploitation is not concerned solely with the production, 
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appropriation and utilization of surplus product but "· .. 
refers essentially to the social relations which form the 
context within which such production, appropriation and 
employment takes place. 11 26 He believes Nozick's analysis of 
the concept of exploitation is mistaken because he has 
abstracted from the question of social relations. Gerald A. 
Cohen is representative of a critique of the labor theory of 
value from within the Marxian tradition. Cohen claims to 
demonstrate the mutual irrelevance of the relationship 
between the labor theory of value and the concept of 
exploitation.27 He argues that the labor theory of value is 
not a suitable ground for the charge of exploitation laid 
against capitalism. There is a related but simpler basis 
for the charge. He believes the mere concept of value is 
sufficient to explicate the exploitation of the worker under 
the capitalist mode of production. He defines the concept 
of value independently of the labor theory and says the 
worker is exploited because he "does not receive back all of 
the value of his product. 11 28 This, he claims, is an easily 
observable fact. In a rebuttal of Cohen's view, Holmstrom 
argues that Cohen is mistaken because Marx's charge of 
exploitation against capitalism does require the labor 
theory of value.29 She claims Cohen's conception of 
exploitation is weaker than Marx's both theoretically and 
morally. It is also argued that Cohen's criticisms of the 
labor theory of value rest on a misunderstanding of the 
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theory and Marx's intention. 
Geoff Hodgson also rejects the labor theory of value 
on the ground that it is redundant in the explanation of 
exploitation. He formulates a theory of capitalist 
exploitation without a labor theory of value and which 
differs from the bourgeois neoclassical approach and the 
classical Marxian conception.JO He maintains that 
exploitation is "the appropriation of the surplus product 
. . . by the class that owns the means of production. 11 31 It 
can be abolished when there is a "collective ownership and 
control of the means of production. 11 32 David Laibman claims 
to reject Hodgson' s view and to defend the labor value 
formulation. 3 3 He tries to show why Hodgson' s proposed 
theory of capitalist exploitation is inadequate, and then, 
tries to demonstrate in what sense the labor-value concept 
is germane to the theory of exploitation, commodity 
relations and capitalism. 
Like Cohen and Hodgson, Robert Paul Wolff believes 
that the labor theory of value is not essential to the 
understanding of capitalist exploitation because "neither 
the labor/labor power distinction nor the assumption that 
labor is the substance of value is required in order to 
explain the emergence of profit. 11 34 He demonstrates this by 
using a simple input-output model in calculating the labor 
embodied in the physical surplus produced in a capitalist 
economy. In this analysis, the labor embodied in the 
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physical surplus is represented by the difference between 
the actual amount of labor expended and the labor used in 
producing that labor. This calculation, Wolff claims, has 
been done without any appeal to the labor theory of value. 
oavid Schweickart disagrees with Wolff's claim and argues 
that Wolff has misunderstood Marx's project.3 5 Marx is not 
seeking for the secret of profit but the secret of a 
self-expanding capital. He is looking at this in a 
historico-logical way rather than in a transcendental way. 
Schweickart believes that Marx's interest concerns the 
development of capitalism from simple commodity production, 
an economic situation of relative equality. Under simple 
commodity process of production, the tendency in any 
industry is to achieve an equal return to labor. This 
It causes prices to be proportional to embodied 
labor.n36 On this ground, Schweickart concludes that the 
labor theory of value is true under simple commodity 
production. 
is true " 
He also claims that the labor theory of value 
during that part of the transition to 
capitalism when simple commodity production is still 
dominant, and is approximately true even after capitalism's 
triumph."37 
We now come to publications in the third category. A 
central figure here is John Roemer. Roemer gives a unique 
twist and a novel refinement to the Marxian concept of 
exploitation by providing a new characterization of 
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exploitation in game theoretic terms, using property 
relations and counterfactual property distributions.38 The 
game theoretic reformulation of exploitation is the central 
issue in Roemer' s recent and highly controversial book, A 
General Theory of Exploitation and Class. 39 The property 
relations definition agrees with the classical definition in 
simple models, but they diverge in more complicated models. 
Roemer argues that the property relations definition 
gives the correct analysis of exploitation in complex models 
while the classical definition fails. He also argues that 
the property relations, unlike the labor extraction, makes 
clear the ethical consequences 
accusation of exploitation.40 
Despite Roemer's ingenious 
associated with the 
contribution to the 
evolution of the concept of exploitation and the brilliance 
of his arguments, his "general theory" has come under 
criticism. Particularly important in this respect was the 
special publication of the 1982 issue of Politics and 
Society which was devoted entirely to a critical analysis of 
Roemer's theory. For example, Jon Elster claims that 
Roemer's two definitions of exploitation are different from 
one another and defends the first, exploitation as unequal 
exchange, against the second, exploitation in the game 
theoretic approach.41 Margaret Levi and Doughlas c. North 
locate the weakness of Roemer' s argument in his cursory 
treatment of the State. 42 Adam Przeworski disagrees with 
Roemer's characterization of 
characterization as making 
alternative to capitalism. 43 
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socialism and sees such 
socialism an undesirable 
Erick o. Wright argues for 
the inadequacy of Roemer's treatment of politics and class 
struggle. 44 
Following a presentation of Roemer's theory of 
exploitation, Julius Sensat contrasts two competing 
frameworks for theorizing about exploitation and defends one 
against the other. 45 In the first framework, which is of 
the Roemerian type, exploitativeness is defined relative to 
a set of feasible alternatives and exploitation is 
fundamentally a type of maldistribution of the benefits of 
social cooperation. In the second framework, exploitation 
is a certain kind of use of what is exploited, a use which 
goes contrary to its nature. Sensat explicates the first 
framework, provides some sample theories and criticizes this 
framework. Then, he explicates and defends the second 
framework, and presents in a synoptic form the Marxian 
theory of value and capital as an example of a theory of the 
second type. 
While Roemer and his critics are concerned with the 
extension of classical Marxian theory of exploitation by 
means of abstraction to the game theoretic model, another 
kind of reasoning takes the notion of classical Marxian 
exploitation and extends it to the relationship between 
countries. Arghiri Emmanuel develops this concept by 
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extending the Marxian analysis of exploitation to trade 
relations between nations, which leads to his assertion of 
the exploitative character of free trade. 46 He employs an 
abstract model of trade relations between two countries, one 
that is underdeveloped and the other that is developed, and 
argues that the underdeveloped country can both benefit and 
be exploited at one and the same time through free trade.47 
Free trade is exploitative because of the unequal exchange 
which occurs when trade is carried out among regions with 
different wage rates and/or different capital endowments. 
Given the premise that there is equalization of profit rates 
in all regions and lines of production - which is the 
tendency of capitalism - Emmanuel claims that part of the 
surplus appears to be lost from the lower wage and capital 
regions (the underdeveloped countries) to the higher wage 
and capital regions (the developed countries). 
A body of literature, known as "dependency theory," 
deriving primarily from Latin American scholars, also 
examines the question of exploitation in the context of the 
relations of First and Third World.48 This theory explains 
the position of the Third World as a consequence of the 
development of the First World. According to the 
protagonists of this theory, certain countries have become 
developed as a result of other countries having become 
underdeveloped.49 
From the literature so far reviewed, the discussion on 
27 
exploitation seems to have been confined to the Marxian 
circle. In fact, very little has been written on 
exploitation from the neoclassical liberal perspective. 
within the liberal camp the fourth of the listed 
categories - the most conspicuous effort which has been made 
to discuss and/or construct a theory of exploitation is that 
of Hillel Steiner's. steiner formulates and defends the 
existence of a theory of exploitation from the liberal 
rights tradition.50 He claims that exploitation is 
occasioned in a trilateral relationship: A exploits B by 
worsening the latter's bargaining power through a violation 
of the rights of c. This theory will be examined in detail 
in Chapter Two. 
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a. Some Characterizations of Exploitation 
Steiner has defined exploitation in terms of rights-
violation. Marxian thinkers have offered different 
characterization of exploitation, which reflect their 
slightly varied viewpoints. Exploitation has been variously 
defined as: "the undemocratic control of production," "the 
appropriation of the worker's surplus value," "the worker's 
inability to get what he deserves," etc. 
What sense do we make of all these notions of 
exploitation? Can we find a common ground of meaning among 
these different explanations? In simple terms, what is 
exploitation? What do we mean by exploitation in intuitive 
ordinary language? In other words, what do we mean when we 
ordinarily say that Paul exploits John? What simple common 
definitions of exploitation do we have? 
One simple definition of exploitation is the 
non-technical, general, unspecific, common-sense meaning. 
In common parlance, "to be exploited" means to be ill-used, 
badly treated, oppressed or treated harshly. And "to 
exploit" is to make someone worse off for the exploiter's 
advantage or self gain at another's expense. This is what 
is meant by exploitation in the ordinary language outside of 
the more specific technical sense of economic exploitation. 
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In defining exploitation, the Oxford English 
oictionary says to exploit means "to utilize for one's own 
ends, treat selfishly as mere workable material persons. 11 51 
This definition has a similarity with the Kantian imperative 
which enjoins: "Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time 
as an end. 11 5 2 In other words, a human being is not 
something to be used merely as a means but always as an end 
in himself. To whatever purpose a person is subjected, this 
purpose must be one that conforms to his nature, and that 
promotes his interest as an end in itself. Anything to the 
contrary conflicts with the humanity of man, uses him merely 
as a means and consequently, is exploitative. Similarly, 
Sensat defines exploitation ordinarily in his second 
framework as a certain kind of a use of what is exploited, 
namely a use which is contrary to its nature. He says, "x 
exploits y iff: (i) x uses y as means to some end, e, and 
(ii) this use is contrary toy's nature. 11 53 
We find a similar "general conception" of exploitation 
in Marx's The German Ideology where he states: 
In Holbach, all the activity of individuals in their 
mutual intercourse, e.g. speech, love, etc., is 
depicted as a relation of utility and utilization. 
Hence the actual relations that are presupposed here 
are speech, love, the definite manifestations of 
definite qualities of individuals. Now these 
relations are supposed not to have the meaning 
peculiar to them but to be the expression and 
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manifestation of some third relation introduced in 
their place, the relation of utility or utilization. 
This paraphrasing ceases to be meaningless and 
arbitrary only when these relations have validity for 
the individual not on their own account, not as 
self-activity, but rather as disguises, though by no 
means disguises of the category of utilization, but of 
an actual third aim and relation which is called the 
relation of utility. In this case the utility 
relation has a quite different meaning, namely that I 
derive benefit for myself by doing harm to someone 
else; further in this case, the use that I derive from 
some relation is in general alien to this relation • . 
All this actually is the case with the bourgeois. 
For him only one relation is valid on its own account 
- the relation of exploitation; all other relations 
have validity for him only insofar as he can include 
them under this one relation, and even where he 
encounters relations which cannot be directly 
subordinated to the relation of exploitation, he does 
at least subordinate them to it in his imagination. 
The material expression of this use is money, the 
representation of the value of all things, people and 
social relations.54 
This general conception includes two elements: first, to 
exploit someone is to utilize him in a way harmful to him 
and second, the end of such utilization is one's own 
benefit. There is also a suggestion of a third element here 
in the notion of alienation. The Marxian notion of 
alienation suggests that an alienated being is one who is 
used contrary to his nature. And Buchanan likewise proposes 
that "[Marx's concept] of alienation supplies content for 
the concept of exploitation by providing a systematic 
classification of the ways in which human beings are 
utilized and the forms of harm that this utilization 
inflicts on them. 11 55 The point in this general 
characterization of exploitation is that exploitation is not 
confined to the labor process alone. 
that exploitation encompasses the 
relationships in bourgeois society, 
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Marx suggests here 
totality of human 
because, for the 
bourgeois, human relations in general are exploitative. 
This includes both his relations with the worker and his 
fellow bourgoisie as well. 
Central to the various general conceptions of 
exploitation we have surveyed is the idea that an 
individual, a group or a class benefits unfairly at the 
expense of another who is made worse off. 
understanding of exploitation, we 
characteristics: First, exploitation is 
In this simple 
discover two 
a relationship 
between individuals, groups or classes. This means that the 
existence of an exploited agent always implies the existence 
of an exploiter. Second, exploitation is an unfair 
distribution of effort and rewards. This latter 
characteristic is often especially highlighted. For 
example, Jon Elster's definition of exploitation in a 
general sense states that "a person is exploited if (i) he 
does not enjoy the fruits of his own labor and (ii) the 
difference between what he makes and what he gets cannot be 
justified by redistribution according to need. 11 56 Sensat in 
his Framework I definition also gives a definition of 
exploitation which incorporates the second characteristic: 
"Exploitation is maldistribution of the benefits of social 
cooperation. An exploitative state is one in which some 
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individuals benefit at the expense of others. 11 57 
Generally speaking, the individuals, groups or classes 
who are exploited are politically powerless, materially 
impoverished or in the lowest human segment in a highly 
stratified society. The situation of powerlessness, 
impoverishment and demeaning status which allows the 
exploiter to exploit the exploited is common to many 
societies. In tribal, capitalist and socialist58 societies, 
there are individuals, groups or classes who are politically 
powerless, materially impoverished and of a demeaning 
status: For example, the low-ranking, materially poor 
lineages in Malinowski's socially stratified Trobriands59; 
the African Hutu in the former Ruanda60; the urban poor in 
mid-nineteenth century London61; the blacks in South Africa 
today; urban and rural blacks in the United States since the 
demise of slavery; Soviet farmers under Stalin; Catholics in 
Northern Ireland, etc. 
Certain conceptions of exploitation emphasize the 
unequal states of the exploiter and the exploited. Frank 
Parkin maintains that "exploitation here defines the nexus 
between classes or other collectivities that stand in a 
relationship of dominance and subordination, on whatever 
social basis. 11 62 He believes that the collective efforts to 
restrict access to rewards and opportunities on the part of 
one social group or class against another can be regarded as 
exploitative. On this ground, he concludes: 
33 
Relations of dominance and subordination between 
bourgeoisie and proletariat, Protestants and 
catholics, whites and blacks, men and women, etc., can 
all be considered as exploitative relationships in the 
neo-Weberian sense.63 
When we put together the bi ts and pieces of our 
exposition of the general conception of exploitation, we 
find that the central issues in this conception are the 
ideas that in exploitation, 
i. the exploiter and the exploited stand 
respectively in a relation of dominance and 
subordination to each other; 
ii. the exploiter benefits at the expense of the 
exploited who is thereby made worse off; 
iii. the exploiter utilizes the exploited merely as a 
means for his (exploiter's) own benefit and in a 
manner contrary to the exploited's nature. 
Most people would agree intuitively that some or all 
of these issues are central to a general characterization of 
exploitation. Despite this apparent general agreement, a 
basic controversy locks in here. Should we or should we 
not, include in the notion of exploitation the notion that 
it is contrary to one's nature? Kant does. Sensat argues 
-i~ ~ · o·~vo; ;;" · ~ 
.......; L , '" -· .. \.J > \ 
i • y,: ,. •. "''' ·1·.l"Y J 
,,} ':'· . :;· t" t \ :.1 
/ 
34 
that we should. Marx's notion of alienation suggests that 
we should. On the other hand, Elster, Roemer and Parkin 
make no reference to such a notion. 
It is not necessary for us to settle this controversy 
by taking a stand on the "true nature" of exploitation. 
What we really want to do is to find the definition that is 
most appropriate for our project at hand. For this purpose, 
such a theory of exploitation does not necessarily have to 
incorporate all the three issues. The candidates for this 
theory seem to be the first two conditions. The third 
condition is problematic. For example, the "unequal 
exchange" definition would be hard pressed to satisfy it. 
Are we going to claim that free trade between the First and 
Third World countries is contrary to the nature of the 
latter, or contrary to the nature of the human community? 
If the First World country is exploiting the Third World 
country strictly through trade, in what sense is it contrary 
to the nature of the latter country? So, to stress on the 
"violation of nature" requirement might be interesting, but 
it would require some philosophical ingenuity to make the 
case. 
For our purpose, however, there has to be some kind of 
domination-subordination relationship between the exploiter 
and the exploited, and there has to be some sense in which 
one of them is benefitting. I have included the "violation 
of nature" requirement as part of a general characterization 
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of exploitation because there are a lot of notions of 
exploitation that do want to appeal to this requirement. 
since this is a preliminary survey Chapter, it is useful to 
have it there in order to call attention to the fact that it 
is often part of the notion of exploitation. But we are not 
going to rely on this notion since it is not the central 
focus of this dissertation, the alleged exploitation of the 
Third World by the First.64 
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c. WHY DO WE NEED A THEORY OF EXPLOITATION? 
1. Comparison with Rawls's Theory of Justice 
A basic question confronting any theory of 
exploitation is, why do we need such a theory? And a proper 
starting point is to make a comparison with Rawls's project, 
why do we need a theory of justice?65 In general, the point 
of A Theory of Justice seems to be to systematize our 
"considered moral judgments, n66 to see what kind of 
fundamental principles they are derived from, one 
consequence of which is that a few of these judgments might 
be corrected or revised. 67 A Rawlsian theory of justice 
assumes that we share a wide range of such judgments, and 
sees the main problem as discovering the basic principles 
from which this wide variety derives. So, the Rawlsian 
theory is trying to bring together a wide variety of 
judgments in things we have in common into a systematic 
order, and as a result of that, possibly to adjust some of 
these judgments. 
A Marxian theory of exploitation also begins with 
something like "considered moral judgments." These are 
judgments or intuitions about the exploitative nature of the 
wage relation (at least, 19th century capitalist Europe) and 
the exploitative nature of free trade between the First and 
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Third World. Concerning the wage relation in 19th century 
Europe, when we reflect on the horrific conditions that Marx 
documents in the historical sections of Capital and also, 
about rich capitalists counterposed with workers who had to 
work for 18 hours a day for subsistence wages, intuitively, 
we want to say there was something exploitative going on 
there. Yet, how was that possible when everyone was free? 
The issue of the First and Third World relations presents 
the same dilemma. When we look at the structure of the 
global economy, we see that the First World is so rich and 
the Third World is so poor, and yet, they have long been 
historically connected. Intuitively, we want to say there 
is something going on here that is not right. Yet, how is 
that possible when there is free trade? How can there be 
exploitation when parties are free to either trade or not 
trade? 
The main task of the theory of exploitation is to 
resolve this paradox and to explain how there can be 
exploitation when the parties are in a significant sense 
"free" or, alternatively, to show that what appears to be 
"exploitation" is not really that. Such a theory will have 
to tell us the nature of the exploitation and the mechanism 
by which this exploitation takes place. And hopefully, the 
theory will also provide an insight into how this problem 
can be overcome. 
However, what we notice when we examine the literature 
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is that there are multiple theories of exploitation. For 
Rawls too, there are other theories of justice. In 
constructing his theory of justice, he contrasts his with 
competing theories of justice: utilitarianism, intuitionism 
and perfectionism. 68 He argues for the correctness and 
superiority of his theory to these other theories by 
revealing some internal problems inherent in the rival 
theories and by showing that his theory synthesizes and 
provides a better account of our "considered moral 
judgments." 
With regards to the theory of exploitation, I will 
consider two competing theories, one associated with 
liberalism and one deriving from the Marxian tradition. In 
a sense, I will be considering more than two, since I will 
be looking at Steiner, Marx, Emmanuel, etc., but as I will 
show, these various theories constitute different moments of 
the two basic theories. I will evaluate them, as does 
Rawls, by considering internal problems and by asking which 
provides a better account of our "considered moral 
judgments." Rawls, recall, looks for the fundamental 
underlying principles of our "considered moral judgments" in 
order to construct a theory of justice. Unlike Rawls, we 
are not constructing an original theory of exploitation. 
But we will examine theories of exploitation in order to 
find out their underlying moral presuppositions. We are 
interested in knowing what moral intuitions are being 
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appealed to by the different theories. We need to do this 
in order to know whether the moral presuppositions behind 
them, when revealed, would be widely shared or not. 
Rawls compares his theory with a "theory of grammar," 
which accounts for the way we speak. 69 The "theory of 
grammar" gives the rules that people observe in speaking and 
it systematically explains what they are doing. 
comparatively, the theory of justice does something like 
that. It is meant to account for our "considered moral 
judgments." 
it may very 
But it differs from a theory of grammar in that 
well be that when we see what the basic 
principles are that explain most of our sense of justice, we 
will in fact decide to change some of our moral judgments in 
order to make them more consistent with these principles. 
So a theory of justice can itself change our judgments, 
while a theory of grammar does not change the way we speak. 
Similarly, a theory of exploitation may cause us to revise 
certain judgments. For example, the Marxian theory that 
explains the obvious exploitation of 19th century capitalism 
leads to the non-obvious conclusion that even the affluent 
workers of the 20th century are "exploited." As with a 
theory of justice, such a counterintuitive claim might cause 
us to revise either our theory or our "considered 
judgment." As with a theory of justice, we would have to 
evaluate the theory in terms of its broad explanatory powers 
in comparison with the major alternatives. 
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2. Competing Theories of Exploitation 
There are, as noted above, competing theories of 
exploitation to be considered, one from the liberal 
tradition and the other from the Marxian tradition. Hillel 
Steiner's theory is paradigmatic of the liberal tradition, 
as is a more concrete expression of this tradition, 
"developmentalism." Within the Marxian tradition, Marx, 
Emmanuel, Roemer and dependency theory are not alternative 
theories but different moments of the same general theory. 
These models are linked together, because one is a 
development out of the other. The classical Marxian model 
is the basis for all the other models, but the defect it has 
is that it does not treat First and Third World relations. 
The classical theory is set strictly in the context of 
capital-labor relation. This model, however, gets developed 
in a creative direction by Emmanuel, who uses the same 
Marxian categories but now applies them to First and Third 
World relations. But with Emmanuel, one runs into the 
problem of the framework's reliance on the labor theory of 
value, and on certain kinds of mathematical anomalies. 
John Roemer claims that one can get basically the same 
result without relying on the labor theory of value. He 
does this by means of a game theoretic approach. This 
approach introduces the notion of "domination" as one of the 
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principles of exploitation, but this notion is left 
undeveloped. And it is the developing of the notion of 
"domination" more concretely that leads to dependency 
theory. 
The logic of the Marxian argument as it unfolds is a 
kind of Hegelian model in which a theory develops, reaches a 
certain limit, then has to be transformed or revised in a 
certain way to deal with the deficiencies that have been 
revealed. But then certain deficiencies appear at the next 
stage, and it has to be transformed again. So that each 
time, one is picking up what was still there in the earlier 
version rather than being an alternative approach. This is 
the pattern of development from classical Marx to Emmanuel, 
to Roemer, to dependency theory. 
Our concluding Chapter will evaluate the two competing 
theories in their most concrete forms: developmentalism and 
dependency theory. We will apply both theories to the 
African context - taking Ghana as a test case - in order to 
decide which of them makes more sense and is more fruitful 
in understanding the concrete situation of the Third World 
countries. We must note, however, that such a decision will 
be inconclusive because we are not going to expect an 
irrefutable solution here. At best, this test case will 
help us determine which of the competing theories is more 
fruitful in terms of its moral plausibility and greater 
explanatory power. 
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Notes 
lit is in Marx's thought that we find a link between 
the idea of exploitation and the idea of surplus value. The 
whole philosophic-economic thought of Marx can be said to be 
a theory of the exploitative process within the capitalist 
system. For example, the first volume of the Capital 
analyzes the origin of surplus value, the raison d'etre of 
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CHAPTER II 
A LIBERAL THEORY OF EXPLOITATION 
A. Brief Historical Survey 
Ever since the publication early in this century of 
Leonard Hobhouse's classic, Liberalism1l the importance of 
liberalism as the dominant ideology of most Western 
societies has been widely recognized. The last several 
decades of academic work in political theory, especially in 
England and America, show no decline in the attention given 
to liberalism. 
The classical liberal tradition has been characterized 
by a stress on freedom, equality and protection of rights. 
With regards to freedom, a deep concern of liberalism for 
the freedom of the individual inspired its opposition to 
absolute authority - whether State, Church or political 
party. David Schweickart confirms this: 
Classical liberalism and laissez faire have long been 
associated with liberty. Classical liberalism rose to 
prominence in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries 
as a philosophy opposed to aristocratic privilege, to 
the unlimited authority of monarchs, to all forms of 
governmental tyranny, including tyranny of the 
majority. Government, to the classical liberals, is 
by its very nature coercive, and coercion is opposed 
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to liberty. 2 
According to Overton H. Taylor, 
The central ideal of the liberal philosophy is 
adequate and equal liberty or freedom for all persons 
severally; freedom for everyone to pursue in his own 
ways his own freely chosen ends, and freedom from 
coercion or control by others; for each and every 
person the greatest amount of such freedom which can 
be made consistent or compatible with the same amount 
of it for everyone else ... 3 
Concerning equality, liberalism proclaims the equality 
of all men. This is not material equality but equality 
before the law. On the protection of rights, liberalism 
sees the ultimate purpose of government as that of upholding 
and protecting the rights of all its citizens, which include 
property rights, rights to liberty and rights of equal 
treatment under the law. 
With Thomas Hobbes, we get a justification for the 
State derived from the concept of natural rights. Hobbes, 
who can be credited as the founding father of liberalism, 
introduced natural rights and deduced them from the laws of 
nature. He argued that the rights men possess cannot be 
secured in the state of nature. The state of nature is a 
state of the war of the all against the all, every man at 
war with every other man simultaneously.4 In the state of 
nature, the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short. 11 5 In order to secure their rights, men must give 
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up their natural rights to a sovereign; security for rights 
required above all a government with powers.6 Given Hobbes' 
conception of the state of nature, the sovereign is endowed 
with almost limitless powers. 
John Locke remedies this with a more benign concept of 
the state of nature. In particular, he retains in civil 
society, the natural right to property. With Locke, this 
crucially important category is introduced and theorized. 
Hence, Locke claims, "the great and chief end ... of men's 
uniting themselves under government is the preservation of 
their 'property• ..• to which [end] in the state of nature 
there are many things wanting 117 What was wanting in 
the state of nature were legislative, judicial, and 
executive powers.a To supply these defects and thereby 
secure their rights, men agree to be governed by a sovereign 
to whom they yield the natural rights by which they exercise 
these powers themselves.9 
Prominent among these rights is the right to acquire 
and accumulate private property. For Locke, every 
individual has a property in his own person and his own 
labor, and so can rightfully appropriate to himself from the 
common stock whatever he has mixed his labor with. 
"Whatsover then he removes from out of the state that nature 
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with, 
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his property. 11 10 But he outlines certain limits to 
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the amount of property one may appropriate. First, anyone 
may appropriate only as much as leaves enough and as good 
for others. Second, one may appropriate only as much as he 
can use before it spoils. Third, one may appropriate only 
what he has mixed his labor with. 
In the premonetary society, there were moral limits to 
accumulation based on spoilage. With the introduction of 
money, the spoilage limit was transcended. All limitations 
to accumulation were removed because gold, silver, etc. are 
not subject to spoilage. Individuals are free in such an 
economy to appropriate and keep whatever they can. In 
effect, Locke was able to remove all legal, ethical and 
moral limits to individual appropriation and consequently, 
to establish the natural right to accumulate an unlimited 
amount of private property. Locke's theory of property 
rights is thus alleged to represent a moral justification 
for unlimited concentration of wealth and class inequality, 
which is the basis for capitalist society .11 Macpherson 
argues that this is Locke's important contribution to the 
seventeenth century debate about "the true original, extent 
and end of civil government," since it fixed property rights 
in the center of liberal theory. 
For Locke, property rights are inviolate and prior to 
societal or governmental claims. They are sacred and 
fundamental because such rights are inseparable from what it 
means to be a human being. Eric Mack emphasizes of Lockean 
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rights that "each person possesses these rights against all 
other men and correlatively each person is under a natural 
moral obligation not to coerce any other person. 11 12 As a 
consequence, if property rights are prior to every other 
claim, then no person, government or society can be 
justified in taking away any property which has been justly 
acquired through one's labor. To do so is to "exploit" the 
individual, and this is unjust. It is to prevent such 
abuses, Locke argues, that men have voluntarily come 
together to form government. Consequently, the purpose of 
government is delimited to the protection of natural rights, 
namely the set of rights connected to property. 
But how is a society of free property holders to avoid 
economic anarchy with such a limited state? Adam Smith 
provides the answer, introducing the notions of the market 
and of the "invisible hand." The set of rights connected to 
property favors a market economy as both protecting property 
rights and allowing individual the liberty to define and 
pursue his 
values. 13 
marketplace 
own ends, which are his happiness and set of 
It is generally believed by liberals that the 
is the key coordinating mechanism of the 
socio-economic life of the people. The classical liberal 
tradition claims that under the free competitive market 
conditions, capitalism is non-exploitative. In other words, 
liberalism " . regards competitive market equilibrium as 
the best of all possible worlds; thus a world where 
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exploitation does not exist."14 The pedigree of this 
proposition, which has dominated the intellectual thought of 
all liberal thinkers since the seventeenth century, is 
traced back to Adam Smith. 
Smith proposed the existence of a natural law of 
economic life in which social good is served only when each 
individual is free to pursue his own self interest in the 
marketplace. He argued that the weal th of a nation is 
increased not by the accumulation of gold and silver by a 
sovereign but by the "invisible hand," whereby each person 
is free to pursue his own economic interest and, in the 
process, promotes the common good. In Smith, we see the 
linkage of individual selfishness with the general progress 
of the society: 
As every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as 
he can both to employ his capital in the support of 
domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that 
its produce may be of the greatest value; every 
individual necessarily labors to render the annual 
revenue of the society as great as he can. He 
generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the 
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting 
it. [B]y directing that industry in such a manner as 
its producemay be of the greatest value, he intends 
only his own gain, and, he is in this, as in many 
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an nd 
which was no part of his intention.15 
Smith claims that there is a natural law of economic life 
that wealth is best increased through the competitive 
mechanism, free from State interference and control. 
Government best serves by not interfering. 
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The essential 
task for government is to dissociate itself from economic 
life, end all restrictions on individual economic activity 
and pursue a pol icy of free trade. Smith's theoretical 
innovations - government intervention as an interference 
with individual's economic interest, and the fusion 
of individual selfishness with societal economic achievement 
- form the ground for the structure of the liberal culture 
out of which grew the modern capitalist system.16 For 
smith, therefore, liberty can be maintained as well as 
economic prosperity. 
After Smith came the classical economists, David 
Ricardo and Thomas Robert Mal thus, who developed Smith's 
ideas into an integrated system that had a profound effect 
on economic thought during the nineteenth century. Even 
though they aimed at establishing an economy characterized 
by freedom of enterprise and freedom of contract, they were 
less sure of prosperity. Though they fully supported the 
free market, they looked more closely at the laborers, and 
saw that they will have to remain at subsistence leve1.17 
According to Ricardo, labor was a commodity that was 
sold and bought like any other commodity in the free market. 
What the laborer received in wages, the "natural price," was 
a "subsistence wage," just enough to maintain him and his 
family. He says: 
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Labour, like all other things, which are purchased and 
sold, and which may be increased or diminished in 
quantity, has its natural and market price. The 
natural price of labour is that price which is ·neces 
sary to enable the labourers, one with another, to 
subsist and to perpetuate their race, without either 
increase or diminution.18 
Ricardo argues that if the laborer got more in wages, it 
would be at the expense of profits because 
the necessity which the labourer would be under of 
paying an increased price for such necessaries would 
oblige him to demand more wages; and whatever 
increases wages reduces profits. But suppose the 
price of silks, velvets, furniture, and any other 
commodities, notrequired by the labourer, to rise in 
consequence of more labor being expended on them, 
would not that affect profits? Certainly not: for 
nothing affects profits but a rise in wages ... 19 
This means that an increase in wages at the expense of 
profits would be dangerous for business, as from profits 
came the capital needed for increasing investments. Or it 
would be at expense of another worker, as total wages could 
not exceed the collective "wages fund." As wages were 
determined chiefly by the cost of food, the classical 
economists favored the repeal of the Corn Laws, the tariff 
on food imports that kept the cost of food high in Britain. 
As a consequence, cheap food from abroad would lower the 
cost of living, which would give rise to lower wages being 
paid to the workers. The cost of production being lower, 
profits would be higher; hence, the amount left for 
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investment would be greater. Cheap food, according to the 
classical economists, would lead to national prosperity. 
But under this scheme, the worker was doomed to exist on a 
mere subsistence level. 
Freedom of contract between individuals was considered 
essential to the functioning of the free economy. Buyer and 
seller, employer and employed, landlord and tenant were to 
be left free to negotiate the terms of their contracts, and 
contracts thus negotiated would generally prove beneficial 
to both parties. Combinations, whether of labor or capital, 
were considered to be conspiracies, and, as such, violations 
of the freedom of contract. As a result, liberalism opposed 
trade unions and industrial monopolies. 
Malthus goes beyond Ricardo in arguing via his 
population theory (otherwise known as 'Malthusianism') that 
subsistence cannot be improved. Malthusianism further 
doomed the worker to his fate. This principle proclaims 
that there is a natural universal tendency for the increase 
of population to outrun the increase of the food supply: 
"that population has this constant tendency to increase 
beyond the means of subsistence, and that it is kept to its 
necessary level . . • will sufficiently appear from a review 
of the different states of society in which man has 
existed. 11 20 The balance between population and food supply 
had to be maintained by famines, wars, pestilences, etc. 
"The immediate check may be stated to consist in all those 
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customs, and all those diseases, which seem to be generated 
by a scarcity of the means of subsistence; and all those 
causes, independent of this scarcity, whether of a moral or 
physical nature, which tend prematurely to weaken and 
destroy the human frame. 11 21 Though these evils have 
lessened, argued Malthus, the "principle of population" 
continues to operate. Should the ignorant worker 
receive an increase in wages, he would raise a larger 
family. Then there would be more workers competing for 
jobs. As a consequence, wages would fall, and the worker 
would be back again to a mere subsistence level. All 
efforts on the part of the government or trade unions to 
ameliorate the lot of the poor, according to Malthus, would 
be nullified by the "principle of population." 
To justify the economic as well as the political 
subordination of the workers in a free society, gradations 
in status and in well being were ascribed by the liberals to 
natural inequality among men. Riches were the reward for 
capacity, foresight, hard work and enterprise; and poverty, 
the consequence for those who lacked these qualities. 
Herbert Spencer, taking classical liberalism in the 
direction of social darwinism, provides a slightly different 
argument for the "necessity" of subsistence wages and 
against any state interference in the name of social 
welfare. He claims: "In common with its other assumptions 
of secondary offices, the assumption by a government of the 
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off ice of Reliever-general to the poor is necessarily 
forbidden by the principle that a government cannot rightly 
do anything more than protect. n22 The functions of the 
government, therefore, were to enforce contracts and punish 
frauds in order to maintain a free and stable economy. This 
laissez faire doctrine forbade intervention by the 
government on behalf of the capitalists as mischievous 
meddling; and on behalf of the workers as a futile effort to 
negate the consequences of the working of natural laws. 
These are natural laws of the species concerning the 
survival of the fittest. Spencer stated the government's 
duty quite succinctly: "It was the essential function of the 
state to protect - to administer the law of equal freedom-
to maintain men's rights . 1123 . . 
In a certain sense, Ricardo, Malthus and Spencer are 
gloomy. The workers have to stay on a subsistence level. 
But with Friedman and Nozick, there is a return to the 
optimism of Smith. 
prosper. Classical 
The free market can allow the workers to 
liberals24 from Adam Smith through 
Herbert Spencer have defended the pure capitalism of the 
competitive market economy as a non-exploitative arrangement 
and as the best solution to the problem of distributive 
justice. They argue that if the market is undisturbed by 
governmental interventions, its system will result in 
abundant wealth for everyone. The automatic working of the 
marketplace will ensure that wealth is spread to all people. 
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profits will be available to the wealthy to invest in 
enterprises that are efficient and productive, thus 
benefitting the less well off. To leave the economic sphere 
to the free choices of individuals helps to provide 
incentive to innovation, development and progress while 
individual liberty is protected. 
The liberals believe that any interference with the 
market mechanism, no matter how well intentioned it may be, 
creates inefficiency and distorts progress. In other words, 
under a market system, individuals' rights to well being and 
to liberty are not in conflict.25 The market system 
satisfies both of them. The modern adherents to classical 
liberalism, Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick, return to the 
optimism of Smith. For them, the free market can guarantee 
liberty and prosperity. 
Friedman maintains that the market mechanism enables 
us to exercise our natural right to liberty by guaranteeing 
freedom of property, freedom of occupation and freedom of 
development and is an important condition for freedom of 
expression. Describing liberalism, he maintains that it 
"· .• is a belief in the dignity of the individual, in his 
freedom to make the most of his capacities and opportunities 
according to his own rights, subject to the proviso that he 
not interfere with the freedom of other individuals to do 
the same. 11 26 While protecting the natural right to liberty, 
the free market also enhances our natural right to 
well-being. 
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Because the mechanism of the market provides 
for maximum productivity and efficiency, the greatest amount 
of economic good is produced for the majority of the people, 
which consequently improves their welfare. 
Nozick' s theory of distributive justice falls within 
the classical liberal tradition. He also provides a defense 
for the operation of the free market economy. 27 Nozick 
maintains that individuals are to be left alone to pursue 
their own interests. Included in this position is the 
caveat that we may not use persons as means to ends they 
have not chosen. 2 8 Nozick, as a liberal, is concerned to 
prevent use of persons solely as means. For example, we may 
not tax earnings from labor without consent, for to do so is 
to channel the person' s labor to purposes not his own. 
There is behind this position a strong sense of the dignity 
of the person, in the Kantian sense, as well as a strong 
affirmation of property-rights in the products of one's 
labor. Therefore individuals should be free to accumulate 
and transfer property without interference by any person or 
institution. On the question of how goods should be 
distributed, the theory does not subscribe to any pattern of 
justice, since any such pattern will limit the individual's 
liberty of accumulating and transferring his property as he 
wishes. Nozick argues that individuals are entitled to 
their holdings which have been gained lawfully and honestly. 
Individuals may accumulate and transfer their property in 
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any manner they desire so long as the rights of others are 
respected. Nozick includes the Lockean proviso. The 
accumulation and transfer of property are permissible in so 
far as "the position of others no longer at liberty to use 
the thing is not thereby worsened. " But he does not think 
that a market economy will get into trouble with this 
principle, because of the alleged superior efficiency of 
such an economy. In other words, increased productivity 
does not interfere with his theory because people are made 
better off in the process. 
Besides Friedman and Nozick, other "libertarians" (as 
modern classical liberals sometimes designate themselves) 
defend the free market as a matter of principle. They claim 
that the market economy is more conducive to liberty. For 
example, Eric Mack argues that the free market plays an 
important function in any society in which the Lockean 
rights of individuals are to be respected and protected. 
These rights refer to one's ". . natural moral right to 
life and liberty - i.e. , a moral right to freedom from 
coercion of his person or of his activity. n29 It is also 
argued that the market institutions preserve liberty and 
solve the problem of distributive justice, since goods are 
distributed according to the free choices of individuals. 
The classical laissez-faire theory of distributive justice 
is one that is concerned with a just procedure such that 
whatever the actual distribution, so long as the procedure 
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is uncoerced, the distribution is fair. The driving force 
of this distributive procedure is self-interest. As 
individuals try to maximize their own self-perceived good, 
the greatest good for all is achieved. In a strange 
paradox, selfishness produces beneficence: private vice 
results in public virtue. 
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B. Hillel Steiner 
1. The Theory Explained 
our review of the existing literature in the liberal 
tradition results in a striking revelation: very little has 
been written on the subject of exploitation. Most of the 
writings, particularly the more recent ones, have been 
concerned with issues of distributive justice. It is only 
in Hillel Steiner's work that we see a major attempt by a 
liberal to discuss and construct a liberal theory of 
exploitation. 
In his article, "A Liberal Theory of Exploitation," 
steiner attempts the task of arguing for a theory of 
exploitation from a liberal perspective.JO Essentially, 
this theory derives from the classical liberal tradition. 
It relies on the primacy of liberal values of individual 
rights, liberties and choices. It sees exploitation as a 
trilateral relationship involving the violation of rights. 
Steiner's theory is a prototype in the lineage of the 
liberal tradition. It is the first systematic attempt by a 
liberal to formulate a theory of exploitation within the 
liberal rights tradition. In my telephone conversation with 
Steiner on January 17, 1986, he told me that "it was the 
absence of a theory of exploitation within the classical 
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liberal tradition which prompted me to formulate this 
theory. " Continuing, he said, "this theory is properly 
situated within the liberal tradition because its framework 
of analysis is one that is grounded on liberal values of 
personal rights and liberties and choices. 11 31 As the first, 
and presently the only, theory of exploitation in the 
liberal tradition, Steiner's theory serves as representative 
of the liberal conception. 
Steiner has three objectives in formulating this 
theory: First, he wants to show that classical liberalism, 
which is rights-based, can have a theory of exploitation; 
second, he wants to argue against the traditional classical 
liberals that exploitation in the capitalist world may be 
far more extensive than they would normally allow. 
According to the classical liberal position, all that one 
needs to ensure the absence of exploitation is to maintain a 
free market economy in which there is perfect competition, 
in which rights are respected and in which the government 
remains neutral in the economic activities of individuals. 
Steiner wants to prove that even within such a free market 
system, exploitation can still exist through a rights 
violation. He describes himself as "a left-wing classical 
liberal who is more egalitarian than the right-wing 
classical liberals. 11 32 He claims that "a properly 
constructed theory of rights would be clearly less 
inegalitarian or more egalitarian than the traditional 
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classical view. 1133 Third, he wants to circumvent the idea 
that the only way to think of exploitation is bilaterally. 
In particular, he wants to challenge the Marxian bilateral 
view of exploitation by arguing for a trilateral conception 
of exploitation. The claim he wishes to defend is that in 
exploitation, three different actors are involved in 
producing rights violation: the exploiter, the exploited and 
the agent whose rights have been violated. 
Central to this claim is the following: exploitation 
is a trilateral relationship which involves the voluntary 
transfer of unequally valued items between two parties, this 
exchange made possible by the violations of the rights of a 
third party. For Steiner, rights are title-based because 
they are property-rights.34 A rightholder can exercise his 
rights either by modifying the object of his title or by 
transferring this title to another. Any interference with 
the exercise of one's rights constitutes a violation of 
rights. For rights to be valid, they must derive from the 
exercise of past valid rights. Therefore, rights will be 
invalid if they derive from an action which interferes with 
the free exercise of another's valid rights. steiner claims 
that this inviolability condition of valid rights justifies 
Nozick's historical entitlement theory of just rights to the 
extent that any set of titles has to be validated by a 
historical link to the exercise of the set of valid rights 
that created them. 35 In other words, a title is valid if 
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and only if it has arisen from the exercise of a valid 
right. 
Steiner sees the institutional circumstance of 
exploitation as arising as a consequence of 
rights-violation. His model starts with a society with a 
system of justly acquired titles. Within such an 
institution of valid rights, any title will be invalid if it 
arises from an action interfering with the exercise of valid 
rights, no matter what legal justification such a title may 
have in the system. Steiner gives the following example: 
Blue interferes with White's opportunity to bid with Red in 
order that he (Blue) may exchange his 3x-valued item for 
Red's 5x-valued item. Blue's title to the 5x-valued item is 
invalid because it has arisen from a violation of White's 
rights. This is White's right to negotiate with Red. More 
than just an invalid title resulting from Blue's action, 
Steiner believes that "an injustice - an exploitation - has 
occured" because Blue has received a surplus of 2x-valued 
item from Red.36 In this exchange, Red is the one 
exploited, and White is the one whose rights have been 
violated. The exploitation of Red is a consequence of the 
violation of White's rights while Blue's title arises from 
an action interferring with the exercise of White's valid 
rights. Steiner uses other similar models of exploitation 
to buttress his point and then, he concludes with these 
three propositions: 
(i) exploitation involves a voluntary exchange of 
unequally valued items; 
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(ii) exploitation always results from a violation of 
rights, and 
(iii) exploitation is essentially a trilateral 
relation. 
He says "at least three persons or sets of persons are 
needed for an exploitation. 1137 Even slavery as a form of 
exploitation is considered by him to be a trilateral 
relation: "it is the master's forcible exclusion of all 
other persons from engaging in commerce with the slave that 
creates the circumstance of the slave's exploitation by the 
master. n38 Steiner's notion of exploitation embodies the 
characteristics of exploitation we espoused in Chapter 
One: that the exploiter is in a relation of dominance to the 
exploited and that the exploiter benefits at the expense of 
the exploited. But there is a slight anomaly in Steiner's 
definition. While the notion of exploitation developed in 
Chapter One is of a bilateral relation, Steiner's notion is 
trilateral. The party whose rights are violated is not the 
party exploited. The exploiter is the party that benefits 
but the one who dominates only creates the circumstance of 
exploitation. 
The state is also implicated as a violator of rights 
because it is said to create the circumstance of 
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exploitation. Such a circumstance of exploitation involving 
the state appears to be a quadrilateral relation because 
four distinct parties are involved: the State (as the 
violator of rights), the exploiter, the exploited and those 
whose rights are violated. But Steiner maintains that a 
more perspicuous analysis reveals that the State's 
intervention favors the exploiter, and therefore, the 
exploiter's interest is to be identified with the State. 
This identification, he says, "supports the trilateral 
characterization of exploitation.n39 
In the final section of the article, Steiner claims 
that "laissez-faire conjoined with the universal right to 
natural resources is both necessary and sufficient to ensure 
the absence of exploitation. n40 But he also believes that 
monopoly ownership of natural resources resulting from a 
violation of others' rights to the resources ". can 
constitute the circumstance of exploitation. n41 The 
"circumstance of exploitation" is one that puts an agent in 
a situation to exploit. This circumstance, if acted upon, 
can violate the universal right to natural resources. Hence 
it would be legitimate to intervene in the laissez-faire 
economy to break the circle of monopoly in order to prevent 
exploitation. 
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2. Moral Assumptions 
Steiner claims John Locke and Robert Nozick have had a 
strong influence in his thought process and consequently, 
that the ethical presuppositions of his theory are derived 
from, and rely heavily on Nozick's "entitlement theory." 
Nozick's theory essentially has two components: a principle 
of just transfer and a principle of just acquisition. 
steiner would seem to agree with Nozick's principle of just 
transfer: 
A person who justly acquired a holding is free to 
transfer this holding to another in so far as this 
transfer does not interfere with the rights of 
others.42 
The principle of just acquisition is not quite the same for 
Nozick and Steiner. For Nozick, it means: 
A person is entitled to appropriate unheld things in 
so far as there is enough and as good left in 
common for others.43 
With Steiner, there is a variation in Nozick' s principle. 
His version, which is more egalitarian, introduces the 
notion of the universal right to natural resources. One 
acquires something justly as the first appropriator if such 
acquisition does not violate others' rights and if it 
fulfils the universal right to natural resources. 
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What 
exactly is the universal right to natural resources? It is 
the right of everyone to "an equal share of the basic 
non-human means of production. 1144 Steiner deviates from 
Nozick' s principles in two ways. One is that voluntary 
transfers are not always just. Unlike Nozick who claims 
that a voluntary exchange between consenting adults is 
always just, Steiner maintains that an exchange can be 
voluntary and yet still involve the violation of a third 
party's rights. This is where exploitation occurs. What 
steiner is saying is that an exchange is just so long as it 
is voluntary and so long as neither of the parties to the 
voluntary exchange violates a third party's right to 
exchange. This is a basic ethical presupposition in 
Steiner's theory. Secondly, Steiner challenges Nozick's 
principle of just acquisition and replaced it by an 
alternative principle - the equal right of all to the basic 
non-human means of production. This principle is not very 
clear, and Steiner admits not having developed it fully. 
These moral assumptions run through Steiner' s entire 
theory, especially the first one. Their underlying -
significance will become clear shortly. Even though the 
classical liberals believe that the ordinary market system 
is non-exploitative, Steiner is worried that even within the 
free market economy, exploitation can still occur as a 
result of a rights-violation. The free market could involve 
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rights-violation through the violation of one's rights to 
natural resources or throu9h government trade restrictions. 
Therefore, he wants to ensure that individuals' rights 
remain inviolate and that they are not infringed upon. The 
absence of 
exploitation. 
rights-violation means the absence of 
He is particularly concerned about government 
intervention in the working of the free market system which 
can violate people's rights. Monopolies arise, he claims, 
because of State restrictions between people. Licensing 
restriction is a case in point. Also, the State may create 
laws that favor some people and disfavor others. All 
monopolies, in Steiner's view, are State-based and 
state-caused. They are manifest sources of exploitation 
because they constantly violate people's rights. 
Steiner is worried about labor unions because their 
attempts to struggle to effect a minimum or higher wage 
level undermine and interfere with the working of the free 
market economy. Such interference creates inefficiency and 
thwarts development and achievement. It is also an 
infringement on the people's natural right to liberty in 
determining their choice of occupations and what wages are 
best for them within the competitive market. On the whole, 
Steiner's interest is to devise a theory that will protect 
property-rights, promote liberty, while ensuring the 
elimination of monopoly power. 
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3. Critical Cases Considered 
Let us examine how Steiner's theory relates to the two 
forms of alleged exploitation most discussed in the 
literature surveyed in Chapter One, the case I have called 
the "critical cases of exploitation." Steiner does not 
subscribe to a labor theory of value nor to its version of 
exploitation theory. For him, there can be no exploitation 
without a rights-violation. In a situation where the 
worker's rights have not been violated, steiner says his 
bargaining power will give him the wage equivalent to the 
value of his product. In other words, under a condition 
where rights are intact, the worker's wage will be equal to 
the social value of his product.45 
In the free trade between capital and labor, devoid of 
any restriction or violation of the worker's rights, there 
is no exploitation because, according to Steiner, what the 
worker receives in the form of a wage is equivalent to the 
social value of his product. In other words, in a perfectly 
competitive economy in equilibrium, the rewards given to the 
owners of capital and labor will be equal to their 
respective contributions. Each one therefore in the words 
of Milton Friedman, "gets what he or the instruments he owns 
produces. n46 Exploitation will only exist if the 
transaction is influenced by force or fraud instead of being 
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regulated by the market forces, in which case, the worker's 
rights would have been violated. 
Steiner's theory deals with the economic relationship 
between the First and the Third World in terms of the 
acquisition and distribution of natural resources. 
Basically, he believes that there is an egalitarian claim to 
all natural resources, because all nations of the world have 
equal rights to these resources. The primordial possession 
of these resources by these nations gives them 
property-rights to their initial resource acquisitions, and 
also imposes a corresponding obligation on nations not to 
interfere with others' property-rights to their resources. 
The effect of violating a nation's natural resource rights 
can result in exploitation. Steiner argues that "the uneven 
distribution of natural resources between the First and 
Third World today is a consequence of the First World having 
violated the rights of the Third World to its natural 
resources. Exploitation results as a consequence of the free 
exchange resulting from the rights-violation of the Third 
World. 11 47 
Thus, for Steiner, exploitation does not exist in 
general in the first critical case. It exists in the second 
case only as a 
stands squarely 
result of initial rights violations. He 
opposed to the Marxian view that free 
exchange, whether between worker and capitalist, or between 
First and Third World, can be exploitative. 
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4. Problems with the Theory 
In the early part of this section, we mentioned the 
objectives steiner had in mind in constructing his theory. 
we shall bring them into focus again for purpose of 
revealing the problems bedeviling this theory. He wants 
first to defend the existence of a liberal theory of 
exploitation, second, to show that under a free market 
condition, exploitation can occur through a rights-
violation, and third, to challenge the Marxian bilateral 
view of exploitation. 
Has Steiner been able to achieve these objectives? Is 
his theory persuasive enough? Are the conditions he 
stipulates as tools in identifying cases and situations of 
exploitation adequate enough? Are they sufficient and 
necessary conditions of exploitation? Are there any 
problems with this theory? We shall now investigate these 
questions. 
Steiner defines exploitation as the voluntary exchange 
of unequally valued items arising from a rights-violation. 
Since it is a third party whose rights are violated, 
exploitation is considered to be a trilateral relation. 
Here, three conditions can be identified as indicative of 
the existence of exploitation: 
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i. the exchange of the unequally valued items has to 
be voluntary; 
ii. the rights of a third party have to be violated; 
iii. the candidates for exploitation have to be 
trilateral relations. 
The composition of these conditions constitute the necessary 
tools with which liberalism can identify cases and 
situations of exploitation. The adequacy of the liberal 
theory of exploitation rests on the veracity of these given 
conditions. But are these conditions necessarily true? Can 
we falsify their basic claims? To answer these questions, 
we shall now examine the three conditions in a greater 
detail. 
(a) First Condition: Voluntary Exchange 
In exploitation, Steiner maintains that the exhange of 
the unequally valued items is voluntary. He says, "· .. it 
is not that an exploitation is accurately characterized as 
consisting in one voluntary transfer and one transfer which 
is either less voluntary or involuntary: both are voluntary, 
and may be equally so. 11 48 Steiner's example indicates that 
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if Red has 5x valued item and Blue has 3x-valued item, both 
Red and Blue would agree voluntarily to an exchange that 
results in Red having Blue's 3x-valued item and Blue having 
Red's 5x-valued item. This means that the parties concerned 
consent voluntarily49 to make the exchange even though they 
are aware that their items are of unequal values.so 
First, it is not clear from Steiner's analysis what 
values are to be attached to the items of 3x and 5x. He 
simply says that the exchange takes place on "some share 
scale of values.n51 What is this "shared scale of values?" 
can it be determined by individual's preferences, interests 
or caprices? This is unlikely since it is a shared common 
scale. It appears to be a universal measuring mechanism for 
widely differing values. Steiner does not attempt to 
clarify its meaning.52 The absence of such a clarification 
greatly impairs his argument. From a closer reading of the 
text, we can assume that these values are predicated of the 
same item, "x." If this is the case, then it means that 
Red's 5x would be greater than Blue's 3x since the numerical 
value of Red's item is greater than that of Blue. Any 
exchange between Red and Blue will be at a real loss of 2x 
for Red. Under such a situation of a loss, will Red consent 
voluntarily to an exchange with Blue? It is unlikely except 
under the following situations: (i) if Blue and Red were 
involved in an altruistic transaction in which Red decides 
to favor Blue; (ii) if Blue were to force Red to make the 
77 
exchange or (iii) if Red were to be in a hypnotic state 
which blurs the function of his reason. But in a situation 
of a non-altruistic transaction and with the proper 
functioning of his rational powers, it is doubtful whether 
Red will consent voluntarily to the terms of an exchange 
that will result in his loss of 2x. No rational agent 
involved in a non-altruistic transaction will engage 
voluntarily in a benevolent exchange that brings him less 
value than more value of his own items. Since Steiner's 
concern in exploitation is with a non-altruistic 
transaction, Red, as a rational agent, will not trade 
voluntarily his Sx for Blue's 3x. Hence, in exploitation, 
Red will not consent voluntarily to an exchange in which he 
loses his 2x to Blue. on this ground, I submit that the 
consent of the parties involved in a situation of 
exploitation is not totally voluntary. While the exploiter 
may consent voluntarily, the consent of the exploited is 
involuntary to the extent that he is the one who loses out 
in the transaction. Steiner fails to see this reasoning. 
Its rejection is implicit in his mistaken claim: " . it 
is not true that an exploitation is accurately characterized 
as consisting in one voluntary transfer and one transfer 
which is either less voluntary or involuntary • n53 This 
claim led to Steiner's erroneous conclusion that "· •. both 
are voluntary, and may equally be so. 11 54 
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(b) Second Condition: Rights Violation 
According to Steiner, exploitation results from the 
violation of the rights of a third party. In other words, 
rights-violation creates the circumstance of exploitation 
which makes it possible for the exploiter to take advantage 
of the exploited. Using Steiner's example, Blue, who has 3x 
is able to exploit Red who has 5x on account of the 
circumstance of exploitation created through Blue's 
violation of White's rights (that is, by forcibly preventing 
White from offering to Red more than 3x in exchange for 
Red's 5x). This means that if White's rights have not been 
interfered with, and Red has equal access to both Blue and 
White, Blue may not have been able to exploit Red by getting 
a surplus of 2x from him. It is possible that White might 
have offered 5x in exchange for Red's 5x, and this situation 
would have made it impossible for any transaction to take 
place between Blue and Red. 
Contrary to Steiner's proposal, exploitation can occur 
without the intervention of a condition of a 
rights-violation, which is said to occasion the circumstance 
of exploitation. This is the case with a monopolistic 
situation created by nature in which the exploiter enjoys a 
natural monopoly over the exploited. An example will 
illustrate this.55 John and Frank are both skilled artists. 
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Both of them produce their art works at the same value of 3x 
per painting. Through a natural mishap, John loses the use 
of his fingers and is no longer able to produce art works. 
Frank enjoys a monopoly of the art work business and raises 
his price to the value of 5x per painting. Joseph (a 
non-artistic merchant) wants a piece of painting and can 
only get it from Frank. Frank also wants a pair of shoes 
and only Joseph has a supply of the merchandize. The pair 
of shoes has an actual value of 5x. Joseph exchanges the 
pair of shoes valued at 5x for Frank's art work with an 
actual value of 3x. In effect, Joseph is paying Frank a 
value of 5x for a piece of painting whose value is not worth 
more than 3x. One could say that if John were still 
actively involved in the art work business, Joseph could 
have got the painting from him for a value of 3x. Now, he 
gets it from Frank, and Frank makes a surplus value of 2x 
from him. Even though Frank exploits Joseph in the 
exchange, he has not interferred with John's rights to 
produce in order to effect this transaction. Frank's 
exploitation of Joseph happened on account of the exchange 
of unequally valued items, and not as a result of John's 
rights having been violated. But Steiner's claim is that 
Joseph's exploitation must result from the violation of 
John's rights.56 Our example shows this view to be 
seriously mistaken. Exploitation does not necessarily occur 
because someone's rights have been violated. It can occur 
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on account of a natural monopoly being enjoyed by the 
exploiter. Steiner's theory does not address the issue of 
natural monopoly and consequently, does not count it as 
being exploitative. 5? Since John's rights-violation does 
not affect Frank's exploitation of Joseph, I conclude that 
the presence of a rights-violation is not a necessary 
condition of exploitation. Exploitation can still exist 
without the violation of anyone's rights. 
(c) Third Condition: Trilateral Relation 
Steiner claims that exploitation is a trilateral 
relation because it must always involve three different 
actors: the exploiter, the exploited and the one whose 
rights are violated. This means that only trilateral and 
not bilateral relations are candidates for exploitation. He 
argues for this claim by also considering a quadrilateral 
relation involving four parties: the State (Black), the 
exploited (Red), the exploiter (Blue) and the one who 
suffers a rights-violation (White). One view may see this 
case to be quadrilateral relation because it involves the 
State which interferes with White's rights thereby creating 
the circumstance of exploitation in which Blue exploits Red. 
Steiner disclaims this view, for if it were to be true, then 
"there would have to be no motivational reason to suppose 
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that Black's intervention in terms of trade is authorized by 
any of the other three parties, that Black is in effect 
acting as an agent for one of them as principal. 11 58 He says 
that since the state's action neither favors Red nor White, 
neither could have authorized the State's interference. But 
Blue as the beneficiary of the State's action will not 
withhold his consent from the State's interference. The 
State's intervention is to be identified with Blue's 
interest. such an identification validates the trilateral 
nature of exploitation since the State is only acting as 
Blue's agent in his interest as the exploiter. 
The crux of Steiner's argument is simply this: Blue 
will consent to Black's action, since he is the one who 
benefits from Black's intervention. We can reply Steiner in 
the following way. The fact that Blue is a beneficiary of 
Black's action does not mean that he necessarily supports 
his action. He could be equally opposed to it just as Red 
and White would be. Suppose Blue is a strong advocate of 
the equal rights and equal treatment of all persons. Then he 
will be opposed to an interference that favors one party 
over the others. He will be opposed to any action that 
promotes the rights of one party at the expense of others' 
rights. How then does Steiner expect Blue who manifests 
such egalitarian principles to support Black's intervention? 
The fact that Blue is not withholding his consent does not 
mean that he supports Black's action. The fact that one 
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does not support a law does not mean that when the law 
passes and if a loophole is there, one should not take 
advantage of it. Even though one would consent to the law, 
one should not feel constrained to be altruistic when the 
law does not require it. We might say that Blue accepts or 
consents to Black's action because his status as a 
beneficiary is a consequence of Black's action. But it 
might be purely accidental that Black's action favors Blue 
at this moment. At another time, the beneficiary might be 
either White or Red. Steiner is mistaken to correlate 
Black's action, which favors Blue's interest with the fact 
that Blue consents to Black's action or is acting through 
Black. Black acts independently of Blue as a unique agent 
just as Blue acts independently of Black. 
exploitative situation which involves the 
Therefore, an 
four parties: 
Black, Blue, Red and White, is a quadrilateral and not a 
trilateral relation as Steiner would have us believe. 
Exploitation can also be a bilateral relation. But Steiner 
also denies the latter. He says ". whereas rights 
violation . . . is a bilateral relation, an exploitation is 
essentially a trilateral one ••. n59 and " •• that slavery 
cannot be both a bilateral relation and exploitative. n60 
Let us examine again the case involving the exchange between 
Frank (the monopolistic professional artist) and Joseph (the 
merchant). Frank produces a work of art worth the value of 
3x and wishes to sell it for a value of 5x. Joseph wants 
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this piece of art. He exchanges a pair of shoes valued at 
5x for it. Frank has exploited Joseph to the tune of a 
surplus value of 2x. 
involves a bilateral 
This is a case of exploitation which 
relation between Frank and Joseph. 
since a bilateral relation can also constitute an 
exploitative situation, the claim that only trilateral 
relations are candidates for exploitation is unjustifiable. 
Therefore, exploitation is not necessarily a trilateral 
relation as claimed by Steiner. 
We recall that part of Steiner's objectives is to 
justify the claim that liberalism has the appropriate tools 
to identify exploitative situations. Thinking that his 
claim has been successfully proved by his arguments, he 
concludes that there exists an adequate liberal theory of 
exploitation. The liberal tools are constituted by the 
three conditions he has given as underlying any case of 
exploitation. These are: 
1. the voluntary exchange of unequally valued items; 
2. the rights-violation of a third party, and 
3. the trilateral nature of exploitative relations. 
The justification of his claim relies on the validity of 
these conditions. But are these conditions valid and true? 
Our analysis of Steiner's arguments has shown that these 
conditions are not necessary determinants of situations of 
exploitation. In other words, exploitation is not 
i. a totally voluntary exchange; 
ii. necessarily occasioned by a rights-violation; 
iii. always a trilateral relation. 
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on the first condition, the consent to the exchange which 
gives rise to exploitation may be voluntary on the part of 
the exploiter, but it is usually involuntary (in some 
relevant sense) for the exploited. On the second condition, 
exploitation does not result from the violation of rights of 
a third party. It is often the consequence of the unequal 
exchange that goes on between the two parties involved in a 
non-altruistic transaction. On the third condition, 
exploitation does not necessarily have to be a trilateral 
relation. It has been shown that it can be a bilateral or 
quadrilateral relation. 
So far our analysis has shown Steiner to be mistaken 
in his various claims. His conditions are not adequate in 
deter- mining or identifying cases of exploitation. Since 
the composition of these conditions constitute the liberal 
tools, then Steiner's claim that liberalism has the 
appropriate tools to identify exploitative forms remains 
unproven. Consequently, his conclusion that liberalism has 
an adequate theory of exploitation seems false. Liberalism 
does not appear to have an adequate theory of exploitation, 
85 
because it is bereft of the appropriate mechanisms with 
which to identify situations of exploitation. 
Besides being false, Steiner's theory of exploitation 
is bedevilled by other problems. Recall that Steiner 
disagrees with Nozick's principle of just acquisition. With 
Nozick, the original acquisition is something that happened 
long ago and we need not worry about it. With Steiner, the 
acquisition problem is something 
Every generation, he maintains, 
we have to worry about. 
possesses the universal 
right to natural resources, and consequently, there has to 
be a periodic redistribution of natural resources. Nozick 
wants to avoid this, and instead, allows a redistribution 
only in cases where injustices have occured down the 
centuries. But Steiner wants to claim that even though 
there has not been any injustice along the way, there is 
still a need for a redistribution because of the universal 
right of all to natural resources. In other words, with 
Steiner, we have a conflict of rights. There is a universal 
right to natural resources which takes precedence over the 
right to be left alone so long as one has acquired his 
property justly without violating anyone else's right. 
Nozick's view of rights is one in which rights never 
conflict, nor take precedence over one another. As long as 
one is acting justly within the limits of his rights, it 
means that one is not violating any one else's rights. In 
so far as one acquires property justly, leaving enough for 
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others, no rights have been violated. As long as transfers 
voluntarily what he has acquired justly, no rights have been 
violated. It seems that for Steiner, one's rights to a 
property which has been acquired justly does come in 
conflict with others' universal right to natural resources. 
This is where we have a problem. 
It seems to be the case, I believe, that if I have a 
right to property, it belongs to me and I have a right to do 
whatever I want with it. People are not born with a right 
to what others already own. Consequently, one's right to 
his property will always come in conflict with people's 
universal right to natural resources. When we try to make 
clear the meaning of the "universal right to natural 
resource," we run into conflict with the first of the two 
principles we enunciated earlier. Steiner maintains in his 
theory of the compossibility of rights that 
Any coherent or well-ordered set of rights must there 
fore be such that it is logically impossible for one 
individual's exercise of his rights to constitute an 
interference with another individual's exercise of his 
rights.61 
In other words, rights must be coherent, and it is logically 
impossible for them to be in conflict. And precisely, the 
problem with specifying the moral assumptions of Steiner's 
theory is that his notions of the right of transfer and of 
the universal right to natural resources do seem to 
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conflict. Steiner wants to claim that the rights to 
transfer and the universal right to natural resources are 
universal and inalienable. It that is true, it is logically 
impossible for them to conflict. And yet, they do conflict 
on Steiner's own ground. 
Furthermore, his advocacy of freedom for individuals 
in the pursuit of their economic ends can only result in 
inegalitarian distribution of 
among the citizenry. This 
individuals to pursue their 
economic goods and services 
is because the freedom of 
own interests without any 
positive constraints might increase disparities in income, 
wealth and opportunity. These might tend to establish 
patterns of inequality, leading to poverty and want. Even 
though this is of little concern to the individual, it is of 
a grave concern to the society as a whole because of its 
effect on the general population. This could lead to social 
unrest, increased crime, etc. Steiner's principles imply a 
completely free market economy. This implies the 
elimination of the labor unions. With the abolition of the 
latter, the marketplace may not adequately protect freedom 
and stability of employment because there will be no unions 
to protect the individual employee against his employer. 
Also, the marketplace may be incapable of guaranteeing 
the basic needs of the people. Often, these needs are 
overlooked. In fact, one of the problems in an affluent 
market-based society is the relative invisibility of those 
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whom the market has bypassed. Al though the poor may be 
largely invisible, they number in the millions and the 
extent of their needs is very great. They hold marginal and 
inconsequential jobs, have inadequate housing, medical care, 
etc. The existence of such a culture of poverty within a 
society that holds tenaciously to a free market economy 
would seem to raise questions about an absence of 
"exploitation." 
Steiner is defining exploitation in a rather peculiar 
way. According to this definition, there is no exploitation 
in the society even though all these social problems exist. 
steiner believes that the existence of inequalities and 
social problems in the society are not a problem to his 
theory of exploitation since they have not come about 
because of exploitation. Prima facie, this anomaly reveals 
that there is something wrong with Steiner's theory. There 
is no exploitation and yet, we have all these social 
problems. This does not seem right. Perhaps it is, but 
this circumstance gives us reason to look at another theory 
that does not draw this conclusion, one that sees such 
social problems as precisely the result of exploitation. It 
is to this theory that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE MARXIAN THEORY OF EXPLOITATION 
A. Exposition 
It is an assumption commonly accepted today that 
Marx's interpretation of classical political economy helped 
to shape and determine the structure and content of his own 
economic theory which includes an economic explanation of 
exploitation. Some pertinent questions arise from this 
assumption: How did Marx view classical political economy? 
What was its influence on him? How strong was this 
influence? In short, what is the relation of Marx to 
classical economics? 
Marx shared in the same fundamental problems with 
which the classical economists had to grapple. The crucial 
issues at the core of the classical theory of value were 
concerned with: 
1. the origins and magnitude of non-wage incomes 
(profits and rent) in the capitalist mode of 
production: what Marx was to term 'surplus 
value,' that is, the difference in value terms 
between social input and social output; 
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2. the measure of the value of commodities (natural 
price) in terms of which both social output and 
the surplus product could be quantified. 
In order to understand Marx's interpretation of the 
classical labor theory of value and his use of it to define 
exploitation, we must first analyze the origins of the 
theory in the period antedating the publication of the 
wealth of Nations, then, Adam Smith's treatment and lastly, 
David Ricardo's refinement of Smith's arguments. 
The pre-smithian epoch featured the Mercantilists and 
the Physiocrats, both of whom were engaged in the same quest 
of classical political economy: the analysis of the origins 
and magnitude of surplus value. l They saw the crucial 
importance of production-cost in the economy and claimed the 
value of commodities to be determined by the cost of 
production. Obviously, there was difficulty in reconciling 
such a "wage cost" theory of value with the existence of 
non-wage incomes or profits. If the value of a commodity 
was dependent solely on the labor costs incurred in its 
production, it could not both be sold at its value and yield 
incomes to the capitalist responsible for its production. 
The question therefore is: How could the existence of rent, 
interest and particularly, profit be reconciled with the 
"wage-cost" labor theory of value? 
The Mercantilists solved this question by claiming 
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that profits originated in the act of exchange and not from 
the process of production. They argued that this was 
because commodities were sold at prices higher than their 
cost of production. Their viewpoint, which was the dominant 
position in the sixteenth century, was rejected by the 
Physiocrats and the later English classical economists. 
Marx also criticized Proudhon and Malthus for falling into 
this same error.2 His criticism of Destutt de Tracy brings 
out this point succinbtly: 
A may be clever enough to get the advantage of B or c 
withou~ their being able to retaliate. A sells wine 
worth QC'40 to B, and obtains from him in excha_!!ge corn 
j:o the value of .J:so. A has converted his .;C40 into 
}$0, has made more money out of less, and has converted 
his commodities into capital. Let us examine thi~ a 
little more closely. Before the exchange we hadoz;.40 
worth of wine in the hands of A, and /:?o worth of corn 
in those of B, a total value of · />90. After the 
exchange we have still the same totaf"'value~O. The 
value in circulation has not increased by one iota, it 
is only distributed differently between A and B. What 
is a loss of value to B is surplus-value to A; what is 
"minus" to one is "plus" to the other. The same 
change would have taken place, if A, without the 
formality of an exchange, had directly stolen the,;e.-10 
from B. The sum of the values in circulation can 
clearly not be augmented by any change in their 
distribution, any more than the quantity of the 
precious metals in a country by a Jew selling a Queen 
Anne's farthing for a guinea. The capitalist class, 
as a whole, in any country, cannot over-reach 
themselves. Turn and twist then as we may, the fact 
remains unaltered. If equivalents are exchanged, no 
surplus-value results, and if non-equivalents are 
exchanged, still no surplus-value. circulation or the 
exchange of commodities, begets no value. 3 
The point of Marx's argument is that it is impossible for 
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everyone to cheat every other person and to make a gain in 
the process. This is because one person's gain is another's 
loss and ultimately, on the aggregate, they must cancel out 
each other. Capitalists could get more than the value of 
their commodities when they sell them but in aggregate, they 
will pay just as much more for the commodities that they 
purchase. Three responses to this argument exist in the 
literature. 
The first response was offered by the Mercantilists 
themselves. They accepted the validity of this argument 
only for domestic trade but not for international trade. 
They argued that it is ultimately possible for one nation to 
enrich itself by sytemically cheating its trading partners. 
This view forms at least one strand of the Marxian and 
post-Marxian theory of imperialism. Consequently, the 
Mercantilists viewed foreign trade as the only source of 
surplus value and of economic growth. 
The other two possible responses rebut the 
Mercantilist's view and assert the possibility of profits or 
non-wage incomes outside of foreign trade. The second 
response, which originates from the Physiocrats, sees 
surplus value as a derivation from agricultural production. 
Accordi'ng to them, industrial profit is to be explained by 
the fact that farmers are cheated by the industrial 
capitalists. That the Physiocrats saw agriculture as the 
only form of productive activity is not surprising. During 
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the early seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries in which 
they wrote, France was a predominantly agricultural nation, 
with a small commercial sector of low-profit manufacturing 
industries and a large, parasitic bureaucracy that was 
tended towards subsidizing and protecting the few industrial 
monopolies. With this background, it was easy to see 
surplus product in agriculture as a physical surplus of corn 
output (the harvest) over corn input (seed and the 
maintenance of farmers). It is therefore easy for us to 
understand how agriculture came to be perceived as the only 
productive sector of the economy. Marx summarized the 
Physiocrats' argument as follows: 
Industry buys raw materials from agriculture, in order 
to work them up; its labour - as we have already said 
- gives these raw materials only a form, but it adds 
nothing to them and does not multiply them. Give the 
cook a measure of peas, with which he is to prepare 
your dinner: he will put them on the table for you 
well cooked and well dished up, but in the same 
quantity as he was given, but on the other hand give 
the same quantity to the gardener for him to put into 
the ground; he will return to you, when the right time 
has come, at least fourfold the quantity that he had 
been given. This is the true and only production . . 
Therefore the value or the increase of value of 
commodities is not the result of industrial labour, 
but of the labourers' outlays.4 
The Physiocrats saw the industry as a sterile institution 
because of its incapability to produce surplus like 
agriculture. It merely cooks the raw materials supplied by 
agricultural activity without adding any value to the cooked 
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stuff. Any surplus that accrues to industry is the result 
of the sale of manufactured goods to the farmers at prices 
higher than their values. This is the cheating referred to 
above. On the Physiocrats' assumption, industrial profit 
represented a deduction from the surplus value available for 
production in agriculture. Therefore, they insisted on 
laissez-faire, which amounted less to a charter of liberty 
for industrial capital than to a demand for the abolition of 
state protection over the parasitic monopoly industrial 
sector. It is not surprising that this was not a 
theoretical apparatus likely to survive the advent of a 
large, highly competitive and dynamic industrial capitalism. 
The third response claims that if surplus value arose 
in the process of production and was realized in the act of 
exchange, then there is no need to resort to the 
Mercantilists' view of their origins. Going by this 
solution, there is the possibility of reconciling the 
existence of property incomes with adherence to a labor 
theory of value and to the view that commodities are sold at 
their labor values rather than higher than these values. 
This position is developed by Smith and Ricardo, and then, 
by Marx, all of who perceive capitalist prof it as resulting 
from capitalist production. 
It was clearly his perception of the primordial 
beginnings of the industrial revolution which made Adam 
Smith to regard industry as being as productive as 
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agriculture, and to extend the production of surplus value 
"to all spheres of social labour."5 Consequently, it was 
possible to analyze the origins of industrial profit, which 
both classical political economy and Marx saw as the most 
essential form taken by surplus value, in the context of a 
theory of value which did not require manufactured goods to 
be sold at prices greater than their value in order for any 
profit to be made. Marx made explicit what Smith's critique 
of the Physiocrats had left implicit. Marx perceived that 
their model of society was an uneasy mixture of feudalism 
and capitalism: 
Feudalism is thus portrayed and explained from the 
viewpoint of bourgeois production; agriculture is 
treated as the branch of production in which 
capitalist production - that is, the production of 
surplus value - exclusively appears. While feudalism 
is thus made bourgeois, bourgeois society is given a 
feudal semblance.6 
In analytical terms, Marx also argued, correctly I believe, 
that the Physiocrats were mistaken in the only grounds which 
they could consistently employ to justify the unique 
position attributed to agriculture. He claimed that this 
was the identification of surplus value with surplus 
product, seeing the former as a simple physical surplus of 
output over input. According to Marx, this view was only 
tenable perhaps in a purely agricultural society, when both 
inputs and outputs were of the same commodity, for example, 
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corn. But what meaning did it have in an advanced 
capitalist economy where a range of different commodities 
enter into production and the output is quite distinct in 
its physical characteristics from any of them? 
consequently, Marx criticized the Physiocrats for their 
failure to make a distinction between "riches" and 
"values." He claimed that physical output is a different 
concept from the value of that output. Such confused 
reasoning made the Physiocrats to attribute the social 
surplus to the "mere gift of nature" and hence, to ignore 
the social relations which give rise to property incomes in 
a capitalist economy: 
[the Physiocratic system] conceived value merely as 
use-value, merely as material substance, and surplus 
value as a mere gift of nature, which returns to 
labour, in place of a given quantity of organic 
material, a greater quantity • . • On the other hand, 
this surplus value is explained again in a feudal 
way, as derived from nature and not from society; from 
man's relation to the soil, not from his social 
relations.7 
Marx argued that the Physiocrats were led to this glaring 
mistake by their insistence that free competition would 
completely eliminate industrial profit, the implication of 
which was that the continued existence of agricultural 
prof it, rent and interest required the surplus value to be 
viewed as a "mere gift of nature." Ultimately, the 
Physiocrats had no theory of industrial profit. What then 
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was their achievement? Marx pointed out that the 
achievement of the Physiocrats consist in the fact that they 
" . transferred the inquiry into the origins of surplus 
value from the sphere of circulation into the sphere of 
direct production, and thereby laid the foundation for the 
analysis of capitalist production. 11 8 
How far did Adam Smith build on these foundations? 
Smith accepted the Physiocrats' argument that surplus value 
arises in production instead of exchange (or circulation) 
and consequently, cannot be explained in terms of the 
general sale and purchase of commodities at prices higher 
than their values. But he went beyond the Physiocrats in 
showing that the production of surplus value was not 
restricted to agriculture. It also arises from 
manufacturing industries. In fact, industry plays a central 
role in his treatment of productive labor. As Marx 
observed, Smith attributed surplus value to the activity of 
social labor, and not to the mere gift of nature: 
But to Adam Smith, it is general social labour - no 
matter in what use-values it manifests itself - the 
mere quantity of necessary labour, which creates 
value. Surplus value, whether it takes the form of 
profit, rent or the secondary form of interest, is 
nothing but a part of this labour, appropriated by the 
owners of the material conditions of labour in the 
exchange with living labour.9 
As Meek emphasized, Smith was the first economist to base a 
labor theory of value explicitly on a particular analysis of 
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the nature of society.10 This he did in his famous example 
of the deer and the beavers, which articulates the first 
clear theory of value: 
In that early and rude state of society which preceeds 
both the accumulation of stock and the appearance of 
land, the proportion between the quantities of labour 
necessary for acquiring different objects seems to be 
the only circumstance which can afford any rule for 
exchanging them for one another. If among a nation of 
hunters, for example, it usually costs twice the 
labour to kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, 
one beaver should naturally exchange for or be worth 
two deer. It is natural that what is usually the 
produce of two days or two hours labour, should be 
worth double of what is usually the produce of one 
day's or one hour's labour.11 
Here, we see Smith analyzing a model of simple commodity 
production, in which production is embarked upon for 
exchange rather than to satisfy the needs of the producer 
himself, but in which capitalist class relations are absent. 
In this simple model, not only does all income accrue to the 
producers, but the ratios at which the different commodities 
exchange depend entirely on the ratios of labor embodied in 
them or required for their production. 
In this "early and rude state of society," profit and 
rent do not exist; the labor theory of value applies without 
modification. However, when we move to a capitalist 
society, Smith rejected the labor theory of value as 
inapplicable to capitalism: 
Neither is the quantity of labour commonly employed in 
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acquiring or producing any commodity, the only 
circumstance which can regulate the quantity which it 
ought commonly to purchase, command or exchange for. 
An additional quantity, it is evident, must be due for 
the profits of the stock which advanced the wages and 
furnished the materials of that labour.12 
consequently, Smith argued that the very existence of 
property incomes invalidates the labor theory of value. The 
value of the labor embodied in a commodity is now less than 
the value of the labor which it can command or for which it 
is exchangeable. Suppose that two hours of labor are 
necessary to kill a beaver, and that the value of an hour of 
labor is $1.00. The "labor embodied" value of a beaver is 
$2.00. The capitalist's profit is 50 cents per beaver, so 
that it sells for $2.50. But at the prevailing wage $2.50 
will purchase two and half hours labor, so that 
"labor-commanded" exceeds "labor-embodied." Essentially, 
this was the same problem which confronted the 
Mercantilists. They tried to solve it by retaining a 
primitive cost of production theory by arguing that 
commodities generally sell at prices higher than their 
values. Smith, as we already have seen, rejected this 
position and consequently, rejected the labor theory of 
value. He replaced it with a cost of production theory 
which Sraffa has called the "adding-up" theory.13 According 
to this theory, the price of a commodity in a fully 
developed economy is " what is sufficient to pay the 
rent of the land, the wages of the labor, and the profits of 
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the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing to 
market, according to their natural rates . 1114 Rent and 
profit are seen as costs of production, on a par with wages, 
and form part of the value of commodities. 
Commodities can therefore be sold at their values, and 
still yield profit to the capitalist and rent of the 
landlord. But these values no longer depend solely on the 
quantity of labor required to produce them. Labor now 
figures only as one constituent part of the costs of 
production. As a measure of value, it is no longer the only 
source of value. This change is a major one. Property 
incomes, instead of being derived from the labor used to 
produce commodities, are seen as costs additional to it. 
Instead of resulting from the value of the commodity, which 
is defined in terms of embodied labor alone, they become a 
component part of that value. 
Even though Smith abandons the labor theory of value, 
and tries the "adding-up" theory, this has its problem. The 
basic problem with the cost of production theory is that 
Smith is defining "natural prices" now in terms of a 
"natural" wage, a "natural" rate of profit and a "natural" 
rent. But he has left these factors undefined and 
unexplained. More specifically, what is a "natural" wage? 
What is a "natural" rent? What is a "natural" rate of 
profit? 
David Ricardo confronts these questions directly. He 
106 
realizes that Smith has not really explained these factors 
and that there are problems with the "adding-up" theory, and 
so, he attempts solving them. Ricardo tries to answer all 
of those questions by positing that the "natural" wage rate 
is subsistence. He develops a whole theory of rent 
depending on the differential fertility of land. This 
leaves profit, the question with which he struggles 
inconclusively. 
Ricardo's attempted solution, which presupposes the 
classical view that surplus value originates in production, 
refines and extends Smith's simple labor theory of value15 
which was applicable to the early and rude state of society. 
According to the Ricardian theory, the value or the natural 
price of a commodity is determined by the quantity of labor 
directly and indirectly required for its production. The 
"indirect" labor refers to the labor embodied in the raw 
materials and the labor that went into the making of the 
machine. The "direct" labor refers to the labor actually 
expended in production. But Ricardo, like Smith, is worried 
that the labor theory of value might no longer apply under 
conditions of advanced capitalism. 
that much of the first Chapter 
It is to this problem 
of the Principles of 
Political Economy is devoted. In free competition, the rate 
of profit on capital tends to equality in all industries. 
But industries differ in the ratio of capital to labor which 
they employ, and also in the ratio of fixed to circulating 
107 
capital. These differences led Ricardo to argue that the 
simple labor theory of value applies only if no capital is 
employed, or if factor proportions and capital durability 
happen to be the same in all industries. In this regard, he 
says: 
If men employed no machinery in production but labour 
only, and were all the same length of time before they 
brought their commodities to market, the exchangeable 
value of their goods would be precisely in proportion 
to the quantity of labour employed . . • If they 
employed fixed capital of the same value and of the 
same durability, then, too, the value of the 
commodities produced would be the same, and they would 
vary with the greater or less guantity of labour 
employed on their production.16 
Ricardo realizes that except under these improbable 
conditions, the labor theory of value fails to hold. The 
labor theory is inadequate in si tut ions where there are 
significant differences in capital intensity or durability 
between industries.17 Ricardo sees this problem of the 
tendency of natural prices to deviate from labor values, but 
is unable to proffer any solution to it. As Wolff remarks: 
Ricardo's labor theory of natural price comes to a 
dead halt right here. Just as Adam Smith was unable 
theoretically to extend his correct analysis of the 
early and rude state to the case in which the 
accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land 
has taken place, so Ricardo is unable to provide an 
adequate analysis of the derivation of natural prices 
from labor values as a consequence of unequal times 
that elapse between the bestowal of labor on the 
production of commodities and their realization, or 
sale, in the market.18 
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Marx comes in the midst of this problem. His objective is to 
redeem classical political economy from its internal logical 
inconsistencies and the methodological defects which were 
largely responsible for these shortcomings. 
Marx is well aware of the problem faced by Ricardo 
the non-proportionality of prices to labor 
He chooses to ignore the problem of natural 
Capital I, and instead, to inquire into the 
question confronting classical political 
economy: the origins of capitalist profit. In Ricardo's 
concerning 
values.19 
prices in 
fundamental 
words, this question concerns the determination of the laws 
which regulate the distribution of the produce of the earth 
among the three classes of the community landowners, 
capitalists and laborers.20 
Marx's solution adopts the Ricardian theory of natural 
price by simply assuming that commodities sell at their 
values, where the value (natural price) of a commodity is 
determined by the quantity of labor directly and indirectly 
required for its production.21 Marx's solution reveals how 
the appearance of capital-labor relation as a simple 
exchange relation actually conceals reality. When the 
capitalist and the laborer meet on the labor market, what 
the capitalist buys from the laborer is not what he appears 
to buy. The capitalist does not buy the worker's labor but 
his labor power. He does not buy the worker's productive 
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activity, or what he worker creates in a specified period of 
time. He buys his labor power, i.e., the worker's capacity 
to labor. Marx writes: 
our friend, Moneybags, must be so lucky as to find, 
within the sphere of circulation, in the market, a 
commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar 
property of being a source of value, whose actual 
consumption, therefore, is itself an embodiment of 
labor, and consequently, a creation of value. The 
possessor of money does find on the market such a 
special commodi~y in capacity for labour or 
labour-power.22 1 
This unique insight forms the basis of Marx's theory of 
exploitation. Writes Wolff, II in this remarkable 
passage, Marx suddenly explodes all of classical political 
economy. 11 23 Marx maintains that the economic forces of 
capitalist society are such that there is a difference 
between the exchange value of labor power and the exchange 
value of what is produced by its employment (that is, the 
exchange value of the product), and the difference is the 
source of the capitalist profit. 
Let us put this in the terms used by Marx in Capital 
I. We assume, as he does that the exchange value of a 
commodity is proportional to its labor value. On this 
assumption, we see that the worker's labor time is divided 
into two parts: (i) that period during which the magnitude 
of the value he creates is equal to the value of the 
commodities he receives from the capitalist through his 
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wage, which Marx terms "necessary labour1124 and (ii) that 
period during which he creat~s value over and above what he 
receives in wages, which Marx terms "surplus labour. 1125 
The ratio of surplus to necessary labor time is termed the 
rate of exploitation. 
In this analysis of capitalism, the value of a 
commodity is made up of three component parts. The first 
part represents the value of the raw materials and tools or 
machinery used up in its production. The second part is 
that which replaces the value of the worker's labor power 
and the third part is made up of the surplus labor. From 
the perspective of the circulation of capital, the first 
part is termed constant capital (c), since it " • does 
not in the process of production undergo any quantitative 
alteration of value. 1126 It merely passes its value on to 
what it produces . In contrast, the second component is 
termed variable capital (v), because it"· .. does, in the 
process of production, undergo an alteration of value. It 
both reproduces the equivalent of its own value, and also 
produces an excess, a surplus-value 1127 In other 
words, the capitalist's purchase of labor power allows value 
to expand through the creation of a third component. This 
third component is surplus value (s) which the capitalist 
appropriates without equivalent. 
The division of capital into constant and variable 
components is unique to Marx's political economy. This 
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distinction is absent in classical political economy where 
the distinction made is that between fixed and circulating 
capital. Even though Marx employs this latter distinction, 
he argues that the constant variable dichotomy is more 
significant because only in these terms can the nature of 
surplus value be fully understood. With this distinction 
made, we see clearly that it is only the expenditure of 
capital on "living labor" that leads to the creation of 
value, and consequently to the production of surplus value. 
The means of production tools, machines, and raw 
materials, which represents "dead" or congealed labor - do 
not create value. They merely transfer the pre-existing 
values which they possess to the commodity in the process of 
production. Thus surplus value is created in the production 
process by the performance of "unpaid labor. n28 Given the 
rate of exploitation, its magnitude depends on the quantity 
of living labor, that is, variable capital employed, and not 
on the quantity of dead labor (constant capital) that is 
used. Constant capital does not produce value, and, 
therefore, cannot produce surplus value. Commodity values, 
at any level of aggregation, can be written as c+v+s. 
Surplus value forms the source of capitalist's profit, and 
this in turn derives from surplus unpaid labor. The 
extraction of surplus labor from the laborer and its 
appropriation by the capitalist in the form of surplus value 
is exploitation as Marx employs the term. 
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B. Moral Assumption and Arguments 
Marx believes that the wage relationship between the 
capitalist and the worker conceals the systemic exploitation 
that goes on under the capitalist mode of production. The 
contract which brings about the wage relationship appears to 
have been embarked upon on the platform of "Freedom, 
Equality, Property and Bentham. 11 29 The capitalist employs 
the worker for a day's work and pays him a wage which 
suggests that all the worker's labor has been paid for. 
Hence, there is no cheating either way because equivalents 
have been exchanged: the worker supplies labor and the 
capitalist pays him an equivalent in the form of a wage. 
For Marx, this transaction is an appearance concealing 
reality. In reality, there is exploitation because some 
labor is unpaid labor. How does he prove this claim? 
According to him, what the worker really sells to the 
capitalist is not labor but his capacity to labor, i.e., 
labor power. The capitalist then sets it to work for a full 
day. Because he worker labors for more hours than are 
necessary to produce his own laboring capacity for the day, 
he creates a quantity of new value that is greater than was 
embodied in his labor power. This happens because the 
worker spends a part of the day to reproduce the value of 
his means of sustenance which equals the wage he receives. 
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The rest of the day is the surplus labor time during which 
he works to produce surplus value which is appropriated by 
the capitalist. surplus value is therefore new value 
created by a worker over and above what is required to 
reproduce the labor power used up in the production process. 
since surplus value is appropriated by ·the capitalist 
without equivalent, the worker is exploited. Consequently, 
the capital-labor relation is exploitative because the 
worker produces a surplus value beyond the subsistence value 
which is appropriated by the capitalist without 
compensation. 
Marx maintains the capital-labor relation to be only 
illusorily free. The capitalist and the worker appear on 
the labor market as equals who are involved in a free 
contractual exchange: 
He (the uniramelled owner of his capacity for labor 
••. ) and the owner of money meet in the market, and 
deal with each other as on the basis of equal rights, 
with this difference alone, that one is buyer, the 
other seller; both therefore, equal in the eyes of 
the law.30 
Marx believes that this is merely an appearance which is 
quite different from the reality of the exchange: 
The exchange of equivalents, which appeared as the 
original operation, has turned around in such a way 
that there is only an apparent exchange. This is 
first of all because the capital which is exchanged 
for labor power is itself only part of the product of 
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alien labor appropriated without equivalent, and 
secondly because that capital must not only be 
replaced by its producer 1 the worker, but must be replaced by a new surplus. 1 
There is therefore only an apparent exchange. In other 
words, there is no real exchange between capitalists and 
workers. The non-reality of this exchange derives from the 
fact that " . the capital which is exchanged for labor 
power is itself only part of the product of alien labor 
appropriated without equivalent. 11 32 The point Marx is 
making here is this: once we take as our frame of reference 
the entire complex transaction between workers and 
capitalists, and no longer regard the wage exchange in 
isolation from· capital, we see that in the outcome, this 
complex transaction simply transfers value from workers to 
capitalists. ' . A conclusive summary of this analysis is given 
by Marx: 
The relation of exchange subsisting between capitalist 
and labourer becomes a mere semblance appertaining to 
the process of circulation, a mere form, foreign to 
the real nature of transaction, and only mystifying 
it. what really takes place is this the 
capitalist again and again, appropriates without 
equivalent, a portion of the previously materialized 
labor of others, and exchanges it for a greater 
quantity of living labour.33 
The underlying ethical presupposition in Marx's 
critique of capitalism as being exploitative is simply that 
those who produce or create the surplus product should be 
r 
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entitled to control it. As Nancy Holmstrom succinctly puts 
it: 
It is not the fact that capitalists have some, or even 
a very large income that is exploitative. It is the 
fact that the income is derived through forced, 
unpaid, surplus labor, the product of which the 
producers do not control which makes it explotative.34 
This assumption provides the normative ground for 
Marx's indictment of the capitalist system. If this 
assumption is valid, and if Marx is right that non-workers 
(capitalists) control and appropriate the surplus product, 
then capitalism would be illegitimate, wrong and unjust. 
Such an appropriation would necessarily violate the workers' 
right over the product. The presence of exploitation as a 
violation of workers' right, Elster says, " •• can provide 
the exploited with a ground for taking individual or 
collective action against the system. 11 35 What I have shown 
clearly here is that the capitalist benefits at the expense 
of the worker. A relation of domination exists whereby the 
capitalist dominates the worker because the worker, although 
he is free to work for any capitalist he wants to, he has to 
work for some capitalist because he has no access to the 
means of production. 
On the basis of Marx's moral assumption, the real and 
exploitative content of the wage relation becomes unjust, 
because it violates the workers' rights to control the 
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product of their labor. That Marx finds the capital-labor 
relation unjust is clear from the language he employs. 
Hence, we have Marx speaking of the capitalist's 
appropriation of surplus value in terms of 'robbery', 
•theft', 'embezzlement•, etc. This is tantamount to saying 
that the capitalist has no right to appropriate it and that 
his doing so, is therefore a violation of the workers' right 
of ownership, and this action is wrong and unjust. In 
referring to the surplus product as the tribute annually 
exacted from workers by capitalists, Marx says: 
Even if the latter uses a portion of that tribute to 
purchase the additional labor power at its full price, 
so that equivalent is exchanged for equivalent, the 
whole thing still remains the age-old activity of 
conqueror, who buys commodities from the conquered 
with the money he has stolen from them.36 
Continuing, Marx similarly talks of the annual surplus 
product "embezzled from the English workers without any 
equivalent being given in return," and he claims that "all 
progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, 
not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil. 11 37 
He refers to "the booty pumped out of the workers" and "the 
total surplus-value extorted • the common booty" and 
"the loot of other people's labour. 11 38 The prospective 
abolition of capitalist property he describes as "the 
expropriation of a few usurpers. 11 39 And the wealth produced 
under capitalism, he says, is based on the "theft of alien 
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labor timen40 (that is, surplus value or surplus labor). 
If I am correct about the basic ethical assumption 
underlying the Marxian critique, then it is quite 
illegitimate to argue that Marx's use of the language of 
robbery, embezzlement, etc. does not imply any charge of 
wrongdoing or injustice. Allen Wood has argued that 
exploitation, on Marx's terms, is not wrong by the juridical 
standards of a capitalist society.41 He claims that even 
though the worker is exploited, he is not thereby treated 
unjustly. His interpretation of Marx relies on the 
following passage in Capital I: 
The circumstance that on the one hand the daily 
sustenance of labour-power costs only half a day's 
labour, while on the other hand the very same labour-
power can work during a whole day, that consequently 
the value which its use during one day creates, is 
double what he pays for that use, this circumstance 
is, without doubt, a piece of good luck for the buyer, 
but by no means an injury to the seller.42 
But this passage is plainly satirical. Immediately after 
this passage, Marx characterizes the appropriation of 
surplus labor as a trick: 
Our capitalist foresaw this state of things, and that 
was the cause of his laughter . • . The trick has at 
last succeeded; money has been converted into 
capital. 43 
If Marx were merely satirizing capitalism, then his use of 
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the word "trick" as descriptive of the exchange between the 
capitalist and the worker is very significant. Wood has 
interpreted Marx out of context by failing to take 
cognizance of what Marx means by the "trick" of exploiting 
labor power. It is on account of this "trick" that Marx 
characterizes exploitation as robbery, plunder, theft, 
embezzlement, etc. If therefore the capitalist robs the 
worker, then he appropriates what is not rightfully his own 
or what rightfully belongs to the worker. Consequently, 
there is no meaningful way in which the capitalist can 
simultaneously rob the worker and treat him justly.44 
Marx is not explicit about the standard or criterion 
by which he judges the extraction of surplus value to be 
unjust. This criterion is often misconstrued. Robert 
Nozick, for example, assumes that Marx holds that each man's 
property rights are based on his labor, so that every man 
has a right to appropriate the full value created by his 
labor, and that anyone who deprives him of any part of this 
value may be said to have done him an injustice. It is not 
difficult with this view of property rights to prove that 
surplus-value extraction is unjust. The problem is, as 
Nozick notes, almost any society, even a socialist one, 
would also be unjust, by this criterion.45 
But Marx rebuts such a labor theory of property rights 
in his Cri tigue of the Gotha Programme. This critique is 
directed at the Lassallean demands for a "just distribution 
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of the proceeds of labor" and "an equal right to the 
undiminished proceeds of labor. 11 46 Contrary to the 
Lassallean demands, Marx claims that in the first phase of 
socialism, workers will not receive "undiminished proceeds 
of labor" because certain necessary deductions will have to 
be made before any distribution is made· to individual 
workers. Deductions are made for "replacement of the means 
of production used up . ., expansion of production .•. 
reserve or insurance funds to provide against accidents, 
dislocations caused by natural calamities, etc. n47 
Deductions are also to be made for social services like "the 
general costs of administration the common 
satisfaction of needs, •.• funds for those unable to work 
n48 It is only after these deductions are made that 
the labor theory of property rights comes into effect: 
distribution of the rest of the proceeds is made to 
individuals according to their labor contributions: 
"Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from 
society - after the deductions have been made - exactly what 
he gives to it. 11 49 In the first phase of socialism 
therefore, Marx proposed a modified labor theory of property 
according to which each worker has a right to part of the 
"diminished" total social product (in proportion to his or 
her labor contributions) after the initial deductions have 
been made towards public goods and benefits. Nozick is 
right that workers do not receive back all the value of 
their products in 
capitalist society. 
the latter is the 
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a socialist society, just as in a 
But what distinguishes the former from 
fact that the workers have a common 
ownership of the means of production. Nozick's mistake here 
is ignoring this essential distinction. In the socialist 
society envisaged by Marx, the workers make the decisions on 
how the products of their labor are to be dispensed: 
production and distribution are under their conscious 
collective control and hence, they are-not being exploited. 
A central tenet of Marx's analysis is that workers, 
and only workers, create the product. It is often objected, 
however, that capitalists also contribute to the creation of 
the product. At least current production would not be 
possible without the current stock of capital. And 
capitalists are the ones who provide this capital. Against 
this counterclaim, one may argue that capital is only past 
labor (congealed labor) and hence that workers, taken as an 
intergenerational whole, produce the lot and are therefore, 
entitled to control the lot. 50 Furthermore, one may also 
argue that there is a crucial distinction between 
contributing to the creation of something and participating 
in its creation or as G.E. Cohen puts it, between a 
"productive act" and an "act of producing. n51 Even though 
capitalists contribute to production, they do not 
participate in it. 52 Even though capital is productive, 
only workers produce.53 It is only those who engage in the 
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act of production that should control the product. 
consequently, the workers' labor is always exploited by 
capital, since workers (who participate in the creation of 
the surplus product) are excluded from controlling it, while 
capitalists (who do not participate in the creation of the 
surplus product) appropriate it, an appropriation based on 
their ownership of capital or means of production. 
How is this ethical premise justified? Cohen makes 
the following arguments. He argues that the private 
ownership of the means of production is illegitimate. 54 
consequently, he further argues that: 
when apologists for capitalism deny that capitalists 
are exploiters on the ground that they contribute to 
the creation of the product by providing means of 
production, the appropriate Marxist reply is .•• that 
the said 'contribution' does not establish absence of 
exploitation, since capitalist property in means of 
production is theft, and the capitalist is therefore 
providing only what morally ought not to be his to 
provide. 11 55 
Another argument put forward to justify capitalist 
profits is that profits are reward or wages for the 
entrepreneurial skill of the capitalists.56 Marx rejects 
this claim, emphasizing that profit is a privilege deriving 
from ownership of capital, and not from managerial 
responsibilities. For example, in modern business 
enterprise, when economies are dominated by giant 
corporations, the stockholders as capitalists (e.g. those 
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who "provide capital") play little or no role in the 
managing of the corporation. And those who do - when not 
additionally compensated as managers, board members, etc.-
receive the same stock dividends as those who do not. 
Hence, reward is for ownership, not service. 
A third argument sees the capitalist's profit as a 
reward for his "abstinence" or "waiting. 11 57 Marx rebuts the 
abstinence theory because the capitalist, in modern 
capitalist societies, can equally consume and save. His 
high income level enables him to save without sacrificing 
his enjoyments or the good things necessary for his life 
comfort. 
A fourth argument considers prof it a fair return for 
the risk involved in losing one's capital in investment. 
The capitalist deserves to be rewarded for the risks in the 
investment he undertakes. Underlying this argument is the 
presupposition that the worker is guaranteed a fixed income 
while the capitalist must undertake some risks in order to 
make his profits. As Marx says, 
All economists, when they come to discuss the 
prevailing relation of capital and wage labour, of 
profit and wages, and when they demonstrate to the 
worker that he has no legitimate claim to share in the 
risks of gain, when they wish to pacify him generally 
about his subordinate role vis-a-vis the capitalist, 
lay stress on pointing out to him that, in contrast to 
the capitalist he possesses a certain fixity of income 
more or less independent of the great adventures of 
capital. Just as Don Quixote consoles Sancho Panza 
with the thought that, although of course he takes all 
the beatings, at least he is not required to be 
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brave. 58 
Marx rejects this argument because he sees the worker as the 
one who is continuously placed in situations of uncertainty 
regarding his job holding. He has no security of employment 
because of the capitalist tendency to create an industrial 
reserve army of the unemployed. 
All the familiar arguments to justify capitalist 
profits seem to have failed. As we have shown, 
rationalizations of profit in terms of ownership of capital 
and reward for entrepreneurial or managerial skill, for 
abstinence, or for risk taking, do not suffice to prove the 
capitalist's case. Because the capitalist is unable to 
justify his share of the product, he seems to exploit and 
consequently, to rob the worker of what rightfully belongs 
to him. Exploitation is wrong and unjust because non-
producers appropriate and control the produce of direct 
producers. Accordingly, Jon Elster reinforces the moral 
wrongness of exploitation: "Exploitation is wrong; 
exploiters are morally condemnable; a society that tolerates 
or generates exploitation ought to be abolished. 11 59 
In the overall, Marx's theory seems persuasive in 
respect to the capital-labor relationship at least within a 
stylized model. But the real problem with Marx's model is 
its relation with the specific problem that I am interested 
in namely, capital-labor relations within a given country. 
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It is not immediately obvious how this model should be 
applied to First and Third World relations. Here, we must 
turn to Emmanuel for an answer. 
r 
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CHAPTER IV 
AGHIRI EMMANUEL: UNEQUAL EXCHANGE 
A. Exposition 
on account of the diminishing degree of world 
domination by old European colonial powers, the Leninist 
theory of imperialism has lost some of its plausibility. A 
new thesis which emphasizes the indirect economic 
exploitation of the rest of the world by the industrial 
nations has gained more ground: this is the theory of 
"unequal exchange." 1 The leading protagonist of this new 
theory is Arghiri Emmanuel, who uses the Marxian theoretic 
framework as developed in Capital in analyzing the issue of 
unequal exchange. 
"Unequal exchange" is Emmanuel's key theoretical cate 
gory, which is employed to convey the notion that on the 
world market, the poor countries are obliged to sell the 
products of a relatively large quantum of labor-hours (both 
direct and indirect) in order to obtain in exchange from the 
rich countries commodities embodying a much smaller quantum 
of labor-hours. More specifically, Emmanuel argues that the 
structure and functioning of the capitalist world market is 
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determined by a definite law of price formation which 
involves in 'an unequal rewarding of factors,' most notably, 
the 'labor factor.' This law tends to produce an 
• inequality in exchange' between rich and poor countries. 
This inequality, Emmanuel argues, in turn dictates an 
international division of labor which is detrimental to the 
interests of the latter group of countries. 
Emmanuel's theory was first developed in a paper 
presented at the Sorbonne on December 18, 1962. 2 In this 
paper, he concentrates on the problems of international 
exchange, and puts particular emphasis on indirect 
exploitation under the guise of •equal exchange' as opposed 
to direct exploitation based on imperialist power. In his 
Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade, 
Emmanuel expands his analysis. He reformulates Marx's 
formulae for the transformation of values into prices of 
production so as to examine why the terms of trade for 
developing countries are consistently unfavorable. More 
precisely, he argues that under capitalism, prices are 
determined by what Marx called 'prices of production', part 
of which is wages. Given that wages are lower in colonial 
and semi-colonial countries, a product of a certain number 
of hours of labor of these countries can be bought by the 
rich ones by giving in exchange a product that has cost a 
smaller number of hours of labor. For Emmanuel, these 
unequal trading relations are the root cause of the 
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•inequality between nations' as well as the cornerstone of 
imperialism. Thus, imperalism is the exploitation of labor 
in developing countries with the benefits accruing to the 
consumers in the developed countries because of the 
favorable terms of trade their countries enjoy. 
Since, on his view, unfavorable terms of trade are 
inevitable for developing countries, due to the immobility 
of labor and the significantly higher level of wages in 
developed countries, Emmanuel criticizes other commonly 
discussed explanations of the terms of trade. As he says, 
"the •worsening of the terms of trade for primary products' 
is an optical illusion. It results from a mistaken 
identification of the exports of the poor countries with the 
export of primary products. 11 3 To justify his claim, 
Emmanuel refers to a number of empirical instances which run 
contrary to the view that demand for primary products is 
inelastic - with the result that prices fall after supply 
reaches a certain level: 
The copper of Zambia and the gold of South Africa are 
no more primary than coal, which only yesterday was 
one of the chief exports of Great Britain; sugar is 
about as much •manufactured' as soap or margarine and 
certainly more 'manufactured' than Scotch Whisky or 
the great wine of France . . . bananas and spices are 
no more primary than meat or diary products. And yet 
the prices of the former decline while those of the 
latter rise; and the only common characteristic is 
that they are, respectively, the products of poor 
countries and the products of rich countries. 4 
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Furthermore, when manufactured goods are no longer produced 
in the industrialized countries, their formerly high prices 
fall: 
why 
" 
Textiles were formerly among the pillars of wealth of 
the industrialized countries, and Britain's warhorse; 
since they have become the specialty of poor 
countries, their prices hardly suffice to provide a 
starvation wage for the workers who produce them.5 
The crucial question that Emmanuel wishes to answer is 
certain category of countries whatever they 
undertake and whatever they produce always exchange a large 
amount of their national labour for a smaller amount of 
foreign labour? 11 6 To answer this question, Emmanuel prefers 
a stylized model employing classical Marxian categories. 
His model is based on the following key assumptions. First, 
it is assumed that capital is internationally mobile. 
Capital will flow around the world looking for the most 
profitable investment outlets. over time, this will cause 
the rate of profit to tend to equalize. On the other hand, 
labor is not internationally mobile. 7 Consequently, wage 
rates will not tend to equalize between countries as they do 
within countries. Most controversially, wages are held by 
Emmanuel to be "independent variables" determined not so 
much by market forces as by what he characterizes in Marxian 
fashion as the "social and historical factor. 118 An 
important element of this is the "trade union" factor, which 
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itself is shaped by other non-market factors: 
The effectiveness of trade-union factor itself, and 
the outcome of collective or individual negotiation in 
general between wage earners and their employees, 
depends to a large extent upon the relation between 
what the workers are demanding and what society 
regards, in a certain place and at a certain moment, 
as the standard of wages. It depends on a certain 
level of attainment, which is itself the result of 
past struggle and evolutions.9 
This "social and historical factor," Emmanuel says, 
brings about the differences in wages in different countries 
making "· •. impossible the equalization of wages on a world 
scale" under conditions of free trade.10 Consequently, in 
international trade relations, II • differences between 
wages, not being able to affect profits these being 
equalized by the assumed mobility of capital - will affect 
prices. 1111 To demonstrate exactly how unequal wages lead to 
unequal exchange, Emmanuel uses stylized Marxian model to 
understand the basic argument. The numerical examples in 
Table I will help to illustrate this point. 
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TABLE I 
Unequal Exchange: Primary Form 
Commo- K Constant Variable Surplus Value Rate of Price 
dity capital capital value .- prof it p=(c+v 
c v s c+v+s (r) =s/K +rK 
1 1000 100 50 150 300 250/2000 275 
= 12.5% 
2 1000 100 100 100 300 do 325 
We are assuming here that the two countries produce 
distinct commodities (1 and 2) each of which requires 
exactly the same initial investment of capital (K) and 
exactly the same quantities of indirect and direct labor per 
unit of output. The only difference between the two 
countries is the wage rate. Recall that in Marx's 
terminology that c = indirect labor, that v+s = direct labor 
and that v = the wage = the labor embodied in the goods the 
wage purchases. (In this example, the wage rate in 
commodity 2 producing country is twice the wage rate in 
commodity 1 producing country since 50 buys 200 hours of 
living labor in commodity 1 country and 100 hours in 
commodity 2 country). Recall that a product's value is the 
total embodied labor c+v+s. For Emmanuel, the uniform 
prof it rate is calculated by dividing total surplus value by 
total initial investment.12 
Now in the above example, we see that the condition 
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that the rate if profit be uniform requires that each 
country receives exactly half the total surplus value. But 
for this to occur, prices must deviate from labor values. A 
unit of commodity 1 must be sold for 275, thus realizing a 
profit of 150 and a unit of commodity 2 must sell for 325. 
Because labor cost is unequal and total cost is unequal, 
prices must be unequal even though each commodity embodies 
precisely the same amount of labor. This is the "unequal 
exchange" Emmanuel is talking about.13 
On the world market, one unit of commodity 1 will 
exchange for less than one unit of commodity 2. To be 
precise, it will exchange for 275/325 = 11/13 units of 
commodity 2. An equal exchange in price terms masks an 
unequal exchange in labor terms. 
Thus Emmanuel shows how in a free trade situation, 
there can be a "hidden" transfer of surplus from the 
low-wage to the high-wage country.14 The transfer of 
surplus, which is proportional to the wage differential, is 
hidden, because in price terms, equal exchange for equals. 
Generally speaking, the quantity of unequal exchange is 
determined by the wage differential between rich and poor 
countries and the volume of trade between them. Because the 
process is cummulative, Emmanuel argues that it is the main 
cause of the dynamic growth in the rich countries, on the 
one hand, and continued stagnation and underdevelopment in 
the poor countries, on the other. 
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To sum up Emmanuel's stand, it is neither the 
difference in capital intensity nor the variation in .rate of 
profit, but the wage differential between the First and 
Third World countries that is fundamental in making the 
commodities exported from the latter cheaper in price than 
what is warranted by their value {that is, 
labor-content) .15 This happens even under competitive 
capitalist conditions. Monopoly elements, if and where they 
operate, are likely to tilt the balance all the more against 
the poor countries of the world. 
How then might we overcome the problems of stagnation 
and underdevelopment resulting from "unequal exchange?" In 
a rhetorical answer, Emmanuel asks: 
Would it be enough to improve the terms of trade, by 
increasing wages, for development to follow? 
Certainly not. However substantial may be the 
transfer of value engendered by unequal exchange, and 
even if we take into account not merely the immediate 
and momentary impact this has but also its cummulative 
effect from year to year, this transfer does not seem 
to be sufficient to explain completely the difference 
. • • between, on the one hand, the big industrial 
countries, and on the other, the underdeveloped ones. 
To find the reason for this we must look at the move 
ment of capital and the international division of 
labor.16 
On a cursory reading of this passage, one might conclude 
that Emmanuel is saying these two factors - the movement of 
capital and the international division of labor are 
directly responsible for the underdevelopment of the Third 
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World. This is not so. Indeed, both factors are forces 
which block development, but they are secondary rather than 
primary since 
... it so happens that the same cause, that is, the 
disparity between wage levels that produces unequal 
exchange and thereby, indirectly, a certain unevenness 
of development through the draining off of part of the 
surplus available for accumulation, also produces, 
directly and independently of this draining off 
process, uneven development itself, as a whole, by 
setting in motion the mechanism of these blocking 
forces included in the movement of capital and the 
international division of labor.17 
Emmanuel's point is that capital moves toward countries in 
which there are already extensive outlets and expanding 
markets - to areas where aggregate wage levels are high 
neglecting those areas where wages are low.18 Emmanuel 
claims: "this is true not only of foreign capital flowing in 
but also of the small surplus formed locally in low-wage 
countries. 11 19 Union Miniere in Katanga, Congo, expatriates 
its profits. Canadian Petrofina, a Belgian affiliate 
company of Union Miniere operating in Canada invests its 
profits locally.20 This is not because the Belgian parent 
company is concerned with underdeveloping Katanga and 
overdeveloping Canada, but because the latter country 
provides a large market while the former does not. The 
situation in Katanga is an effect, not a cause, of low 
wages, though once established it becomes a cause in its 
turn by further blocking the development of productive 
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forces in Katanga, while further developing them in Canada. 
The same logic also applies to the international division of 
labor. In poor countries, low-paid laborers keep machines 
and engineers out of business, while in rich countries, 
machines and engineers take the place of highly paid 
laborers. Thus again, productive forces are held back in 
poor countries and pushed forward in the rich ones, and the 
vicious circle tightens the more. Emmanuel does not deny 
any tendency of capital flow to low-wage countries. His 
main point is that such capital does not significantly 
affect wages. Also, there is a flow of capital in the other 
direction. Whatever capital is accumulated in the Third 
World tend to flow back into the rich countries. 
Some implications arise from Emmanuel's analysis of 
his theory. First, given unequal exchange and the tendency 
for the rates of profit to equalize around the world, then 
the main benef iaciaries of the imperialism of trade are not 
(at least, in the long run) the capitalists but the 
consumers.21 Since the majority of consumers are workers, 
it is Emmanuel's contention that workers in the advanced 
industrialized countries have a vested interest in the 
exploitation of workers in the developing countries. 
Consequently, he claims that the interests of workers in the 
high wage industrialized countries are diametrically opposed 
to the interests of workers in the low wage developing 
countries, since for a given international rate of profit, a 
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rise in wages in a high-wage country requires a lowering of 
wages in a low-wage country to restore equality of prices of 
commodities internationally. 
Second, unequal exchange theory challenges an argument 
originating from writings on imperialism that the extraction 
of capital from the Third World to the industrialized 
countries via repatriated profits is a basic cause of 
underdevelopment.22 His view also runs contrary to the idea 
that overseas investment is a response of surplus capital in 
the metropolis, but the main point is that the new flow of 
capital from the Third World to the industrialized countries 
is an effect, not a cause of underdevelopment. The reason, 
as already noted, is lack of market outlets, but repatriated 
capital becomes a contributory cause in helping to tighten 
the vicious circle. It is the absence of markets (which is 
in turn related to the lack of high aggregate wage levels) 
which Emmanuel sees as critical. Capitalism, he argues, 
works contrary to common sense. Under capitalism, 
consumption determines production rather than vice versa: 
We begin with the end, with consumption, by creating a 
market actual or potential, which is sufficiently 
large. In this way capital is attracted, and the 
corresponding consumer goods are produced. When 
these industries become extensive enough, and their 
need for mechanization (owing to high wages) is great 
enough, a second market is created for capital goods, 
and this in turn attracts further capital, which 
establishes heavy industry. We keep on going upstream 
all the time. Like certain fish, capitalism can keep 
afloat and move forward only by swimming against 
the stream.23 
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Like Marx who struck at the very roots of bourgeois 
economics, Emmanuel strikes at the core of the marginalist 
theory of international trade. He challenges the 
assumptions that 
(1) trade is necessarily beneficial to both partners; 
and 
(2) that comparative advantages ought always to be 
exploited. 
Emmanuel doesn't so much deny (1) as show that something can 
be mutually beneficial in a sense and at the same time, be 
exploitative for one of the parties involved. This is 
exactly parallel to Marx's demonstration that the wage-
capital relationship is mutually beneficial to both the 
capitalist and the worker and yet, it is exploitative to the 
worker. Prima facie, wage contract appears to be a free 
exchange between the capitalist and the worker. Obviously, 
each one thinks that he is better off and that they are both 
better off exchanging than not exchanging. The worker is 
better off taking the job than not taking the job. Likewise, 
in the exchange between developed and underdeveloped 
countries, both sides are better off trading than not 
trading, or else, they would not have traded in the first 
place. There has to be some advantage to be gained by both 
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sides before they engage in free trade. 
But Emmanuel's critique is similar to the Marxian 
critique. The worker is better off taking job than not 
taking the job given the framework under which that free 
choice is made. Likewise, given the framework of 
international trade, a country may be better off trading 
than not trading. But it is the framework itself that is 
being called into question. 
By articulating the mechanism of unequal exchange, 
Emmanuel denies the prevailing contention of non-Marxists 
that the development process in the countries of the Third 
World can be based on the exploitation of their respective 
"comparative advantage" in the production of commodities for 
the world market. In the short run, comparative advantage 
may be beneficial but in the long run, the gap will widen. 
Also, the theory of unequal exchange contradicts the 
unidirectional theory of historical development: that 
'underdevelopment' is simply the manifestation of a time-lag 
in the natural tendency towards a homogeneous level of 
development throughout the capitalist regions of the world. 
In other words, Emmanuel is saying that (i) it is the very 
integration of the Third World and the industrialized 
countries that led historically to •underdevelopment', and 
that (ii) it is the continuance of the relationship in the 
framework of the international capitalist economy that 
reproduces and intensifies this condition of 
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underdevelopment. 
It is worth noting that Emmanuel's model, however 
elegant it might be, has certain mathematical problems. How 
significant they are, is a matter of some controversy.24 
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B. Moral Assumptions and Arguments 
In analyzing Marx's theory of exploitation, we picked 
out what we thought to be his basic moral commitment, namely 
that those who produce the surplus should control it. It is 
not necessarily that each worker should get the full product 
of his labor. The point is that workers do not control the 
surplus. Now what is the moral assumption in Emmanuel's 
theory? For Emmanuel, free trade is exploitative because a 
formally equal exchange conceals an unequal exchange. It 
would seem to follow that Emmanuel's ethical assumption is 
that when countries trade, at least prima facie, equal 
expenditures of labor ought to command goods embodying equal 
amounts of labor. 
When looking at Marx's critique of capitalism, many 
commentators see as his moral presupposition the assumption 
that the worker should receive the full product of his 
labor. But we argued in chapter III that this is not the 
case. Marx's objection is that workers do not control the 
surplus. It is clear, however, that an analogous move 
cannot be made here. Even if we were to take Marx's model 
of capitalist-worker relationship as being analogous to 
First and Third World relations, there is an important 
difference. For Marx, the capitalist qua capitalist does not 
contribute anything, does not produce anything, and so, he 
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is not entitled to anything. But in Emmanuel's analysis, 
both the First and Third World countries are in. fact 
producing something. It is just that the exchange between 
them is not fair. It is not that the underdeveloped country 
should receive or control the entire product. In Emmanuel's 
analysis, unlike Marx's, the ethical presupposition does 
seem to be that the producer should receive the full (labor) 
value of its product. 
It seem reasonable to presume that this principle is 
intended as a prima facie principle, not an absolute 
principle. This means that this principle ought to hold 
unless it is overridden by another moral principle. Other 
moral principles might refer to need, sacrifice, reparation 
for past injustice, etc. The point is that exceptions might 
be made to the equals for equals principle but these 
exceptions have to be justified in terms of other moral 
principles. But what Emmanuel's argument shows is that the 
unequal exchange between countries will occur simply due to 
the fact that the wage level is higher in the developed than 
in the underdeveloped countries. However, it does not seem 
that this is a morally relevant reason as to why the 
developed country ought to benefit more from the exchange at 
the expense of the underdeveloped country. Nor does it seem 
morally relevant that the developed country happens to be 
more capital-intensive than the underdeveloped country, and 
yet this factor will also give rise to unequal exchange. 
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An objection might be raised here that the workers in 
the advanced industrialized countries have merited the 
increase in their wages, that it is not arbitrary or 
accidental that their wages are higher. It might be argued 
that their wages are higher because they have more skills, 
they work harder, they employ capital-intensive technology, 
etc. The rejoinder to this argument is that it is highly 
implausible to suppose that Third World workers work less 
hard or are less innately skilled than their First World 
counterparts. It seems obvious that they receive higher 
wages because they are using more capital-intensive 
techniques. But one of the reasons they are able to use the 
more capital-intensive technology is because they have the 
surplus they extracted from the underdeveloped countries via 
unequal exchange to pay for it. And the very fact that they 
have higher wages is going to provide an incentive to the 
capitalist to use more mechanization or capital-intensive 
machineries. so, the high wages provide the motive for the 
capitalist to try to cut labor costs not by cutting the 
workers' wages but by replacing the workers with more 
machines. Since the capital to purchase those machines, in 
part comes from the process of "unequal exchange, " the 
mechanization factor is not a moral reason to justify 
inequality. 
The point to stress is that the voluntariness in and 
of itself is not sufficient to ensure the lack of 
exploitation. 
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The point of all Marxian theories of 
exploitation is that structural features constrain options 
in such a way that even though certain choices are 
voluntary, basic moral principles are nonetheless 
violated. 25 In the case of Emmanuel, he shows that the 
structural features of unequal wages will compel a voluntary 
exchange of unequal quantities of labor. 
Even if we were to grant the moral relevance of the 
gap of unequal wages, and if people deserve the higher 
wages, it is still not altogether clear that therefore, the 
exchange is fair. Even if the developed countries deserve 
that gap, unequal exchange widens the gap. It is widening 
the gap simply because wages in the developed country, for 
whatever reasons, are higher. Even if the original gap were 
justifiable on ethically relevant grounds, the additional 
inequality cannot be so justified, because, in Emmanuel's 
model, all such factors have been held constant. 
Another argument proffered against the "unequal 
exchange" theory is to say that this exchange is voluntary, 
since none of the parties has been forced to trade with each 
other. This is a version of Nozick's counterargument 
against Marx: there is nothing exploitative and immoral in 
an exchange between 'consenting adults. ' If both parties 
agree, that is moral and ethical. 
As a critique of "free trade" between the 
developed and underdeveloped countries,· we have singled out 
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Emmanuel's moral principle as being that equal labor ought 
to exchange for equal labor. Intuitively, it seems that one 
of our considered moral judgments is that people who work 
equally hard ought to receive equal returns. But if critics 
do not accept this moral principle as compelling, for 
whatever reason they might have, there is yet another theory 
of exploitation which give the same result as Emmanuel's 
without relying on this principle. It breaks down the world 
into the same classes of "exploited" and the "exploiters" as 
does Emmanuel's theory. It also avoids the technical 
problems associated with Emmanuel's use of the labor theory 
of value mentioned at the end of the previous section. This 
is the game theoretic treatment of exploitation of John 
Roemer. 
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CHAPTER V 
JOHN ROEMER: MARXIAN GAME THEORY 
A. Exposition 
Roemer's general theory 
generalizes and subsumes both 
frameworks as special cases. 
the purpose of embedding 11 
of exploitation and class 
the Marxian and Emmanuel 
Says Roemer, his theory has 
the Marxian theory of 
exploitation into a more general theory. 11 1 Recall that for 
Marx, the worker-capitalist relation is the paradigm and 
that for Emmanuel, it is First and Third World relations. 
But with Roemer's theory, an abstract withdrawal condition 
is central to his analysis which can be applied to the class 
of workers in a country or to a Third World country. 
Roemer' s theory generalizes and encompasses both of these 
theories in the sense that those groups that are exploited 
in Marx's theory are also exploited in Roemer' s and those 
countries that are exploited in Emmanuel's theory are 
equally exploited in Roemer's. So, Roemer's theory picks 
out the same groups of exploited people or country as in 
Marx and Emmanuel's models respectively. 
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It is because Roemer sees Marx's theory 
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of 
exploitation as weak and inapplicable as a general theory 
that he seeks to refine it by constructing a general theory 
of exploitation that is independent of any labor theory of 
value. According to Roemer, the Marxian theory of 
exploitation defined as transfer of labor surplus is 
extremely fragile. It works reasonably well only under the 
most unrealistic conditions. These conditions are in fact 
so restrictive that they are not met in any existing 
society. For instance, the theory yields anomalous results 
in societies where agents are differentially endowed with 
inalienable assets or skills. It is the desire to correct 
such anomalies that motivated Roemer to construct his own 
general theory of exploitation. 
Roemer's theory is based on the game theoretic 
definition of exploitation which relies on counterfactual 
alternatives to the property relations of the society under 
consideration. 2 The definition which provides the general 
condition for exploitation, by relying on the feasibility of 
a better alternative, is given essentially as follows: a 
group is exploited if by withdrawing from the present 
allocation system to a feasible hypothetical alternative, it 
can make its members better off. More precisely, in a 
society composed of N agents divided into two coalitions, a 
coalition s and its complementary coalition, S'=N-S, 
coalition s is considered exploited by coalition S' in the 
initial state if these three conditions are fulfilled: 
1. There is a feasible alternative state in which 
coalition S would be better off than in its 
present situation; 
2. Under this alternative, coalition S' would be 
worse off than at present; 
3. Coalition S' is in a relationship of dominance 
to coalition s. This dominance enables it to 
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prevent coalition s from realizing the 
alternative.3 
1. Withdrawal Condition 
This definition is not by itself operational without a 
specification of what is considered feasible. The test of 
exploitation lies in the ability of the exploited coalition, 
s, to withdraw from the larger society, N, under the 
specified withdrawal rule into a feasible superior 
alternative arrangement in which it is better off, and its 
complement coalition, S' worse off .4 
Roemer's theory of exploitation differs from the 
classical Marxian model in which exploitation was defined in 
terms of transfer of surplus labor. Here, it is defined in 
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terms of counterfactual alternatives to the property 
relations in a society. It differs also in that forms of 
exploitation other than capitalist exploitation can also be 
modelled, depending on the specification of the withdrawal 
rule. Once the withdrawal rules are specified for the 
general theory, one may define the respective games and the 
particular forms of exploitation arising from them. In this 
way Roemer defines feudal, capitalist and socialist 
exploitation. 
Roemer conceives of feudalism as a system in which the 
bondage imposed on the serf is the obligation to perform 
desmesne and corvee labor for the lord despite the serf's 
possession of means of production, including the family 
land. The serf is not allowed to sell his labor power on a 
market or to work exclusively for himself. To model what 
Roemer calls this "feudal exploitation," he specifies the 
withdrawal rule to allow the coalition of serfs to leave the 
feudal society taking with them their own assets including 
their own subsistence plots. If this coalition is better 
off and can improve the welfare of its members under this 
alternative state, and if the lords become worse off, then 
the coalition is considered feudally exploited. 
Feudal exploitation results specifically from feudal 
relations: it is related to the special case of coercive 
production relations whereby surplus labor is provided to 
the feudal lord by the serf. What Roemer models under this 
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stylistic formulation of feudal game is a characterization 
of what might also be called the neoclassical concept of 
exploitation: a producer is exploited if he is not being 
paid his marginal product. The neoclassical statement that 
an agent is not exploited so long as he receives his 
marginal product becomes, in Roemer' s theory, "there is no 
feudal exploitation under (perfect) capitalism. 11 5 
In a feudal mode of production, serfs are feudally 
exploited. Roemer claims, "withdrawal, under these [feudal] 
rules, amounts to withdrawal from feudal bondage, only. 11 6 
He believes that if a group of serfs had been allowed to 
withdraw from feudal society with their endowments, most 
importantly their land, they would have been better off, 
having access to the same means of production, but providing 
no labor for the lord. Instead they work the land only for 
themselves. Clearly, the complementary coalition would be 
worse off, not benefiting from the serfs' surplus labor. 
Consequently, the serfs as a class were feudally exploited, 
and the lords were the feudal exploiters. Capitalism 
abolished this kind of exploitation but not all 
exploitation. 
In capitalism, rather than unequal access to personal 
freedom, the source of inequality is unequal access to the 
means of production or as Roemer prefers to designate them, 
society's alienable (productive) assets. 7 The test for 
capitalist exploitation lies in the attempt to equalize the 
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access of all agents to the means of production. A 
different rule is defined for this game. A coalition is 
allowed to withdraw from the society taking with it not only 
its own endowments (allowed under the feudal game) but also 
its per capita share of the society's alienable assets. A 
coalition is capitalistically exploited if it can improve 
the lot of its members in the alternative situation by 
withdrawing with its per capita share of the alienable 
assets, this withdrawal making the complementary class worse 
off . 8 
One of Roemer's most impressive analytical 
accomplishments is his demonstration that his general theory 
in its special formulation subsumes the surplus labor 
definition as a special case. When Roemer's definition is 
applied to those cases where the labor theory of value is 
applicable, it selects the same classes of exploited and 
exploiters as the surplus labor analysis. In other words, 
the coalitions which are charaterized as exploited by 
Marxian definition (in terms of working longer than socially 
necessary labor time) are precisely the coalitions which are 
characterized as exploited by Roemer's definition (in terms 
of having superior alternative under the per capita share 
withdrawal option).9 A coalition that is Marxian exploited 
because surplus labor is extracted from it and transfered to 
the exploiting coalition, is also capitalistically exploited 
since it will be better off and improve its welfare by 
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withdrawing from the larger society with its per ca pi ta 
share of society's alienable assets and conversely. Marxian 
exploitation is therefore shown as a special case of 
capitalist exploitation, the form of exploitation inherent 
in specifically capitalist property relations. According to 
Roemer, the historical mission of socialism is to abolish 
this form of exploitation, exploitation based on the 
differential ownership of the means of production, or 
equivalently, private property in alienable assets. 
In socialism, as Roemer conceives it, the source of 
inequality is not capitalist exploitation, since all are 
presumed to have equal access to the means of production. 
Socialism is defined to be a society in which private 
ownership of property has been abolished, so that no 
coalition can improve its welfare by withdrawing and taking 
its per capita share of the society's alienable assets. 
Socialism does not abolish all inequality, however. The 
source of inequality in socialism is the differential 
ownership of inalienable assets, that is, skills, education, 
etc. Roemer calls exploitation based on these inequalities 
"socialist exploitation." The appropriate withdrawal rule 
is thus specified: a coalition may withdraw from society 
not only with their endowments and their per capita share of 
the alienable assets, but also with their per capita share 
of the inalienable assets.10 If the coalition can improve 
itself and if its complementary coalition is worse off under 
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the alternative arrangement, then the original coalition is 
socialistically exploited. Socialist exploitation therefore 
exists in a society where agents relate to each other as 
owners of differential inalienable assets and are rewarded 
according to their contributions. Its abolition is, 
according to Roemer, the historical mission of communism. 
communism will abolish exploitation and inequality based on 
the differential ownership of the inalienable assets and, 
ultimately, realize the slogan, "from each according to his 
ability, to each according to his needs." 
2. Dominance Condition 
A component of Roemer' s definition of exploitation 
which we have so far overlooked is the dominance 
requirement: "Coalition S' is in a relationship of 
dominance to coalition s. nll In other words, for 
exploitation to occur, coalition S', the exploiter must be 
in a relation of dominance to coalition s, the exploited. 
This entails that "the coalition S' prevents the alternative 
from being realized, which gives rise to its exploitation of 
s. 11 12 Although Roemer does not define what he means exactly 
by the notion, "dominance", he sees this condition as 
" ... necessary to rule out certain bizarre examples" to his 
core definition of exploitation.13 
given. 14 
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Two such examples are 
First is the case of an invalid who is supported by 
society at a very high cost. On the basis of the first two 
components of Roemer' s game theoretic def ini ti on of 
exploitation, the invalid is a capitalist exploiter because 
if he withdrew with his share of the resources he would be 
worse off and the rest of society would be better off. But 
when the dominance condition is taken into account, this 
judgment (which sees the invalid as capitalistically 
exploiting the rest of society) fails, because the invalid 
does not stand in a relation of dominance to the rest of 
society. If anything, it is the society that dominates him 
through its decision regarding the support he is entitled. 
The second example is the case of two islands, one 
that is rich and the other that is poor, which have no 
relationship with each other (and not even trade) • 
According to the first two components of exploitation, the 
rich islands appears to be capitalistically exploiting the 
poor island since the latter would be better off were it to 
withdraw its per ca pi ta share of the combined resources, 
while the rich island would be worse off. But when the 
dominance condition is invoked, the rich island does not 
capitalistically exploit the poor island because there is no 
relationship between them. 
The dominance condition is thought by Roemer to be of 
an incidental necessity. 
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Its function within the core 
definition of exploitation is strategic, particularly in 
helping to eliminate bizarre cases. But for all practical 
purposes, Roemer says, the first two components of the 
general theory taken together are a satisfactory definition 
of exploitation.15 
B. Moral Assumptions 
We have noted that Roemer' s theory generalizes and 
subsumes Marx's theory of exploitation as a special case. 
But in doing this, Roemer' s theory appeals to a moral 
principle different from the one in Marx. The moral 
presupposition underlying Roemer's game theoretic definiton 
of capitalist exploitation is the moral right of a member of 
a collective to its per capita share of the collective' s 
resources, the alienable assets. This is the assumption of 
"egalitarian property entitlements,nl6 
assumption that property rights ought 
that is, the 
to be equally 
distributed. This assumption, Roemer says, "· •• poses the 
alternative against which one evaluates whether a coalition 
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is capitalistically exploited."17 
We should note that exploitation is not due, 
fundamentally, to certain people being excluded from the 
means of production, and hence compelled to sell their 
services for a wage. Roemer demonstrates that even if 
everyone owns the means of production necessary to produce 
their subsistence, and even if there is no surplus and no 
exchange of labor, exploitation will still occur, as long as 
the initial endowments in the means of production are 
unequal. What this means is that differential endowment is 
the cause (or to use Roemer's term, "the chief culprit") of 
capitalist exploitation. The negation of exploitation 
therefore requires that endowments be equally distributed. 
On this ground, Roemer believes that once the initial 
distribution of endowments is equal, then there would be no 
(capitalist) exploitation. 
Socialist exploitation is something quite different 
for Roemer. Given that this definition has a different 
counterfactual, he also has a different ethical 
presupposition. The ethical assumption underlying Roemer's 
characterization of socialist exploitation is there is 
something unfair going on if each individual does not have 
access to the equal share of the talents in the society. 
There is an interesting parallel here to be drawn 
between the ethical presupposition in socialist exploitation 
and the ethical principles in Rawls' s theory of justice. 
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Rawls maintains that just because one is more talented does 
not by itself entail one having a greater share of societal 
assets.18 He argues that it is just to give talented people 
more of the societal assets, not because they have a right 
to them but because of the difference principle: one needs 
to give them more of the societal assets to create that 
incentive which is necessary to make societal goods larger 
than they would have otherwise been. Rawls is very 
egalitarian in his impulses. Absolute equality is the prima 
facie case. Any deviation from this rule has to be 
justified on the grounds that it will create the incentive 
in people to make the total output bigger and that a portion 
of this increase will benefit the least well off segment of 
society. If differential rewards are to be allocated to 
people who work harder, or who have extra talents or 
entrepreneurial skills, these need to be justified on the 
grounds that they will make the quantity of societal goods 
larger while making the people at the lower strata of 
society better off than they would have otherwise been. 
Similarly, Roemer believes in the prima facie case of 
absolute equality: if everyone has an equal share of 
societal inalienable assets, there would no feudal, 
capitalist or socialist exploitation. Unlike Rawls, he is 
willing to call deviations from equality due to unequal 
talents "exploitation," though he is willing to concede that 
such exploitation is probably necessary during a period of 
r 
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transition from socialism to communism. 
To return to capitalist exploitation: in terms of 
result, Roemer's theory seems to be identical with Marx's, 
but when we look at the ethical presuppositions behind the 
two theories, they are quite different. This would seem a 
good reason to discuss and compare the moral assumptions of 
the two models. 
Marx's ethical presupposition is (as pointed out in 
Chapter III) that people who produce the economic surplus 
should control it. For Roemer, what is wrong with 
(capitalist) exploitation is that people are denied equal 
access to the means of production. Prima facie, it is odd 
that the two models should be the same in terms of their 
results, and yet, to have different moral presuppositions. 
The models are homologous in the sense that they pick out 
the same class of exploiters and exploited, but the reasons 
for qualifying those parties as "exploiters" and "exploited" 
are quite different. This oddity calls for further analysis 
and questioning. 
Which of the 
intuitively obvious: 
ethical presuppositions is more 
that everyone ought to have an equal 
share of the resources of the society or that producers 
ought to control their product? Which of these seems to be 
more ethically compelling? It seems to me reasonably 
obvious that if I contribute 10 labor hours of work to 
society, I should receive or at least control an equivalent 
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amount of the social product. Roemer' s assumption seems 
less obvious. Why ought I get a per capita share of my 
country's productive assets? On what basis do I justify my 
equal share of societal resources? 
It would seem that Roemer's moral assumption is more 
problematic than the assumption which underlies Marx's 
theory. It seems to be less problematic to say that those 
people or that group which produces surplus product ought to 
control it. If it is true that workers do produce the 
surplus (of course one can argue about this claim), then it 
certainly seems morally justifiable that they ought to 
control it. It seems that almost everyone would agree with 
this conception. People may disagree about whether or not 
the workers alone produce the surplus product, but if they 
grant that part of Marx's theory, the moral judgment is not 
particularly problematic. 
Likewise, Emmanuel's moral presupposition seems to be 
fairly non-problematic: people who put in equal amount of 
labor, all else equal, ought to get an equal return. Equal 
pay for equal work is a widely held moral assumption. 
People might argue that First and Third World workers are 
not equally skilled, but as I noted earlier, in Emmanuel's 
model, all those differences are assumed away. Emmanuel 
shows that even if we do have equal skill, equal intensity, 
equal hours of work, etc., still one country will get a lot 
more return than the other, because free trade will generate 
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unequal exchange if wages or capital intensities are 
unequal. So, the moral principle underlying Emmanuel's 
theory seems to be reasonable. It would likely count as one 
of Rawls's "considered moral judgments." 
On the other hand, Roemer's moral principle that 
everyone ought to have equal access to the collective' s 
resources is less universally accepted. This is not to say 
that it is wholly counterintuitive, but suffice it to say 
that there are cases where this moral presupposition would 
seem to be less than obvious. Here, I am refering to the 
kind of cases that Roemer himself gives. For example, there 
is the case of two islands, totally unconnected and having 
no trade or relationship with each other.19 One island is 
rich in resources and the other is poor. Do people in the 
wealthy island have a moral obligation to share their 
resources with those of the poor island? And in particular, 
once we make this example a little more concrete, we need to 
ask: how do some of those resources come about? Suppose the 
inhabitants of the rich island have worked hard, developed 
some efficient technology, dug mines, etc. while the 
inhabitants of the poor island have lazied around, have not 
dug mines, etc., can we not then correctly maintain that the 
inhabitants of the poor island are poor as a result of their 
own doing. 
But how does this example fare under the moral 
assumption of Roemer's theory? Roemer claims that everyone 
r 
167 
ought to have equal per capita share of the resources and if 
they do not, then they are being exploited. In other words, 
if the rich island is developing and is much richer than the 
poor island, on Roemer's moral assumption, the former will 
be exploiting the latter. This claim seems bizarre and 
counterintuitive. If the inhabitants of the rich island do 
not have any dealings with the inhabitants of the poor 
island, how could they exploit them? 
It is in order to counter such an objection that 
Roemer invokes the dominance condition20: the rich island 
has to dominate the poor island in some way in order for the 
relationship to be really exploitative. With the 
introduction of the dominance requirement, we now have a 
second condition that has to be violated in order for 
exploitation to arise. First, the condition has to be 
violated that individuals have an equal right of access to 
the collective per capita assets. Secondly, people's right 
not to be dominated has to be violated. These are 
the two moral principles that underlie Roemer•s theory. 
We have earlier on compared the moral assumptions 
underlying Marx, Emmanuel and Roemer' s models. In Marx's 
model, what is violated is the right of producers to control 
their surplus product. What is violated in Emmanuel's model 
is the right of an individual to get an equal return for his 
labor. At first sight, it would seem that what is violated 
under Roemer's assumption is only equal right of individuals 
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to the alienable assets of the society. But this condition 
in and of itself is not sufficient. A second condition, the 
right to be free from domination, has to be violated. But 
one of the problems with Roemer's theory is that it does not 
explicate much about what constitutes "domination." 
If workers are exploited by capitalists or Third World 
countries by First World countries, is it because the former 
are denied equal access to resources or because they are 
dominated? Roemer says both but he elaborates only the 
first condition. 
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c. Problems with the Theory 
Roemer's general theory of exploitation specifies the 
withdrawal rules which makes an exploitative situation 
either to be feudal, capitalist or socialist. These rules 
tell us that there is exploitation going on whenever we set 
up a counterfactual situation where the exploited coalition 
is supposed to be better off and its complement coalition 
worse off. 
This technique of defining exploitation by means of 
counterfactuals, however, seems to result in a proliferation 
of anomalies, several of which have already been mentioned. 
Such anomalies seem to arise because Roemer stresses the 
status of the exploiter and the exploited in the 
counterfactual situation rather than their relations within 
the given concrete situation from which their status is 
derived. Exploitation arises as a consequence of the 
relations between the exploiter and the exploited in a given 
distribution system. "Exploitation," says Elster, "is 
exploitation because of the structure and the outcome of the 
interaction, not because of hypothetical distributions."21 
It is the interaction between the coalitions which brings 
about the exploitation of one by the other. 22 As Elster 
says, 
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Intuitively, exploitation has a causal as well as a 
moral aspect. The fact that some end up as exploiters 
and others as exploited must be due to some 
interaction between them (or to some network of 
interaction through which they are linked to one 
another). Now it is generally true that causal 
statements cannot be captured exhaustively by 
counterfactual statements: "A caused B" is neither a 
sufficient nor a necessary condition for the truth of 
"If A had not occured, B would not have occured." 
Hence we know in advance that Roemer' s attempt to 
capture the causal notion of exploitation by 
statements about hypothetical withdrawal rules is 
bound to fail.23 
The neglect of the relations between the exploiter and 
the exploited creates a lacuna in the general theory 
precisely because there is no direct connnecting link 
between the exploiter and the exploited, a link that would 
have made us to say that a coalition is the exploiter 
exploiting another coalition who is the exploited. In other 
words, there is the absence of a causal relationship between 
the coalitions such that we can say that coalition S' is an 
exploiter because it exploits or utilizes to its own 
advantage coalition S that is made worse off in the 
process. Because there is no causal connection specified 
between the exploiter and the exploited, Roemer's withdrawal 
rules are unable to determine what causes exploitation, are 
unable to determine the mechanism through which exploitation 
comes about. Roemer tries to get around this objection 
through his "dominance condition" which is supposed to 
supply the connecting (causal) link between the exploited 
and the exploiter. Unfortunately, as noted previously, this 
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condition is not adequately developed by Roemer to counter 
this objection in any meaningful way. 
D. Significance of the theory 
The fact that Roemer's theory suffers from some 
internal problems does not invalidate it as a theory of 
exploitation. As earlier observed, a theory of exploitation 
must be evaluated in the large, in light of other theories 
when all such theories when carefully examined are likely to 
be found deficient in one respect or another. 
Of major significance in evaluating Roemer' s general 
theory of exploitation is the fact that it does not appeal 
to the labor theory of value. It makes no reference at all 
to embodied labor. It seeks to dispense with the labor 
content of goods and instead, to focus on the property 
relations concept. 24 A coalition is considered to be 
exploited if it has some other alternative which is superior 
to the present allocation. "One startling outcome of this 
analysis," Roemer says, "is a formulation of Marxian 
exploitation without reference to the concept of surplus 
labor. 11 25 
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Roemer demonstrates the equivalence between the 
surplus labor definition of exploitation and the property 
relations concept holds for simple economic models where 
labor is homogeneous. But when applied to more complex 
models of differential or heterogeneous labor endowments 
' 
the labor theory of exploitation falters while the property 
relations concept remains tractable. The property relations 
approach, being more of a general definition, makes an 
advance over the surplus labor approach and includes it as a 
special case. Says Roemer, "the Marxian surplus labor of 
exploitation . [is] a special instance of a more general 
theory which is expressed in the language of property 
relations, not the labor theory of value. 11 26 What Roemer's 
theory does is to severe the link between exploitation and 
the labor theory of value. Since the labor theory of value 
itself is highly controversial and obviously not appropriate 
in certain situations involving differential skills, this 
seperation must be counted a positive development. Roemer's 
theory circumvents the perennial criticisms of Marx's theory 
of exploitation arising from the latter's reliance on the 
allegedly defective labor theory of value. 
Even though Roemer's theory has the advantage of 
generality, which is normally considered an advantage in 
theories, and even though it also has the advantage of not 
relying on the controversial labor theory of value, it now 
has the drawback of resting its moral case on two moral 
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principles, the first (that everyone has an equal right to a 
per ca pi ta share of the world's resources) which is less 
intuitively obvious and less widely acceptable than the 
principles upon which the Marxian and Emmanuel's theories 
are based, and the second (that everyone has the right to be 
free from domination) which is left unspecified and 
undeveloped. For further understanding of the notion of 
"domination," which we have seen as being important for 
understanding exploitation, we need to turn to a more 
concrete treatment of exploitation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DEVELOPMENTALISM AND DEPENDENCY 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
What dependency theory does is to elaborate on the 
"dominance" question by explaining it in terms of concrete 
historical reality of the process and mechanisms of 
domination. This is what we see when we look at dependency 
theory in relation to Roemer's theory of exploitation, 
though, of course, dependency theory has not developed 
solely to solve a problem with Roemer's theory. Essentially 
dependency theory looks at the problem of the First and 
Third World countries, and tries to suggest the reason for 
the enormous wealth that the First World countries have vis-
a-vis the poverty of the Third World. 
question confronting dependency theory. 
This is the basic 
The theories of exploitation we have been examining 
are concerned fundamentally with these moral questions: Is 
there exploitation going on in various contexts? Are the 
workers being exploited by capitalists? Are Third World 
countries being exploited by the First World countries? 
What are the mechanisms of exploitation? On the other hand, 
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dependency theory asks the question: why are some countries 
rich and others poor? It takes its point of departure from 
developmentalism, an alternative theory. To explain what 
dependency theory is, we have to see it in the context of 
this alternative theory, "developmentalism" which is tied to 
the liberal tradition, of which Steiner's theory (discussed 
in Chapter II) is a classic example. 
is developmentalism? 
Precisely then, what 
Developmentalism, as a self-conscious movement, is a 
theory that arose in the 1950s following the reconstruction 
and consolidation of the economies of Western European 
countries that had been devastated by World War II. 
secretary of State George c. Marshall's initiative in June 
1947 caused the United States to undertake an unprecedented, 
massive program of economic assistance to the war-shattered 
countries of Western Europe. At the end of World War II, 
the countries of Western Europe possessed all the 
requirements for recovery and continued development except·. 
the command over sufficient foreign exchange to replenish 
their stocks of working capital, to repair and replace 
destroyed production facilities, and to make it possible to 
restore the flow of intra-European trade. This the Marshall 
Plan provided. This Plan, which extended over four years 
and cost over $13 billion, was a triumphant success. The 
free nations of Western Europe not only recovered and 
rebuilt the foundations of their societies, but were enabled 
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as well to achieve new standards of wealth and unity. 
But World War II also ushered in another important 
change, whose global implications were not felt 
immediately. The weakening of the European powers and the 
logic of a war effort aimed at preserving self-determination 
marked the final collapse of the vast colonial empires of 
the nineteenth century and the establishment of a 
multiplicity of new States, each claiming sovereign and 
independent status. The new nations soon drew the attention 
of the United States' policymakers concerned with the claim 
that Marxism presented the best and most logical road to 
full incorporation into the modern world~ They also 
captured the attention of U.S. scholars who saw the solution 
in another Marshall Plan designed for the Third World .. · 
These theorists of developmentalism argued that now that the 
legal constraints of colonialism had been broken, the newly 
independent countries of the world, if protected of course 
from communism, would inevitably develop along the path 
followed by Europe. With independence would come increasing 
urbanization and education, the adoption of Western 
political attitudes and structures, increased Western aid 
and capital investment, the consequence of which would be 
the promised material advance and a modern society. The 
success story of the Marshall Plan in the case of Western 
Europe led to the acceptance of the belief that since 
Western Europe has enjoyed such spectacular economic 
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progress as a consequence of American economic assistance, 
similar results can be achieved by providing similar aid to 
the less developed areas of the world. This belief inspired 
I 
President Harry S. Truman's Four Point Program, which was 
designed to provide aid and technical assistance to the 
underdeveloped areas. 
Unfortunately U.S. scholars and policymakers 
overlooked the tremendous difference between the advanced 
economies of Western Europe and those of the less developed 
countries. The Marshall Plan served as a powerful catalyst 
which stimulated and released the tremendous potential 
inherent in the mature industrial societies of Western 
Europe. Unfortunately, such potential did not yet exist in 
most of the underdeveloped areas of the world. Also 
overlooked were the fundamental differences between the 
developmental experience of Europe and the underdeveloped 
areas, which mitigated against the success of such a 
strategy in the latter. For Third World countries, it was 
not simply a matter of reconstruction. Consequently, 
developmentalism failed to find a solution to the problems 
of these new emerging Third World nations. There were 
theoretical problems as well. The fact that most of Latin 
America, which had been free of colonial rule for over 125 
years, had not develbped along the lines followed by 
capitalist development in Europe could, of course, not be 
explained by the overly optimistic developmental theory. 
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There were obvious problems in applying the 
assumptions of developmentalism to the developmental 
problems of Latin America. In university research centers 
Latin American scholars tried to come to grips with the 
widespread economic stagnation which affected the region in 
the postwar period. These scholars from var~ous disciplines 
- economics, sociology and political science - turned to the 
broader and more basic question of the roots of Latin 
American underdevelopment. Many intellectual strands came 
together in the 1960s with the elaboration of a more general 
and comprehensive framework. The "dependency" theory became 
the dominant approach in most Latin American circles by the 
mid to late 1960s.1 Generally, this theory explains 
underdevelopment throughout Latin America as a consequence 
of outside economic and political influence. More 
specifically, the economy of certain countries is believed 
to be conditioned by the relationship to another economy 
which is dominant and capable of expanding and developing. 
This explanation approximates Dos Santos's definition which 
states that dependency is 
an historical condition which shapes a certain 
structure of the world economy such that it favors 
some countries to the detriment of others, and limits 
the deyelo~ment possibilities of the subordinate 
economies. 
Developmentalism and dependency are thus two sharply 
/ 
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different frameworks giving different explanations of 
development and underdevelopment. The former maintains that 
the development of Latin American countries will come ·about 
through external influence and assistance, while the latter 
sees foreign penetration as the cause of underdevelopment. 
These two models originated in different areas with 
different methodologies, different explanations different 
evaluative judgments and different assumptions. On account 
of their contrasting premises and assumptions, analyses of 
development and underdevelopment in Latin America differ 
from one another to the extent that such analyses rely on 
either the developmental or dependency model. Within the 
_ developmental model, underdevelopment appears as a starting 
point on the path to development, a condition which has 
characterized every region and nation-state, from which some 
have advanced toward development. 
dependency model understands both 
In contrast, 
development 
the 
and 
underdevelopment as the product of the same historical 
process, the expansion of international capitalism. 
Dependentistas claim that through this process, the economic 
forces of the system's center have penetrated underdeveloped 
areas, creating development in the metropolis and 
underdevelopment in the periphery.3 
I sketch briefly the theories of developmentalism and 
dependency and in the remainder of this chapter we shall 
investigate the forms more carefully - and more critically. 
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We shall then turn to dependency theory and this would also 
be examined in more depth, with attention paid to its 
underlying moral assumption. 
B. Developmental ism 
Basic to the developmental theory is the assertion of 
the mutual-benefit claim. 4 This is the claim that free 
economic relations between two countries will be mutually 
beneficial. These relations must yield gains for both 
countries or else the countries would not engage voluntarily 
in such economic transactions. 
The developmentalists advocate a push from the 
industrialized countries through aid, expanded trade and 
technical assistance to help the Third World countries 
toward the path of development. As earlier noted, this view 
was enhanced by the success of the Marshall Plan in the 
economic recovery of Western Europe. Hirschman notes that 
this view 
. • .became an article of faith, reinforced by the 
rapid postwar recovery and growth • . • of Western and 
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Eastern Europe, that growth depended critically on the 
injection of an adequate amount of capital, domestic 
or foreign.5 
Probably the most influential and famous theorist of 
developmentalism was Walt Whitman Rostow whose stages of 
economic growth dominated the doctrine in the later 1950s 
and early 1960s.6 It seems appropriate therefore to focus 
our critique of developmentalism on Rostow•s specific 
version. Rostow believes that development is a linear path 
of five stages along which all countries travel. The stages 
are the traditional society, the pre-conditions for 
take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity and the age of 
high mass-consumption. 
The traditional f?Ociety is one whose structure is 
developed within limited production functions, based on 
pre-Newtonian science and technology. The level of 
productivity is limited by the inaccessibility of modern 
science and consequently, a very high proportion of 
resources is devoted to agriculture. The second stage 
embraces societies in the process of transition and this is 
the period when the preconditions for take-off are 
developed. Traditional societies are transformed such that 
they are able to exploit the benefits of modern science. 
The third stage, the take-off, is the interval when the old 
blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally 
overcome. The forces making for economic progress, which 
184 
yielded limited bursts and enclaves of modern activity, 
expand and come to dominate the society. Growth becomes its 
normal condition. 
After the take-off follows a long period of sustained 
if fluctuating progress, as the now regularly growing 
economy drives to extend modern technology over the whole 
front of its economic activity. The make-up of the economy 
changes increasingly as technique improves, new industries 
accelerate, older industries level off. The economy finds a 
place in the international economy: goods formerly imported 
are produced at home; new imports requirements develop, and '!;--·· 
new export commodities to match them. In the age of high 
mass-consumption, the leading sectors shift towards durable 
consumers' goods and services. In this stage real income 
per head rise to a point where a large number of persons 
gain a command over consumption which transcend basic food, 
shelter, and clothing; and the structure of the working 
force changes in ways which increased not only the 
proportion of urban to total population, but also the 
proportion of the population working in off ices or in 
skilled factory jobs - aware of and anxious to acquire the 
consumption fruits of a mature economy. 
There are obvious problems with the Rostovian theory. 
How a nation gets from one stage to another is unclear, 
since all Rostow presents, in effect, is a series of 
snapshots which freeze the development process in five 
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different moments of time. What is clear, however, is that 
economic development, on this view, occurs in a succession 
of stages, and that today's underdeveloped countries are 
still in a stage, sometimes depicted as an original state of 
history, through which the now developed countries passed 
long ago. But this view, Frank has stressed, 
" . . . attributes a history to the developed countries but 
denies all history to the underdeveloped ones. n7 Rost ow 
neglects the past of the underdeveloped countries but 
confidently predicts a future similar to that of the rich 
countries. To classify the underdeveloped nations as 
"traditional societies" begs the issue and implies either 
that the underdeveloped countries have no history or that it 
is unimportant. But it is clear that the underdeveloped 
countries do have a history, and that it is important. Says 
Frank, 
Even a modest acquaintance with history shows that 
underdevelopment is not original or traditional and 
that neither the past nor the present of the 
underdeveloped countries resembles in any important 
respect the past of the now developed countries • • . 
Historical research demonstrates that contemporary 
underdevelopment is in large part the historical 
product of past and continuing economic relations 
between the satellite undeveloped and the now 
developed metropolitan countries.a 
There is a substantive evidence to prove that the 
expansion of Europe, commencing in the fifteenth century, 
had a profound impact on the societies and economies of the 
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rest of the world. For example, Rich says 
By the end of the sixteenth century . the 
agricultural economies of the Spice Islands, the 
domestic industries of large parts of India, the Arab 
tradingeconomy of the Indian Ocean and of the Western 
Pacific, the native societies of West Africa and the 
way of life in the Carribean Islands and in the vast 
areas of the two vice-royal ties of Spanish America 
[were] all deeply affected by the impact of Europeans 
The results [of European expansion] on 
non-European societies were . . . sometimes immediate 
and overwhelming.9 
In other words, Rich is saying that the history of the 
underdeveloped countries in the last four centuries is, in 
large part, the history of the consequences of European 
expansion. Consequently, we can tentatively conclude that 
the automatic functioning of the international economy which 
Europe dominated first created underdevelopment and then, 
hindered efforts to escape from it. In summary, 
underdevelopment is a product of historical processes. 
Also, Rostow's linear view of development seems to beg 
a host of questions about the nature and causes of 
development. It tends to focus on constraints or obstacles 
(particularly lack of capital), the removal of which would 
free the "natural" forces making for the steady move toward 
even higher incomes. Applied to the area of international 
relations, this view calls on the rich countries to supply 
the missing components to the developing countries and 
thereby to help them break bottlenecks or remove obstances. 
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These missing components may be capital, foreign exchange, 
skills or management. The doctrine provides a rationale for 
international capital aid, technical assistance, trade and 
private foreign investment. 
There are problems with this view on moral, political, 
and economic grounds as well as historical grounds. Morally 
and politically, this view rules out options of different 
styles of development. Inexorably, we are all bound to pass 
through the Rostovian stages. This view is surely 
excessively deterministic. Economically, it is deficient 
because it ignores the fact that the propagation of impulses 
from the rich to the poor countries alters the nature of the 
development process; that "late-comers" face problems 
essentially different from the early starters, and that 
"late later-comers" again find themselves in a world with a 
range of demonstration effects and other impulses, both from 
the advanced countries and from other "late-comers," which 
present opportunities and obstacles quite different from 
those that England or even Germany, France and Russia faced 
in their pre-industrialization phase.10 
Frank also attacks developmentalist's ahistorical 
explanations of underdevelopment. He views the entire 
spectrum of developmentalism, from its primordial post-World 
War II form through Rostow•s stages of economic growth 
model, as sharing the underlying assumption " • that 
underdevelopment is an original state which may be 
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characterized by indices of traditionality, and tendency of 
abandoning these characteristics and adopting those of the 
developed countries. 1111 Theorists who adopt these 
assumptions believe in diffusionism: Western ways must 
diffuse into underdeveloped countries, undermining and 
transforming their traditionalism. They view underdeveloped 
countries as precapitalist and see progress in terms of the 
penetration of capitalism into the precapitalist sectors or 
into the traditional culture of Third World countries. 
Essentially, the diffusion model sees underdevelopment 
as a condition which all countries have experienced at some 
time. While some countries have managed to develop, others 
have not. In Latin America, according to the model, a 
feudal structure inherited from the Spanish and Portuguese 
conquistadors has stifled change. Though modern cities have 
arisen through contact with the developed world, the 
countryside remains backward, mired in the unproductive 
agriculture of large feudal estates. If the conditions are 
to improve, traditional values must be challenged and modern 
diversified industry must replace current dependence on one 
or two agricultural products. Change requires the 
introduction of external capital because the region is 
poor. Foreign investment can also bring modern technology 
and organizational methods to these backward countries - a 
problem which did not confront feudal England and other 
early developing countries, but one that becomes 
189 
particularly critical for the late starters on the path to 
development. Thus, the diffusion model endorses and even, 
encourages increased U.S. aid and investment to advance 
economic development in Latin America. 
To counter the developmental perspectives, Frank 
suggests that it lacks empirical (especially historical) 
validity and hence, leads to a quite erroneous conclusion, 
regarding the progressive nature of Western contact with 
Third World countries. In fact, he totally reverses the 
argument: the Third World is underdeveloped because it has 
been capitalist for centuries. Its socio-economic structure 
is not in some primordial, traditional or feudal state but 
was created and molded by a centuries-long process of 
interaction with the capitalist West. The most important 
conclusion from this argument is that further capitalist 
involvement is unlikely to bring underdeveloped countries 
into a state of economic independence; on the contrary, it 
will intensify the dependency and underdevelopment that it 
has already created.12 
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c. Dependency Theory 
The dependency model originated in an atmosphere of 
increasing disillusionment with past strategies of 
development and consequently, was formulated as an 
alternative to the "developmental" models. These latter 
models assumed that underdeveloped countries would follow a 
process of development essentially like that followed by 
countries which are now highly developed. The dependency 
model rejects this view on the ground that external 
conditions are fundamentally different for the present-day 
underdeveloped countries. They are different in that the 
present-day underdeveloped countries have always been 
dominatedby and dependent upon the industrialized rich 
countries. Furthermore, the interdependent nature of the 
world capitalist system and the qualitative transformations 
in that system over time make it inconceivable to think that 
individual nations on the periphery could somehow replicate 
the evolutionary experience of the now developed nations. 
According to the dependency model, "Latin American 
' 
underdevelopment is not a backward condition which precedes 
capitalism, but a consequence of capitalism and a specific 
form of capitalist development. 11 13 
In contrast to the developmentalists who see Western 
intervention in underdeveloped countries as progressive and 
beneficial, the dependentistas emphasize that the ills of 
191 
underdeveloped countries were to be found in the historical 
relationships between these nations and the industrialized 
Western countries. These relationships are to be 
comprehended in terms of dominance and dependence. The 
interdependence between the industrialized and the poor 
countries assumes contrasting forms of dominance and 
dependence because the dependent poor countries develop as a 
reflection of the expansion of dominant countries or 
underdevelop as a consequence of their subjective 
relationship. Instead of hypothesizing underdevelopment as 
an original state, the dependentistas assert that the now 
developed countries were never "underdeveloped" and that 
contemporary underdevelopment was created. They claim that 
the contemporary underdevelopment of many parts of the world 
was created by the same process of capitalism that brought 
development to the industrialized countries. Latin America, 
for example, is underdeveloped because it has supported the 
development of Western Europe and the United States. 
At the core of the dependency theory is the idea that 
development and underdevelopment are two sides of the one 
global capitalist system, an idea which is expressed in the 
polarization of the world between the dominant developed 
metropolitan countries on the one hand, and the dependent 
underdeveloped peripheral countries, on the other. 
Dependency theorists believe that foreign penetration, 
rather than being a force for development, has created 
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underdevelopment in the peripheral countries. Dos Santos 
gives a general characterization of dependency: 
Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the 
economies of one group of countries are conditioned by 
the development and expansion of others. A relation 
ship of interdependence between two or more economies 
or between such economies and the world trading system 
becomes a dependent relationship when some countries 
can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of 
the dominant countries, which may have positive or 
negative effects on their immediate development.14 
In Dos Santos's view, dependency is a "conditioning 
situation" which causes underdeveloped countries to be both 
backward and exploited. The development of capitalism, he 
argues, led and continues to lead to a combined and unequal 
development of its constitutive parts: unequal, because 
development of parts of the system occurs at the expense of 
other parts; combined, because it is the combination of 
inequalities and the transfer of resources from 
underdeveloped to developed countries which explains 
inequality, deepens it, and transforms it into a necessary 
and structural element of the world economy.15 
The unequal development of the world, according to the 
dependentistas, goes back to the sixteenth century with the 
formation of a capitalist world economy in which some 
dominant countries in the center were able to specialize in 
industrial production of manufactured goods because the 
dependent peripheral areas of the world which they colonized 
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provided the necessary primary goods, agriculture and 
mineral, for consumption in the center. 16 Contrary to some 
assumptions in economic theory, the international division 
of labor did not lead to parallel development through 
comparative advantage. The center states gained at the 
expense of the periphery. The center is viewed as capable 
of dynamic development responsive to internal needs, and as 
the main beneficiary of the global linkage. On the other 
hand, the periphery is 
development; one which 
seen 
is 
as having a reflex type of 
both constrained by its 
incorporation into the global system and which results from 
its adaptation to the needs of the expansion of the center. 
Thus, the dependency situation is one in which the state of 
the economy of dependent countries is determined by the 
development of the dominant countries, a situation which is 
often retrogressively disastrous to the former. 
Dependency theorists therefore are trying to show that 
the internal dynamics of Latin American society and its 
underdevelopment was and is primarily conditioned by Latin 
America's position in the international economy, and the 
resultant ties between the internal and the external 
structures. Even though each theorist emphasizes different 
aspects of how and why the international economy and its 
changes, condition changes in Latin America, they all argue, 
contrary to the developmentalist analysis, that 
underdevelopment is not the natural state. 
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"Underdevelopment" for the dependency theorists denotes a 
dynamic process: a process which began centuries ago but 
which is still ongoing. In other words, while 
developmentalism sees underdevelopment as the original state 
and a process taking place whose end result is capitalist 
development, the dependentistas see underdevelopment as a 
condition that deepening and becoming more pervasive. Samir 
Amin describes it in the following manner: 
What is worse is that this definition [liberal 
development theory) leads straightaway to an essential 
error: the underdeveloped countries are seen as being 
like the "developed" ones at an earlier stage of their 
development. In other words, the essential fact is 
left out, namely, that the underdeveloped countries 
form part of the world system, that the history of 
their integration into this system forged their 
special structure - which thenceforth has nothing in 
common with what prevailed before their integration 
into the modern world.17 
This process is subsumed in Frank's well-known phrase - "the 
development of underdevelopment. 11 ls According to Frank, 
underdevelopment is the result of the process of capitalist 
development, which led and still leads to a series of 
metropolis-satellite relations in which the satellized 
national, regional, and local metropolis are incorporated 
into a world capitalist process, which ensures their 
development of underdevelopment and their underdevelopment 
of development. The mechanisms of this process are the 
metropolis-satellite relationship, and the expropriation of 
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the economic surplus from the satellite regions. These 
views are most explicitly set forth in the early writings of 
Frank.lg In his "model of underdevelopment," Frank contends 
that capitalism had long ago entered every nook and cranny 
of the satellite world in such a way as to make global 
capitalism an integrated structure of metropoles and 
satellites that bound countries, regions, and urban-rural 
areas into dominant-dependent relationships. Thus, 
capitalism on a world scale produces a developed metropolis 
and an underdeveloped periphery. 
We can sum up the theoretical perspective in Frank's 
"model of underdevelopment" as follows: First, development 
does not occur through a succession of stages, and today's 
developed countries were never underdeveloped, although they 
were once undeveloped. Second, underdevelopment is part of 
the historical product of relations between the 
underdeveloped satellites and the developed metropoles. 
Third, the dualist interpretation is to be rejected because 
capitalism has effectively and completely penetrated the 
undeveloped world. Frank demonstrates this by showing that 
Latin America and other areas in the periphery have been 
incorporated into the world economy since the early stages 
of their colonial periods. Fourth, Frank hypothesizes that 
development of satellites is limited by their dependent 
status. In this respect, he claims that the close contact 
between the metropolis and the satellite has had a number of 
r 
exploitative, 
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retarding and stunting effects on the 
underdeveloped countries and that spurts of development in 
the periphery have often been associated with periods of 
interruption of contact, such as world wars or 
depressions. 20 He marshals evidence in support of this 
view: the periods of greatest industrial development in 
Latin America have occured when the links between the 
metropolitan and Latin American powers have been weakened or 
interrrupted. Conversely, Latin American underdevelopment 
and stagnation characterize the periods of intense 
metropolitan-satellite interaction. 
As proof, Frank offers a historical periodization of 
Latin American economic development. 21 During periods of 
economic crisis or war in the metropolitan states, Latin 
American satellite countries are left in comparative 
isolation. Frank identifies five such periods: the European 
depression of the seventeenth century; the Napoleonic wars; 
World War I; the 1930s depression; and World War Ir.22 
During each of these periods of comparative isolation from 
metropolitan influence, "marked autonomous industrialization 
and growth 11 took place in Latin American economic 
production. When the metropolis recovers from wars and 
crisis, and resumes economic links to the satellites, "the 
previous development and industrialization of these regions 
is choked off or channelled into directions which are not 
self-perpetuating or promising. This happened after each of 
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the five crisis cited above. 11 23 On account of this, Frank 
develops a subsidiary thesis: 
If it is satellite status which 
underdevelopment, then a weaker or lesser 
metropolis-satellite relations may generate 
structural underdevelopment and/or allow 
possibility of local development.~4 
According to Frank, since the weakening 
generates 
degree of 
less deep 
for more 
of the 
satellite-metropolis network can only take place for reasons 
external to the satellite economies, of a necessarily 
transient nature, it follows that there is no real 
possibility of sustained development within the system. 
According to this analysis, the only alternative becomes 
that of breaking completely with the metropolis-satellite 
network through socialist revolution. Frank and the 
dependentistas favor "autarchy," the only way in which 
backwardness, stagnation and poverty in the Third World 
countries can be overcome. "Autarchy" is here understood to 
mean the severing of all economic links that any particular 
political economic formation has that extend beyond its 
boundaries. 
This is in distinction to the developmental theory 
(incorporating Ricardo's law of comparative advantage) which 
argues that the international economic system is and should 
be "interdependent," that greater economic integration 
allows " . a greater specialization in a wider division 
198 
of labor and often a better utilization of the comparative 
advantages of each region or population group. 11 25 Thus, 
what characterizes the existing international economic 
system is not simply a relationship of dependence on the 
industrialized countries by the underdeveloped world, but a 
dependence of both upon each other. While this may be true 
in the broad overall view, the dependency school argues that 
this relationship is marked by inequality and domination; 
that the Third World, rather than being characterized by 
independent capital accumulation, has been subordinated to 
the needs of the industrialized capitalist countries. 
Now we may ask, what is the moral presuppostion 
underlying dependency theory? In a certain sense, it is 
Marxist precisely because dependency theory deals with the 
mechanisms of dominance. Its moral presupposition is that 
people ought not to be dominated. This is precisely one of 
Roemer's moral principles, but, as we have seen, Roemer 
leaves it unanalyzed, whereas dependency theory goes into a 
great deal of discussion about the specific mechanisms of 
domination. We see this in dependency theory's careful 
examination of the history of underdevelopment and 
development. 
With reference to the history of the Third World, it 
pays close attention to the theory of expansion, the use of 
force, the question of slave trade, the issue of genocide, 
etc. It looks at the very concrete forms of physical 
r 
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domination, military domination and the explicit setting up 
of mechanisms that disrupted and/or destroyed local crafts 
so that textiles from the colonizing country could be used 
instead. In such cases, dependency theory is looking at the 
very explicity historical phenomena backed up by the use of 
force. 
The phenomena involving the use of force provide an 
interesting contrast with the earlier theories. For 
example, Marx's theory of exploitation is a critique of the 
wage-labor relation in the absence of the use of force. 
Likewise, Emmanuel's theory looks at the exploitation that 
takes place in free trade between nations in the absence of 
the use of force. But dependency theory shows how force was 
necessary to set up the structures of dependency so that 
today, force is no longer needed as much and as explicitly. 
This is where in a sense dependency theory ties back to 
Roemer, Emmanuel and then, ultimately, to Marx by showing 
that once those structures are in place, exploitation can 
continue without the overt use of force.26 
To give but one instance as to how "unforced" free 
trade works against developing countries, consider for 
example, in the 1950s, how the terms of trade turned sharply 
against the underdeveloped countries. To buy one ton of 
imported steel, the following were the prices paid by these 
countries of three continents in terms of their respective 
major export commodity: 
Ghana 
Brazil 
Malaya 
(lb. cocoa) 
(lb. coffee) 
(lb. rubber) 
1951 
202 
158 
132 
200 
1961 
570 
380 
44.1 
According to this outline, excerpted from J. Woodis' 
Introduction to Nee-colonialism, 27 Ghana in 1961 had to 
exchange 570 lbs of its major exports commodity, namely, 
cocoa, for one ton of imported steel, whereas a decade 
earlier, in 1951, the import price of steel was equivalent 
to only 202 lbs of cocoa. Similarly, Brazil exchanged 380 
lbs of coffee in 1961 for one ton of steel, as compared to 
158 lbs of coffee in 1951. Malaya was able to import 1 ton 
of steel with only 132 lbs of rubber in 1951 but a decade 
later, the import price had increased to 441 lbs of rubber. 
Observing this same situation, Raymond Vernon points out 
that "· .. the prices of raw materials tend to decline over 
the course of time in relation to the prices of manufactured 
products. A ton of copper, according to the argument, will 
bring fewer tractors in 1976 than in 1956. 11 28 
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D. Implications and Conclusions 
Through a comparative analysis of developmentalism and 
dependency, we have attempted to weigh the relative utility 
of these competing frameworks in explaining 
underdevelopment. The weight of evidence, it seems, favors 
the dependency analysis which roots underdevelopment in 
exploitation rather than in a not-well-explained absence of 
"take-off." In fact a striking difference between 
dependency theory and developmentalism is the almost 
complete absence of any discussion of exploitation in the 
latter account - the absence that seems to violate the 
historical record. 
On the other hand, liberal developmentalists could 
acknowledge exploitation: they could claim that third 
party's exchange rights are violated within the country, 
that "the remnants of feudalism," and/or the metropoles are 
violating the rights of other countries to trade freely with 
the peripheral countries. 
track Steiner would take. 
This, presumably, would be the 
In this case both theories could claim there is an 
ongoing exploitation. One explains it in terms of some kind 
of unequal exchange (in relation to domination and 
dependency) while the other explains it in terms of 
exchange-rights violation. The policy prescriptions that 
seem to flow from these theories are quite different. 
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Developmental liberalism recommends free trade as the 
solution, because it claims that had there been free trade, 
everything would have been all right. Dependency theor.ists, 
on the other hand, contend that even in a situation of 
perfect competition, everything would not have been all 
right because exploitation would still occur due to unequal 
exchange and the consequent transfer of value from the less 
capitalized low-wage countries to the more capitalized 
high-wage countries. According to this view, free trade 
between unequal countries does not lead to mutual benefits 
but greater inequality and the intensified dependence of the 
poor on the rich countries. 
Theorists write about "dependency" or 
"developmentalism," but they rarely put them side by side to 
see which is most preferable in terms of its superior 
explanatory power and better application to concrete 
reality. We will do so in our concluding chapter, dealing 
with the case of Ghana. We are not going to settle this 
issue conclusively, but at least the test case will help us 
to determine which of the competing frameworks is 
methodologically more promising. 
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Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1960) and "The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth," 
Economic Journal 66(March 1956):25-48. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY AS A TEST CASE: 
AN APPLICATION OF COMPETING THEORIES 
Developmental and dependency theories are two 
different approaches that claim to explain the problem of 
underdevelopment in the Third World. Since World War II, 
developmental theorists have attempted to promote rapid 
development in the Third World through massive financial 
aid, capital investments and an emphasis on a free market 
economy. On the other hand, dependency theory emerged in 
1960s as an alternative way of explaining the 
underdevelopment in the "peripheral" countries. Though 
dependency analysis originated among Latin American social 
scientists as a response to developmental problems in Latin 
American countries, it has gained wide acceptance in Third 
World countries. Recently it has been transferred to black 
Africa in an effort to explain the continent's 
underdevelopment problems.1 
Invariably, both the developmental and dependency 
approaches have something to say about the current phase of 
underdevelopment in the African nations. Both purport to 
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off er appropriate solutions from their determinate 
standpoints. But could both approaches be ultimately 
correct? Which of them explains better the developmental 
problems of the Third World? Which approach offer the most 
plausible solution to these problems in terms of its 
practical realization? How do we evaluate these competing 
paradigms? 
Philosophically, there are two different criteria one 
might use to evaluate a theory. The first criterion is to 
see how well it explains the data vis-a-vis alternative 
theories. In other words, how well does dependency theory 
account for the facts of the present world vis-a-vis its 
main alternative, developmentalism. The second criterion 
would be to evaluate a theory on pragmatic grounds in terms 
of its usefulness for accomplishing a certain purpose, 
specifically in formulating policies for the Third World. 
This concluding chapter is an attempt to apply these 
criteria to a specific case. This application relies on an 
examination of the economic realities of Ghana, a country of 
8,600,000 people situated in West Africa. The case study of 
Ghana will be instrumental in determining the more 
preferable of the two theories in terms of its plausibility 
based on its greater explanatory power and better 
application to the objective conditions of the Ghanaian 
society. 
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A. Developmentalism and the Ghanaian Economy 
Developmentalism is a nee-classical view which asserts 
that economic development in the Third World can be 
described in linear stages. This model, which evolved in 
the decades following World War II, received wide-spread 
support from Ghanaian scholars and policy makers in the 
post-colonial era who argued that the advanced 
industrialized countries of the world all started with 
economies which were predominantly agrarian. Parallels 
were drawn from the results of the application of the 
Marshall Plan. The achievements of those European countries 
who were recipients of aid under the Marshall Plan were put 
forward as an argument for canvassing for an increase in the 
level of financial aid flowing into Ghana. Underdevelopment, 
it was argued, was a function of capital shortages. 
International organizations like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) were lobbied to transfer 
an appreciable amount of funds to Ghana in an attempt to 
eliminate the severe capital constraints experienced by 
Ghana at this time. 
However, in retrospect, we do not find that the shifts 
of financial resources from the industrialized world to 
Ghana resulted in a rapid economic development. Contrary to 
the prediction of the Rostowian model, the injection of 
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substantial capital into Ghana has not brought about the 
desired level of economic growth and development. 
The protagonists of the Marshall Plan argument failed 
to take cognizance of the fundamental structural differences 
that existed between nineteenth century European economies 
and the twentieth century Ghanaian economy. .For example, in 
nineteenth century Europe we witness a gradual transition 
from post-feudal society to industrial society with a large, 
but manageable rate of population growth. But the Ghanaian 
transition in this century is not gradual. Certain features 
of Western society have been superimposed upon Ghanaian 
economic and political structures with devastating effect. 
The importation of advanced medical techniques into Ghana 
has facilitated a population explosion of unanticipated 
magnitude, so that the rate of economic growth has lagged 
behind the rate of population growth. 
Despite its failures, developmental theory of economic 
growth and development has not gone undefended. 
Developmental theorists, in their emphasis on a perfectly 
competitive model, now blame the institutional structures of 
Ghana its state imposed constraints and market 
imperfections for underdevelopment. They prescribe a 
policy package designed to remove market imperfections, 
arguing that a competitive market will be able to 
effectively perform its allocative function so that factors 
of production will receive a reward equivalent to their 
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contributions. However, what the developmentalists seem not 
to realize is that these institutional structures are often 
an outgrowth of the international capitalist system designed 
to make the peripheral countries dependent upon and 
subservient to the needs and interests of the developed 
centre. In particular, these structures have fostered 
massive inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. 
Dependency theory seeks to overcome the inherent 
weakness of developmental theory by relating the persistent 
inequality to the web of international relationships which 
has evolved as a result of colonial, neocolonial and 
imperialistic policies. Resnik argues that there are three 
phases in the development of the relationship between the 
centre and the peripheral countries.2 The first phase was 
characterized by looting, plunder, and slavery, all of which 
facilitated massive capital accumulation in the centre 
countries. The second phase is characterized by the 
development of infrastructure in the peripheral countries 
which facilitates colonial exploitation of a cheap labor 
supply on which the exports of raw materials and 
agricultural commodities depend. In the third phase, we 
note the strategic positioning of multinational corporations 
within the areas of abundant cheap labor and natural 
resources. By virtue of their size and concomitant economic 
power, these multinationals are able to influence the policy 
decisions of governments in the peripheral states. 3 
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Much of the literature on underdevelopment stresses 
the capitalist nature of the world economic system and the 
various parts of that system since the sixteenth century. 
While Ghana's incorporation into the Eurocentred expanding 
world capitalist system did begin shortly after this time 
with the rise of the transatlantic slave trade in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, this macrolevel 
approach to development takes account of the continuing 
presence of important aspects of the precapitalist modes of 
production. During the heyday of the slave trade, the 
exchange linkage between black Africa and Europe 
restructured the precapitalist modes of production in 
Ghana. It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, however, that capitalism fully penetrated into 
Ghanaian economy. Specifically, formal colonization of 
Ghana, coming at the end of the nineteenth century, provided 
the political framework for a withering away of the 
precapitalist lineage mode of production and the actual 
penetration of capitalism into the Ghanaian economy. The 
colonial state was instrumental in securing the economic 
hegemony of European capital in the colony and in 
subordinating the interests of an embryonic indigenous 
capitalism. The overall impact of the colonial period in 
Ghana was not only the furtherance of capitalist 
transformation but also an internal disarticulation and 
reintegration of the precapitalist mode of production into 
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the world economic system in the interests of European 
capitalism.4 
It cannot be denied that the colonial domination of 
Ghana caused lasting damage to its economic and social 
fabric and created obstacles to development that still 
persists today. There are many examples of this. Take for 
example, the decline of the weaving and textile industry in 
Ghana as a result of the importation of textiles imposed by 
the British. It was not because they were unable to 
withstand free market competition owing to "comparative cost 
disadvantage" that domestic producers went out of business; 
their disappearance was more the result of restrictions 
imposed on their activities by the colonial power and the 
simultaneous granting of privileges to importers.5 The 
disastrous effects of Great Britain's colonial policy on 
craft industries in Ghana are also well known, and follow a 
similar pattern. 
If the production structure of Ghana has been 
distorted for centuries so as to serve the interests of 
foreign powers, one can hardly expect that "market forces," 
if left to themselves, will correct the distortion and 
modify the structure in the direction of the socio-economic 
optimal. That would require, at minimum, an 
extra-ordinarily high degree of factor mobility, 
entrepreneurial vision and political stability, attributes 
that have not been present in Ghana. Consequently, when 
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"market forces" were able to operate, they tended to 
consolidate the structural distortions rather than removing 
them. 
It would seem then on the basis of the evidence that 
developmentalism has not been successful in generating 
appropriate policy prescriptions for the Ghanaian economy 
because of its neglect of the historically generated 
structural features - rooted in exploitation - its policy 
prescriptions have been floored. Dependency theory, which 
seems to give a better account of these historical 
structural features does not suffer this disadvantage. 
B. Dependency Theory and the Ghanaian Economy 
1. Its Appeal 
Dependency theory gained control over the formulation 
of economic policy in Ghana after December 31, 1981 when the 
military junta led by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings took 
over power from the civilian regime of Dr. Hilla Liman. Why 
did dependency theory has such a considerable appeal in 
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black Africa and particularly in Ghana? 
First, the theory is heavily rooted in economic 
history. It is easy to verify that, under colonial 
government protection, foreign capital penetrated the 
colonized countries. It is also easy to verify that while 
the colonizing countries and their supportive elites grew 
economically, particularly from the eighteenth to the 
mid-twentieth centuries, the incomes of the masses in the 
colonized countries grew relatively little. Attempts to 
promote rapid development in the Third World since 
World War II have not on the whole been very successful, 
giving continuity to the previous dynamics of world 
development. 
Secondly, dependency theory is appealing because, like 
traditional Marxian economic analysis in which it is rooted, 
it carries a call for justice on behalf of the perceived • 
victim, the developing country. Justice and equity are the 
qualities of the virtuous, and it is hard to argue against a 
theory with such seeming objectives without appearing to be 
mischievous, misguided or unjust. 
Thirdly, dependency theory, at least as popularized, 
does not require an understanding of neoclassical analysis. 
Many of the conclusions of neoclassical economics tend to be 
counterintuitive, and it takes effort to understand their 
not-always-unsound economic arguments. For instance, prima 
facie, it may sound absurd to be told that if we desire to 
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see cheaper goods and services over time, governments should 
not control prices; or that the devaluation of a country's 
currency assures a greater supply of imports in the future 
than an over-valued exchange rate does; or that interest 
rates are more likely to be lower in the future if the 
growth of money supply is restricted than if .the quantity of 
money is increased rapidly.6 Because dependency theory 
presents an alternative explanation of economic development 
not so fraught with counterintuitive conclusions, it is easy 
to accept, especially when dependency theory itself asserts 
that neoclassical economics is essentially an ideology 
parading in the guise of science. 7 Finally, neoclassical 
economic analysis tends to warn of difficulties on the road 
to economic development and leaves the impression that 
development is a slow, gradual process. Dependency theory 
seems to promise immediate prosperity, equity and justice, 
once the political obstacles to economic transformation have 
been overcome. 
These factors help to explain dependency theory's 
relative success in Ghana. Ghana was colonized for over a 
century by the British, a period during which mining, timber 
and cocoa industries were developed. The level of economic 
development was nevertheless poor in 1957, when the country 
became independent, though Ghana was relatively more 
developed than many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
When dependency theory came into vogue in Ghana in the early 
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1970s, it was easy - and not wrong - to blame the country's 
economic problems (a balance-of-payment crisis, inefficient 
import-substituting industries, a lagging food-producing 
sector, and increasing budget deficits) on the economic 
structure inherited from the British colonial administration 
and on the world trading system, particularly as it affected 
the country's revenues from cocoa, timber and gold. By the 
end of the 1970s, Ghana's economic problems had grown to 
alarming proportions. The inflation rate had reached 
triple-digit levels, and the government continued to blame 
it on world factors. Underutilization of capacity in 
manufacturing industries had risen from about 50 to about 80 
per cent, and unemployment and underemployment were 
growing. 8 The currency overvaluation that devaluations in 
1971 and 1978 were supposed to have cured persisted and was 
getting worse, and rumors abounded of another devaluation.9 
Corruption in government circles was rife. The less 
privileged in society were getting relatively poorer as 
foreign-exchange, price, and import-control systems, meant 
to alleviate the growing poverty of the majority of the 
population, visibly benefited a select few with connections 
to people in government and the control agencies. 
Finally, in 1980, the government started to campaign 
to attract new foreign investments with some generous tax 
breaks and other package of incentives. lo All of these 
conditions lent considerable credence to the assertions of 
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dependency theory as to the sources of underdevelopment - a 
vicious world trading and financial system, a corrupt and 
nonprogressive elite, and inadequate developmental or 
neoclassical economic theories attempting to justify the 
status quo. 
2. Its Implementation 
At its inception in Ghana, in 
dependency theory was well received.11 
the early 1970s, 
At first it had a 
small following mainly among the faculty and students of 
law, political science, and geography at the University of 
Ghana.12 By the end of the decade, the number of adherents 
had grown significantly, to include some faculty and 
students of history, African studies and economics, and even 
members of the military and the public.13 
The success of dependency theory was marked by the 
extent to which the tenets of the theory were incorporated 
into the government's policy pronouncements and programme. 
Consequently, dependency gained not only numbers but also 
Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, the focal point of the 
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government of Ghana since December 31, 1981. This gain was 
particularly significant, because in a government he led 
from June to September 
transforming the country's 
1979, Rawlings had resisted 
institutions into those that 
would sustain a people's revolutionary state. He is 
reported to have rejected any formal ideological commitment 
for the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which he 
led, that ruled the country after soldiers mutinied on June 
4, 1979.14 Rather, Rawlings, it appears, was an idealist 
and nationalist whose main purpose in 1979 was to frustrate 
his military bosses' efforts to guarantee the wealth they 
had acquired through illegal means and to avoid future legal 
action through the insertion of protective clauses in the 
then draft constitution of the country. In September 1979, 
Rawlings handed over power voluntarily to the civilian 
government of Dr. Hilla Liman. And by December 1979, Dr. 
Liman sent Rawlings into compulsory retirement. It was 
during his forced retirement that Rawlings converted to the 
persuasions of dependency theory. During this time, he 
lived mostly in the company of dependency adherents on the 
University of Ghana campus, was confronted with dependency's 
interpretations of poor economic performance and with 
stories of corrupt practices of the new civilian regime, and 
was ultimately persuaded of the need to change the 
institutional arrangements of Ghanaian society to promote 
justice, economic growth and development. 15 Rawlings later 
r 
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admitted this conversion: 
I was slightly naive (between June 4 and handover in • 
1979), in the sense that it never struck me that some 
kind of supportive system, maybe new institutions 
would have to be organized to ensure that the people 
of this country held on to their newly-won freedom, to 
ensure that they dictate the terms of their survival 
... Now I know better ... 16 
In terms of pronouncements by members of the new government, 
the evidence of Rawlings's conversion is rather soft. His 
speeches of December 31, 1981, January 2, 1982 and January 
5, 1982 had little dependency theory content. There were 
explanations of why the Third Republic had been overthrown 
and appeals to Ghanaians to seize the opportunity which he 
again presented to them, to organize, and take decisions 
that would improve the situation of everyone. 17 Later, 
however, dependency theory's characteristic accusations, 
particularly that the development potential of poor 
countries had been thwarted by colonial and neocolonialist 
exploitation often with the cooperation of unpatriotic local 
individuals, start to appear in his speeches.18 As these 
statements were made in prepared speeches, it could well be 
that they were written by the fundamental advocates of 
dependency theory around him. Others who are more rooted in 
dependency theory have echoed similar views, among them the 
finance secretary, Kwesi-Botchwey (a former law faculty 
member at the University of Ghana) and such members of the 
governing Council as Chris Atim and Amartey Kwei. 19 One 
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government document is particularly explicit in its 
dependency assertions. The "Policy Guidelines of the 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)" specifically 
states that: 
The historical roots of our present state of 
underdevelopment stern from British colonialism which 
bequeathed a set pattern of economic development, 
social structures, attitudes and a parasitic state 
machinery. The retention of the structures of 
colonialism had assured the continued domination of 
our economy by foreign financial interests, with the 
attendant losses of the country's resources and hard 
earned wealth in a new phase of colonialism, which has 
been aptly described as neo-colonialisrn.20 
These guidelines further commit the "Revolution to the 
direct task of achieving total economic independence by 
ensuring a fundamental break from the existing nee-colonial 
relations. 11 21 Finally, they assert that the policies 
projected under the "December 31st Revolution should bear 
the characteristics of a genuine National Democratic 
Revolution. They must be anti-imperialist, 
anti-nee-colonialist and must aim at instituting a popular 
dernocracy. 1122 
The prescriptive orientation of the new government 
seemed clearly in accord with the spirit of such Latin 
American dependentistas, Theotonio dos Santos and Andre 
Gunder Frank.23 De-satellization, according to these 
guidelines, is the only cure to underdevelopment. The chief 
argument in support of the de-satellization thesis is that 
international involvements lead to exploitation. This makes 
dependency theory a prescriptive theory. 
222 
Rodney claims: 
"African development is possible only on the basis of a 
radical break with the international capitalist system ·which 
has been the principal agency of underdevelopment in African 
over the last five centuries. 11 24 The policy of 
self-reliance embarked upon by Ghanaian gov~rnment seems to 
support this prescription. The tenets of its "Policy 
Guidelines" were asserted by or guided the pronouncements of 
the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). But this 
did not preclude the existence of a few dissenters in the 
Ruling Council who consistently opposed the dependency 
approach of government policy.25 
In the overall, the actions taken by the government, 
especially during its first year in office, were certainly 
consistent with the spirit of dependency theory. The 
violent overthrow of the elected government by a group of 
people with such views on Ghanaian society and its economy 
in relation to the rest of the world fulfils the first and 
necessary stage of the transformation seemingly envisaged by 
dependency analysis. Against multinational corporations, 
the government's main target, especially during its first 
six months in off ice, was persistent threats of 
nationalization or confiscation of assets. The 
inauguarations of people's defence committees or workers' 
defence commi ttess were often opportune moments for such 
threats to be made.26 The companies in question were Valeo 
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(Volta Aluminium Company, a subsidiary of Kaiser & Chemical 
Corporation and Reynolds Metal Company of the United 
states), Agripetco (an American petroleum drilling firm), 
commercial firms such as UAC (United African Company), UTC 
(Union Trading Company), the French subsidiaries CFAO and 
SCOA, and a British subsidiary, Lonrho. The government not 
only made threats, but took practical measures against 
several foreign companies. It sought to renegotiate 
contracts by Valeo and Agripetco. The importation of goods 
for which the government was responsible for allocating 
foreign exchange was made virtually a state monopoly, to the 
exclusion of foreign-owned commercial houses. Imports were 
to be handled by the Ghana National Trading Corporation 
(GNTC) and other state agencies, such as the National 
Procurement Agency (NPA).27 Furthermore the government 
announced its intention to amend the Banking Act of 1970 to 
"bar foreign controlled banks from retail banking and to 
redirect them to specialist banking. "2 8 The government 
simultaneously declared its intention to raise its 
share-holdings in foreign-owned banks and insurance 
companies from 40 to 80 per cent, effective January 31, 1983 
for Barclays and Standard Bank (Ghana) Ltd. 
The government did not do much in the primary exports 
sector, which had been mainly under local control for 
several decades. Foreign ownership, even in such areas as 
mining and forest products, had been drastically curtailed 
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in the post-independence period through nationalization, 
majority-shares participation, or outright exclusion.29 No 
attempt was made to restructure the internal organization of 
such firms. 
The government did attempt to curtail the influence of 
foreign western culture by establishing a "Citizens' vetting 
Committee" (CVC) with the power to investigate people "whose 
lifestyle and expenditure substantially exceed their known 
incomes. 11 30 Though no clear definition of acceptable 
lifestyle was given, one criterion for investigation was to 
have had more than c50,000 in one's bank account by December 
1981 (at which time the black-market rate of exchange was 
about c40 to the U.S. dollar). By May 1982, the Citizens' 
Vetting Committee had imposed jail sentences on two 
individuals31 and by August 1982, it had collected c32 
million out of the c71 million it had imposed as taxes on 52 
people who had appeared before it. 32 The government also 
banned the importation of private cars (with a few 
exceptions) and severely limited the ~ersonal effects that 
Ghanaians returning from abroad could import. 
Perhaps the most significant actions of the government 
were those consistent with the denial of the relevance of 
neoclassical economic principles.33 In the marketplace, it 
was suggested that high prices of commodities arose from the 
greed of sellers. The government threatened "revolutionary 
methods" to reduce prices unless sellers voluntarily lowered 
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them to meet workers' wages. 34 Subsequently, some markets 
were burned down, and in some cities, sellers were beaten up 
by mobs with the assistance of the "People's Police"· and 
"People's Army. n35 In the market for rental accomodation, 
there were drastic reductions. For example, the government 
slashed rents in a surburb of Accra from the existing rate 
of clOO to c35 per month. The landlords who refused to 
comply with the government's directives had their properties 
confiscated by the State. 36 In the credit market, the 
government reduced interest rates (believed to be providing 
exploitative income to "a new crop of phoney businessmen and 
lazy annuitants") from 25.5 to 14 per cent on bank loans and 
from 18 to 12 per cent on savings deposits by June 1982, and 
to 9 per cent on savings deposits by April 1983. 37 Also, 
the government reduced the producer price of cocoa from c720 
to c36o38 and imposed the death penalty on cocoa farmers who 
might try to smuggle cocoa out of the country into 
neighbouring countries.39 Some of these actions and 
policies yielded predictable positive results in the short 
run. Market women, land-lords, spare-parts dealers, lorry 
and taxi drivers, cocoa farmers, etc. announced reductions 
in their prices and rates.40 
Neoclassical economics has two explanations for the 
initial downward response of prices to threats and 
violence: first, suppliers get rid of their stocks faster 
than they would have preferred and accept financial loss as 
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a payment for their own safety and security, and second, in 
the case of foreign exchange, buyers significantly reduce 
their demand for foreign currencies needed to import goods 
for sale in the country. Such a reduction in demand should 
exceed the increased demand from those wanting simply to 
leave the country. Theory, however, also predicts that as 
stocks of goods and currencies significantly decline, prices 
will recover and in time exceed those that existed before 
the violence started. It is this predictable response of 
prices and stocks, as well as the reactions of some foreign 
companies, that weakened the grip of dependency theory on 
the government and started a search for alternative 
policies. 
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3. Its Results 
The impact of various policies and actions of the 
government can be bluntly stated: they did not produce 
prosperity and greater independence for the Ghanaian 
economy. Rather, they gave rise to much poverty and misery 
and a greater dependence on international aid and charity. 
Impoverishment stemmed from severe reductions in the stocks 
and flows of consumer and producer goods; reductions in 
production capacity and worker layoffs, especially in the 
manufacturing sectors, significant increases in both 
official and black-market prices, and increased social 
tension and violence. It is difficult to document the 
reduction in the stocks and flows of goods in the economy. 
However, the IMF statistics indicate that the value of 
imports declined by 36 per cent in 1982 as compared with 
1981 and was 78. 9 per cent of 1979 values. 41 If these 
values are adjusted for inflation, they indicate a miserable 
supply situation. 
A second indicator of impoverishment is the extent of 
price reductions reportedly announced at a rally in January 
1983 by market women in the city of Accra. cuts included 60 
per cent for charcoal, 62 per cent for groundnuts, 63 per 
cent for beans, 69 per cent for cooking oil and 67 per cent 
for corn-milling fee.42 If these reductions brought prices 
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to officially sanctioned levels, then it meant that 
consumers were previously paying more than double the 
official prices for these items in spite of all the violent 
measures adopted to reduce prices in 1982. Yet even these 
price reductions did not hold for long. Rawlings complained 
later in January 1983 that 
all of a sudden, and without justification, traders, 
food-sellers, transport owners and shopkeepers have 
arbitrarily raised prices and fares. This callous and 
undisciplined attitude that has emerged within the 
distributive trade has made life unbearable for 
the ordinary workers.43 
Though the government intensified its attempts to control 
prices for the next two months, it finally conceded its 
inability to hold prices down in its first budget (April 
1983) by increasing official prices, which almost tripled 
their 1981 values.44 But these official prices were in many 
cases still much lower than what the majority of people paid 
in the 11 open11 market. For example, even though the 1983 
budget raised the price of tyre from c188 to c495, or by 163 
per cent, the price in the unofficial market was between 
c2,000 and c3ooo.45 
The pricing policy of the government also encouraged 
the smuggling of goods out of the country, in spite of 
repeated threats of the death penalty. Indeed, there is 
little evidence that smuggling ceased even after the 
government took the desperate measure of closing the 
229 
country's land borders from September 1982 to March 1983. 
That measure only seems to have restricted legitimate 
commerce with neighboring countries mainly to the 
disadvantage of Ghanaians in dire need of goods that were 
absent in their own country. 
A third indication of the degree of impoverishment 
produced is the black-market rate for foreign currencies. 
After falling gradually from c40 to c20 per dollar following 
the December coup, the black-market rate soared to over c100 
per dollar in the following year. Since the government was 
successful in slowing the rate of money creation from 55 per 
cent during the fourth quarter of 1981 to 19 per cent by the 
fourth quarter of 1982; the sharp depreciation of the local 
currency must be due more to the contraction of goods and 
services in the economy than to anything else.46 It is to 
the credit of the government that, after fifteen months of 
unsuccessful effort, it finally acknowledged in its April 
1983 budget that ". the rigid enforcement of prices 
unrelated to costs of production is not a satisfactory basis 
for action" and that henceforth its "pricing policy will be 
based on production costs together with appropriate 
incentive margins. 11 47 Though the budget rejected the 
"laissez-faire market determination of prices," its chosen 
method, if implemented with significant flexibility, would 
do much less harm to the economy. But even if only the 
rhetoric of policy had changed, that change was significant 
in its own right. 
later on. 
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The reason for this will become clear 
Though the government was still rejecting devaluation 
as a policy in March 1983, it did change taxes on 
international transactions and granted significant subsidies 
to exporters in the April 1983 budget, in effect 
implementing an implicit devaluation. In October 1983, the 
cedi was officially devalued by 991 per cent. from c2.75 to 
c30 to the U.S. dollar. Three subsequent devaluations 
brought the official exchange rate to c50 to the dollar in 
December 1984. 48 However one looks at them, the 
devaluations represent a remarkable "U-turn" from the 
previous belief that currency devaluations was a repressive 
invidious tool of the IMF to open the Third World countries 
for international capitalist exploitation. 
The hardship suffered by the Ghanaian population due 
to layoffs and reductions in production, especially within 
foreign-owned corporations were to be seen to be the 
consequences of the government's hostile rhetoric and 
actions. Some corporations cited a lack of raw materials, a 
consequence of the government's attempt to force them to 
grow materials locally by cutting back on their import 
allocations. By November 1982, some workers at a UAC 
subsidiary seized their textile factory in order to recall 
560 of their colleagues previously laid off and to save 
their own jobs. But layoffs still took place or were later 
l 
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scheduled in such foreign corporations as Valeo, 
Cadbury-Schweppes's Allied Foods, Union carbide, CFAO, and 
"at least 14 other firms. 114 9 These reactions by foreign 
corporations, including an annoucement by Valeo (a 
corporation employing about 2,000 workers) that it would cut 
its operations by 20 per cent, did produce some remarkable 
changes in rhetoric and policy from the government. 
The government tried to persuade Valeo to rescind its 
decision by declaring that it did not mean "to be hostile to 
Valeo and other investors .•. " but wanted only that "· 
their investment [should] prove beneficial and fair to all 
parties. n50 After Valeo had rescinded its decision, the 
government demanded that ". . Valeo confirm formally its 
decision not to shut down and more importantly give an 
undertaking that it will not reduce any of its capacity for 
at least one year. 11 51 Even in its more recent negotiations 
with Valeo, the government declared that it was "· •• the 
wish of the people of Ghana that Valeo should continue to 
operate as freely and profitably as is consistent with the 
justified interests and aspirations of Ghanaians. 11 52 The 
leader of the government's contract-negotiating team, 
Akilakpa Sawyer, later confirmed that it was " not in 
Ghana's interest to drive Valeo out. 11 53 
Contrary to its previous claims about the negative 
impact of multinational operations in Ghana, the government 
organized a 1983 Conference in the U. s. for foreign oil 
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corporations in an attempt to sell geological surveys of 
Ghana's oil potential and to attract prospective 
investors.S4 The May 1984 speech by the finance secretary, 
Dr. Botchwey best illustrates the "U-turn" in the 
government's attitude toward multinational corporations: 
Ghana will actively encourage direct foreign 
investment and ensure that while safeguarding the 
interest of the economy and honor of the people, 
investors will not be frustrated when the time comes 
to transfer their profits and dividends to their 
shareholders overseas. Investors would be particularly 
welcome in such priority areas as petroleum 
exploration and production, mining and mineral 
processing, timber, logging and wood processing, 
quarrying, deep-sea fishing, food processing and local 
resource-based manufacturing industries.SS 
In its 1983 budget, the government also acknowledged that 
"in the short run, increases in capacity utilization 
• can only be achieved with raw material imports," and 
therefore, " • adequate provisions have been made in the 
import programme. uS6 This acknowledgement contrasts with 
attempts during 1982 to force manufacturing corporations to 
produce their own raw materials locally. The policies 
pursued by the government, especially before April 1983, so 
severely reduced the incentives for production, savings, 
investment, and increased productivity in the economy that 
Ghana was forced to accumulate significant further debts to 
international financial institutions, especially the IMF and 
the World Bank, in order to attempt a recovery. s7 Also, 
233 
Ghana had to rely on substantial international aid from 
countries and agencies, among them the United States, 
Britain, West Germany, the Red Cross and the World Food 
Program. 
The glaring failures of the government to improve the 
welfare of Ghanaians were responsible for changes in 
economic policy and moderation in revolutionary rhetoric. 
Though the government has not completely abandoned all of 
its dependency persuasions, the certainty with which it 
believed its policies capable of improving the economic 
status of the country has dwindled considerably. Instead, 
the government's call since January 1983 has been for 
everyone "no matter who he is," to study ideas critically 
and "endeavour to examine the problems confronting the 
nation and together find lasting solutions to them. 11 58 
Rawlings also demanded moderation in revolutionary rhetoric 
and activities in his August 1983 speech: "We can no longer 
postpone the time for halting the populist nonsense • 
and making a noticeable leap forward." He further said, "We 
must not get into the way of thinking that revolutionary 
activities are substitutes for productive work [and] that 
Ghanaians must not deceive themselves with 'empty 
theories.' n59 
L 
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c. Implications and Conclusions 
There are significant implications to be derived from 
Ghana's mixed experiences in respect to the application of 
dependency theory in Third World countries. Even though 
dependency theory may give an accurate account of the facts 
of the present world by telling us why the underdeveloped 
countries have remained underdeveloped, it does not 
necessarily follow that this theory provides a policy 
prescription as to how to overcome this situation. In fact, 
some of the advice it seems to suggest is questionable, 
namely, that countries ought to "delink," they ought to 
"pull out," they ought to get rid of multinational 
corporations, they ought to nationalize foreign enterprises. 
The experience of Ghana demonstrate clearly that policies 
which rely on delinking or autarchic development through a 
break in relations of dependency, may not lead to 
development of the kind already arrived at in the developed 
countries because of the inability to recreate the same 
historical conditions, but it might lead to a greater 
impoverishment of the society in question. 
Another implication is that the emphasis placed by 
dependency theory on the historical development of the 
developing countries, which is one of its greatest 
strengths, is also a danger. By concentrating on an 
interpretation of the past, the theory does not encourage 
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its adherents to think clearly about the future. Indeed, 
history may help us to understand the present, but it does 
not of itself provide us with advice on how to change the 
present situation. Consequently, dependency theory, in its 
received raw form, may not be a sufficiently pragmatic 
framework within which to design economic policies for the 
developing countries of the Third World.60 Policy reversals 
in Ghana suggest this conclusion, and so does Frank, after 
studying the experiences of China, Cuba, Jamaica and 
Tanzania, all of whose leaders have at one time expounded 
some variant of dependency theory of underdevelopment.61 
The experience of Ghana also points out that it is 
possible for governments of the developing countries to 
evaluate critically the embedded hypotheses of theories. 
But such an evaluation may be achieved more quickly with 
results that can be identified with policy actions rather 
than with abstract principles. Here we should note that the 
fragility or non-existence of democratic institutions that 
can sustain open and critical debates complicates the 
problem in most developing countries. Also to be noted are 
the difficulties in these countries in obtaining accurate 
economic data and the technical skills required for the 
quick evaluation of the consequences of economic policies. 
On account of the enormous human and economic costs of 
policy mistakes, as in the case of Ghana under the influence 
of dependency theory, adherents of ideas with such great 
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power and appeal need to exercise much caution in attempting 
to transfer to black Africa unrevised versions of Latin 
American based theories of dependency.62 
Dependency theory needs serious revision if it is to 
be of pragmatic value to the developing nations of the Third 
World. Its underlying moral assumptions are acceptable, and 
its historical analysis is often compelling, but as a 
prescriptive theory, it is seriously lacking. 
On the other hand, developmentalism, with its 
reductionist approach (i.e. in claiming that the Third World 
countries must follow the same path of development that the 
presently developed countries have passed through) does not 
off er much help either. By concentrating its analysis on 
the internal structures and endogenous factors obstructing 
development, it ignores the international dimension and 
external factors obstructing development. Consequently, it 
is unable to achieve practical success owing to its 
unrealistic strategies against underdevelopment, for 
example, the strategy of integration into the world market 
on the basis of free trade regardless of the asymmetrical 
structure of the world economy, the strategy of reducing 
tariffs and other trade barriers, the strategy of open door 
policy in attracting foreign direct investments, etc., etc. 
Unfortunately, the record of the effects of such strategies 
leaves much to be desired. 
Although dependency theory seems more appealing than 
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developmentalism, the experience of Ghana has shown both 
theories to be bedevilled with problems. Even though 
dependency theory is a powerful tool in explaining 
underdevelopment in the Third World, it by no means answers 
satisfactorily enough the question of what needs to be done 
about the impoverished state of of these countries. Perhaps 
there is no universally applicable recipe for success in the 
Third World. The countries of the Third World are so 
different in terms of their cultures, historical 
backgrounds, political environments and resources that it is 
difficult to be any optimistic that one can find a universal 
recipe for development. 
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5Alavi, "Ghana and the Colonial Mode of Production," 
pp. 190-91. 
6The counterintuitive nature of sound economic 
analysis has been responsible for considerable 
disagreements, even among trained economists. See, for 
example, J.A. Schumpeter, "The 'Crisis' in Economics," 
Journal of Economic Literature 20(September 1982):1049-59. 
7Dos Santos, "Structure of Dependence," p. 235. 
8There are frequent citations of these estimates in 
Ghana. See, for example, The Budget of the Republic of 
Ghana, April 1983, p. 14. 
9In 1970, the official exchange rate was cl. 02 per 
U. s. dollar and the black-market rate was about cl. 70 per 
dollar. The devaluation of 1978 raised the rate to c2. 75 
while the black-market rate was about c5 per dollar, 
climbing to about c20 in 1980. Cf. West Africa, April 15, 
1980, p. 1523. 
lOin my interview with His Excellency, Eric Otto, the 
Ambassador of Ghana to the United States, he mentioned that 
"· •• conferences were organized in London, England (1980), 
and Accra, Ghana (1981) to promote an increased flow of 
foreign investments into the country." Cf. Interview with 
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the government, may also have played a significant role in 
his conversion. 
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were also hints about the need to "restructure {the} 
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April 1982, p. 7. Amartey Kwei, on his part, argued that 
the country had been dominated in the past by imperialist 
ideas and that "it is our duty to develop new and fresh 
ideas, to develop anti-imperialist ideas, ideas that·teach 
us about foreign countries and their governments, about 
foreign companies and their local collaborators and how they 
all act together to exploit and swindle us." Cf. West 
Africa, March 31, 1982, p. 1484. 
20Quoted in West Africa, April 22, 1982, p. 1631. 
21rbid. 
22rbid. 
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24Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p. 7. 
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p. 225. Later, speaking of multinational corporations, the 
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Africa, July 12, 1982, p. 1843. The brigadier resigned from 
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direction of "common sense and pragmatism" had not been 
realized. Cf. Ghana News, November 1982, p. 10. Another 
significant dissenter was a Secretary to the Provisional 
National efence Council (PNDC), B. o. Asamoah, who argued 
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capitalist or a socialist the only to succeed is hard 
work." Cf. Ghana News, May 1982, p. 4. 
26see, for example, Ghana News, April 1982, p. 7; West 
Africa, April 26, 1982, p. 1982 and West Africa, July 26, 
1982 I P• 1963 • 
27see Finance Secretary Botchwey's address to the 
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1982, p. 7. 
28Ghana News, August 1982, p. 1. 
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of the Ashanti Gold Fields Corporation in patnership with 
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34Ibid. 
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15, 1982, p. 442. 
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46see, IMF Financial Statistics, April 1984, p. 201. 
47see The Budget of the Republic of Ghana. 
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49west Africa, November 7, 1983, p. 2552. 
50Ghana News, July 1982, p. 1. 
51Ghana News, August 1982, p. 8. 
52Quoted in west Africa, February 21, 1983, p. 51. 
53west Africa, July 18, 1983, p. 1680. It must have 
taken some courage or an amount of "conversion" for an early 
leader of the dependency school in Ghana, with a specialty 
in arguing the detrimental effects of agreements with 
multinational corporations which Sawyerr was during his 
tenure at the University of Ghana Law Faculty, to concede 
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see 
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54Ghana News, October 1983, p. 1. 
55west Africa, June 4, 1984, p. 1155. 
56see The Budget of the Republic of Ghana. 
57on the question of productivity decline in 
Rawlings's speech to the nation of August 
Ghana News, September 1983, pp. 6-7. The IMF 
Ghana, 
1983. 
alone 
pledged U.S. $377 million in loans by the end of 1983. 
Cf. West Africa, September 19, 1983, p. 2254. 
58speeches by Rawlings. Cf. Ghana News, January 1983, 
pp. 1 and 7. 
59Quoted in West Africa, September 12, 1983, P· 2103. 
60it is instructive to point out that the favorable 
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views expressed by Gabriel Palma about dependency theory in 
this regard in his award wining 1978 article ("Dependency: A 
Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the 
Analysis of Concrete Situation of Dependency?") are all 
virtually deleted in his revised version of the· same 
article. See Palma, "Dependency and Development: A Critical 
overview, " in Dudley Seers, ed. Dependency Theory: A 
Critical Assessment (London: Pinter, 1981), Chapter I. 
61see Frank, Reflections on the World Economic Crisis 
(London: Hutchinson, 1981), p. 127. 
62rt should be noted that important sophisticated 
revision of dependency theory are underway. For example 
Cardoso and Faletto, in Dependence and Development in Latin 
stress that while relations of dependency viewed 
historically help to explain underdevelopment, it does not 
follow that dependent relations today necessarily perpetuate 
across the board underdevelopment. With the evolution of 
the world system, the impact of dependent relations can 
change in particular contexts. This is why Cardoso, in 
studying contemporary Brazil, stresses the possibility of 
"associated-dependent development," while Osvaldo Sunkel and 
Edmundo Fuenzalida are able to envision sharp economic 
growth among countries most tied into the contemporary 
transnational system. See, Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent 
Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in 
Alfred Stepan, ed. Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies 
and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 
pp. 142-76; and Sunkel and Fuenzalida, "Transnational 
Capitalism and National Development," in Jose J. Villani, 
ed. Transnational Capitalism and National Development 
(London: Monthly Review Press, 1976). 
Undoubtedly, the earlier form of dependency theory is 
too simplistic in its view that as long as a Third World 
country is tied to the world capitalist system, it cannot 
develop in any significant sense. This is why, I believe, 
dependentistas like Cardoso have pointed to Brazil, which in 
some sense, has developed. South Korea has developed, and 
so, also Taiwan. But we must also note that Cardoso is not 
endorsing "dependent development" nor is he claiming that 
this is the model that Third World countries must follow. 
He is merely saying that it is possible to have some form of 
development within the world capitalist system. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has examined and critiqued different 
theories of exploitation. It has shown that the traditional 
liberal theory is quite problematic as a theory of 
exploitation. It has also shown that a series of other 
theories in the Marxian tradition - Marx's classical theory, 
Emmanuel's "unequal exchange," Roemer's game theory and 
Dependency theory - are not unconnected, distinct theories 
of exploitation but that they all constitute different 
significant moments in the single, general Marxian theory of 
exploitation. 
These different moments, however, do seem to have 
different ethical presuppositions. What we have tried to do 
is to draw out what these ethical presuppositions are and 
how they relate to each other as different moments in this 
general theory. And we have also evaluated these theories 
in terms of different criteria: their internal 
consistencies, the plausibility of their ethical 
how best they explain the data under presuppositions, 
consideration and their usefulness in suggesting strategies 
or policies for development. 
One of the standard criticisms of the Marxian or the 
Emmanuelian types of theories is that they rest on 
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implausible ethical foundations. Contrary to this view, we 
have been able to show that the ethical assumptions they 
rest upon, are not implausible. In fact, in the Marxian and 
Emmanuelian cases, the ethical presuppositions are quite 
straightforward. With Roemer, it a bit more problematic, 
although it is not an irrational ethical assumption. 
our penultimate Chapter posed a crucial question: in 
terms of the different criteria, which of the two theories 
(dependency or developmentalism) best explains the data, the 
data being the current division of the world into advanced 
developed countries and the underdeveloped poor countries? 
It seems obvious from our analysis in this work that 
dependency theory fares better than developmentalism. It is 
not incoherent; its ethical presupposition is reasonable and 
it does seem to better explain why the world is in the way 
it is. 
But the critical weakness of dependency theory seems 
to be in the area of policy prescriptions. This is a 
practical weakness which is obviously true as evidenced in 
the Ghanaian experience. A group who have been influenced 
by dependency theory comes to power. They adopt policies 
which seem to be suggested by this theory. Instead of 
bringing about actual development, they created a lot of 
economic chaos which resulted in efforts to revamp the 
economy through modifications and changes in the policies. 
Despite such practical weakness of dependency theory, 
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developmentalism or neoclassical theory offers no useful 
solution either. In fact, attempts to apply neoclassical 
solutions have often resulted in disaster like the case of 
the "Chicago Boys" in Chile. Maybe there is really no good 
theory available that would explain what the underdeveloped 
Third World countries should do about their impoverished 
situation. And perhaps, there will never be any theory that 
will have the definitive answer or solution. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ackerman, Bruce A., Social Justice in the Liberal State. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. 
Ake, c., A Political Economy of Africa. London: Longmans, 
1981. 
Allen, Christopher and R.W. Johnson, African Perspectives: 
Papers in the History, Politics and Economics of Africa 
Presented to Thomas Hodgkin. London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970. 
/Amin, Samir, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critiaue of 
the Theory of Underdevelopment. New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1967. 
----------- "Development and Structural Change: the African 
experience, 1950-1970," The Journal of International 
Affairs 24(1970) :203-23. 
---------- "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black 
Africa: origins and contemporary forms," Journal of 
Modern African Studies lO(December 1972):503-24. 
----------- "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black 
Africa: Historical origins," Journal of Peace Research 
2(1972) :105-19. 
----------- Nee-Colonialism in West Africa. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1973. 
----------- Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social 
Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1976. 
----------- Imperialism and Unequal Development. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1977. 
Amstrong, c., "Political Consequences of economic 
dependency," Journal of Conflict Resolution 25(Summer 
1981):401-28. 
Arnell, Lars, Recession, the Western Economies and the 
Changing World Order. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 
248 
249 
----------- and Birgitta Nygren, The Western Economies and 
the Changing World Economic Order. New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1981. 
Arneson, Richard, "What's Wrong with Exploitation?" Ethics 
91(January 1981):202-27. 
Arpan, Jeffreys., International Intracorporate Pricing. New 
York: Praeger, 1972. 
Arthur, John and William H. Shaw, eds. Justice and Economic 
Distribution. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1978. 
Austin, D., "Dependent Africa?" Government and Opposition 
14(Summer 1979):335-38. 
Azinna, Nwafor, "Imperialism and Revolution in Africa," 
Monthly Review 26(April 1975):18-32. 
Baran, Paul A., The Political Economy of Growth. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1957. 
~· ----------- and Eric Hobsbawn, "The Stages of Economic 
Growth," Kylos 14(1961):57-65. 
----------- and Paul A. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966. 
Barnet, Richard J. and Ronald E. Mueller, Global Reach: The 
Power of the Multinational Corporations. New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1974. 
Bates, Robert, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The 
Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1981. 
Bath, c. Richard and Dilmus D. James, "Dependency Analysis 
of Latin America: Some Criticisms, Some Suggestions," 
Latin American Research Review 11(1976):3-54. 
Becker, James F., Marxian Political Economy: An Outline. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
Becker, L.C., "The Labor Theory of Property Acquisition," 
The Journal of Philosophy 73(1976):653-64. 
Bell, J.F., A History of Economic Thought. New York: Ronald 
Press, 1967. 
250 
Berman, Bruce J., "Clientelism and Neocolonialism: Center-
Periphery Relations and Political Development in African 
States," Studies in Comparative International 
Development. 9(Summer 1974): 3-25. 
Bernstein, Henry, ed. Underdevelopment and Development. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973. 
----------- and Bonnie K. Campbell, eds. Contradictions of 
Accumulation in Africa: studies in Economy and State. 
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985. 
Bhagwati, J., ed. Economics and World Order from the 1970s 
to the 1990s. London: Macmillan, 1972. 
Blaug, M., Economic Theory in Retrospect. 3rd ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
Bloomfield, Joseph, ed. Social Sciences Index. New York: 
H.W. Wilson, 1975. 
Bodenheimer, Susan, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots 
of Latin American Underdevelopment," Politics and Society 
l(May 1971):327-58. 
Bonilla, Frank and Robert Gilling, eds. Structures of 
Dependency. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973. 
Bornschier, Volker, "Dependent Industrialization in the 
world economy: some comments and results concerning a 
recent debate," Journal of Conflict Resolution 25(1981): 
371-400. 
Bose, Arun, Marx on Exploitation and Inequality: An Essay on 
Marxian Analytical Economics. Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1980. 
Bottomore, Tom, ed. A Dictionary of Marxist Thought. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. 
Bowles, s. and H. Gintis, "Marxian theory of value and 
heterogeneous labor: a critique and reformulation," 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 5(Summer 1981):73-88. 
Bradshaw, York W., "Dependent development in Black Africa: 
cross-national study," American Sociological Review 
50(April 1985):195-207. 
Braun, Oscar, "Unequal Exchange," (mimeo), United Nations 
African Institute for Economic Development. Dakar, 1972. 
Brenkart, George, "Freedom and Private Property in Marx," 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 8(1979):122-47. 
Brenner, Robert. "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A 
Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism," New Left Review · 
104(July-August 1977):25-93. 
Brewer, A., Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical 
Survey. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. 
251 
Bronfenbrenner, M., "Poverty, Exploitation and Alienation," 
American Behavioral Scientist 23(January 1980):383-92. 
Buchanan, Allen, "Exploitation, Alienation and Injustice," 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9(March 1979):121-39. 
----------- Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of 
Liberalism. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982. 
Buckley, Peter and Mark Casson, The Future of the 
Multinational Enterprise. London: Macmillan, 1976. 
Bukharin, Nicolas, Imperialism and World Economy. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1973. 
Burtt, Everett Johnson, Jr., Social Perspectives in the 
History of Economic Theory. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1972. 
Cardoso, Ferdinand Henrique, "The Consumption of Dependency 
Theory in the United States," Latin American Research 
Review 12(1977):7-24. 
, .. · ----------- "Dependency and Development in Latin 
America," New Left Review 74(1981):83-95. 
----------- and Enlezzo Falleto, Dependency and 
Development in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1979. 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher, "Socialist States in the Capitalist 
World Economy," Social Problems 27(1980) :505-25. 
Chicolte, Ronald H., "Theories of Dependency: The View from 
the Periphery," Latin American Perspectives l(Spring 
1974):4-29. 
1 ----------- "A Question of Dependency," Latin American I./ Research Review 2(1978):55-68. 
----------- Theories of Development: Mode of Production 
or Development? Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983. 
252 
v ----------- and Joel c. Edelstein, eds. Latin America: 
the struggle with dependency and beyond. New York: 
Halsted Press, 1974. 
Cockcroft, J.D., Andre Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson, 
eds. Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's 
Political Economy. New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 
1972. 
Cohen, Benjamin J., The Question of Imperialism: The 
Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence. New York: 
Basic Books, 1973. 
Cohen, G.A., "Karl Marx and the Withering Away of Social 
Science," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1(1972):182-203. 
----------- "The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of 
Exploitation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 8(Summer 
1979):338-60. 
----------- "More on Exploitation and the Labor Theory of 
Value," Inquiry 26(September 1983):309-31. 
Crocker, Laurence, "Marx's Concept of Exploitation," Social 
Theory and Practice 2(Fall 1972):201-15. 
De Janvry, Alani, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in 
Latin America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1981. 
Deutsch, Karl w., The Analysis of International Relations. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978. 
Di Quattro, Arthur, "Alienation and Justice in the Market," 
American Political Science Review 72(Summer 1978):871-87. 
----------- "Value, Class and Exploitation," Social 
Theory and Practice lO(Spring 1984):55-80. 
Dobb, Maurice, Studies in the Development of Capitalism. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. 
----------- ed. Karl Marx: Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. 
Dietz, J.L., "Dependency Theory: A Review Article," Journal 
of Economic Issues 14(September 1980):119-57. 
Donaldson, Thomas, Corporations and Morality. Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982. 
/Dos Santos, Theotonio, "The Structure of Dependence," 
American Economic Review 60(1981):231-36. 
253 
Duvall, Raymond and John Freeman, "The State and dependent 
Capitalism," International Studies Quarterly 25{198i):99-
118. 
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1977. 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah and Stein Rokkan, eds. Building 
States and Nations. Vol. 2. Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1973. 
Ellerman, David P., "Marxian Exploitation Theory: A Brief 
Exposition, Analysis and Critique," The Philosophical 
Forum 14{Spring-Summer 1983):315-33. 
Elliot, J.E., "Continuity and Change in the evolution of 
Marx's theory of alienation: from the Manuscripts through 
the Grundrisse to Capital," History of Political Economy 
ll{Fall 1979): 317-62. 
Elster, Jon, "Exploring Exploitation," Journal of Peace 
Research 15(1978):3-17. 
----------- "Roemer versus Roemer: A Comment on 'New 
Directions in the Marxian Theory of Exploitation and 
Class, 111 Politics and Society 11(1982):361-73. 
----------- Making Sense of Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985. 
Emmanuel Arghiri, "Echange inegal et politique de 
developpement, 11 {paper presented at the Sorbonne, Paris, 
18 December, 1962), Problemes de planification, no. 2, 
Paris, 1963. 
----------- "White Settler Colonialism and the Myth of 
Investment Imperialism," New Left Review 73{May-June 
1972):35-37. 
----------- Uneaual Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of 
Trade. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. 
----------- Profit and Crisis. New York: st. Martin's 
Press, 1984 • 
. /Erb, Guy F. and Valeriana Kallab, eds. Beyond Dependency: 
The Developing World Speaks Outs. New York: Overseas 
Development Council, 1975. 
254 
Esseks, J., "Economic Dependency and Political Development 
in New States of Africa," Journalp?f Politics 33(November 
1971):1052-1075. 
Evans, Peter, Dependent Development: The Alliance of 
Multinational State and Local Capital in Brazil. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. 
Fann, K.T. and Donald c. Hodges, eds. Readings in U.S. 
Imperialism. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1971. 
Fernandez, Raul, A. Ocampo and Jose F. Ocampo, "The Latin 
American Revolution: A Theory of Imperialism, Not 
Dependence," Latin American Perspectives l(Spring 
1974) :30-61. 
Fine, Ben, "On the Origins of Capitalist Development," New 
Left Review 109(May-June 1978):88-95. 
--------- Rereading the Capital. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1979. 
Finkelstein, Joseph and Alfred L. Thimm, Economists and 
Society: the development of economic thought from Aquinas 
to Keynes. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. 
Fleming, Arthur, "Using a Man as a Means," Ethics 88(1978): 
299-315. 
Foster-Carter, Adrian, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: 
Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of 
Underdevelopment," World Development 4 (March 1976): 167-
80. 
Frank, Andre Gunder, "The Development of Underdevelopment," 
Monthly Review 18(September 1966) :17-31. 
----------- Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1967. 
----------- "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment 
of Sociology," Catalyst 2(Summer 1967):20-73. Reprinted 
in his Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution? Ch. 
2, pp. 21-94. 
----------- Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution? 
Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the 
Immediate Enemy. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969. 
----------- Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment 
of Sociology. London: Pluto, 1971. 
----------- Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevelopment. New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. 
255 
----------- "Dependence is Dead, Long Live Dependence and 
Class Struggle: A Reply to Critics," Latin American· 
Perspectives 1(1974):87-106. 
----------- Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979. 
----------- Reflections on the World Economic Crisis. 
London: Hutchinson, 1981. 
Frank, Isaiah, Foreign Enterprises in Developing Countries. 
~ Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 
Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
Furniss, Edgar s., The Position of the laborer in a System 
of Nationalism: a study of the labor theories of the 
later English Mercantilists. 2nd ed. New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1920. 
Furtado, Celso, Obstacles to Development in Latin America. 
New York: Anchor Books, 1970. 
Fusfeld, D.R., "Capitalist exploitation and black labor: an 
extended conceptual framework," Review of Black Political 
Economy lO(September 1980):244-46. 
Ghana News, January 1982 - October 1983. 
Gibbins, Peter, "The Marxian Theories of Value and 
Exploitation Axiomatized," Theory and Practice 9(July 
1978):285-93. 
Gilbert, Guy J., "Socialism and Dependency," Latin American 
Perspectives l{Spring 1974):107-23. 
Gill, R.T., Evolution of Modern Economics. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 
Girvan, Norman, "The Development of Dependency Economics in 
the Carribean and Latin America: Review and Comparison," 
Social and Economic Studies 22(March 1973):1-33. 
Gollash, Deirdre, "Exploitation and Coercion," The Journal 
of Value Inquiry 15(1981):319-28. 
Goodman, D., From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist 
Development and Agrarian transitions. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1982. 
Gordon, w., "Institutionalism and Dependency," Journal of 
Economic Issues 16(June 1982) :569-75. 
Griffin, Keith, "The International Transmission of 
Inequality," World Development 2(March 1974):3-16. 
----------- and John Gurlety, "Radical Analyses of 
Imperialism, The Third World and the Transition to 
Socialism: A survey Article," Journal of Economic 
Literature 23(September 1985):1089-1143. 
256 
Grier, Beverly, "Underdevelopment, Modes of Production, and 
the State in colonial Ghana," The African Studies Review 
24(March 1981):21-43. 
Gulbrandsen, o., "The Main Stream of the World Economy," 
(mimeo) XV International Congress of Agricultural 
Economists. San Paolo, 1975. 
Gupta, N.S., Multinational Corporations: A Study of socio-
economic implications on the countries of the Third 
World. Delhi: Pragati, 1978. 
Gutkind, Peter c.w. and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Political 
Economy of Contemporary Africa. Beverly Hills, Calif.: 
Sage Publications, 1976. 
Harris, Richard, ed. The Political Economy of Africa. New 
York: Halsted Press, 1975. 
Hansen, A., Some Cambridge Controversies in the theory of 
Capital. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 
Hansen William and Brigitte Schulz, "Imperialism, dependency 
and social class (an examination of post-World War II 
"dependency theory": conference paper)," Africa Today 
28(1981):5-36. 
Hart, H.L.A., "Are there any natural rights," The 
Philosophical Review 64(January 1955) :175-191. 
Heilbroner, R.L., "Labor Theory of Value Revisited: excerpts 
from Marxism for and against," Dissent 27(Winter 1980): 
91-99. 
Helleiner, G.K., "The Role of Multinational Corporations in 
the Less Developed Countries' Trade in Technology," World 
Development 3(April 1975):161-89. 
257 
Hindess, Barry, Pre-capitalist Modes of Production. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. 
----------- Mode of Production and social formations: an 
auto-critique of Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production. 
Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1977. 
Hirschman, Alberto., Essays in Trespassing: Economics to 
Politics and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981. 
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1958. 
Hobhouse, Leonard T., Liberalism. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1964. 
Hodgson, Geoff, Capitalism, Value and Exploitation. Oxford: 
Martin Robertson, 1962. 
----------- "A Theory of Exploitation without the Labor 
Theory of Value," Science and Society 44(Fall 1980):257-
73. 
Holmstrom, Nancy, "Exploitation," Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy ?(June 1977):353-70. 
----------- "Marx and Cohen on Exploitation and the Labor 
Theory of Value," Inguiry 26(September 1983):287-307. 
Husami, Ziyad H., "Marx on Distributive Justice," Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 8(1978):27-64. 
Hymer, Stephen, The International Operations of National 
Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment. Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1976. 
----------- The Multinational Corporation: A Radical 
Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
IMF Financial Statistics, April 1984. 
Itoh, Makoto, Value and Crisis. New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1980. 
1 Jalee, J., The Pillage of the Third World. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1968. 
Jalee, P., How Capitalism Works (Exploitation). Trans. 
M. Klepper. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. 
Jameson Kenneth and Charles Wilber, eds. Directions in 
Economic Development. Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1979. 
Kamenka, E and A.E. Tay, eds. Human Rights. New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1978. 
Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. 
Trans. H.J. Paton. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. 
Kast, E.C. The Values Theory of Karl Marx: a.primer on 
Marxism. Hicksville, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1976. 
Kaufman, Robert, Harry I. Chernotsky and Daniel s. Geller, 
"A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency," 
Comparative Politics ?(April 1975):303-30. 
Kay, Geoffrey, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist 
Analysis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975. 
Kemp, T., Theories of Imperialism. London: Dennis Dobson, 
1967. 
258 
Kuhne, Karl, Economics and Marxism. Vols. I and II. London: 
Macmillan, 1979. 
~' Kumar, Krishna, Transnational Enterprises: Their Impact on 
Third World Societies and Cultures. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1980. 
/ Laclau, Ernesto, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin 
America," New Left Review 67(May-June 1971):19-38. 
Laibman, David, "Exploitation, Commodity Relations and 
Capitalism: A Defense of the Labor-Value Formulation," 
Science and Society 44(Fall 1980):274-88. 
Lall, Sanjaya, "Transfer-Pricing by Multinational 
Manufacturing Firms," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics 35(August 1973):173-95. 
----------- "Is 'Dependence' a useful concept in analyzing 
underdevelopment?" World Development 3 (November-December 
1975):799-810. 
LaPalombara, Joseph, Multinational Corporations and 
~ Developing Countries. New York: Conference Board, 1979. 
Leaver, Richard, "The Debate on Underdevelopment: 'On 
Situating Gunder Frank'" Journal of Contemporary Asia 
7(1979):108-115. 
259 
Lehmann, D., ed. Development Theory: Four Critical Studies. 
London: Frank Cass, 1979. 
Lekachman, R., A History of Economic Ideas. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1976. 
Lenin, Vladimir I., Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism. New York: International Publishers, 1939. 
Levi, Margaret and North c. Doughlas, "Towards a Property-
Rights Theory of Exploitation," Politics and Society 
11(1982):315-20. 
Levine, Andrew, "Towards a Marxian Theory of Justice," 
Politics and Society 11(1982):343-62. 
Leys, Collins, "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical 
Notes," Journal of Contemporary Asia 7(1977):92-107. 
Linder, Marc, "Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Critics of Political Economy: Studies in the development 
of Marx's Theory of Value," Ph.D. Dissertation. 
Department of Politics. Princeton University, 1973. 
Lipietz, Alain, "Marx or Rostow?" New Left Review 132(March-
April 1982):48-58. 
Locke, John, Second Treatise of Government. Ed. C.B. 
MacPherson. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980. 
Love, J.L., "Paul Brebisch and the origin of the doctrine of 
unequal exchange," Latin American Research Review 
15(1980):45-72. 
Lyons, D.R. ed. Rights. Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1979. 
Maccarthy, T., Marx and the Proletariat: a study in social 
theory. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 
MacEwan, Arthur, "Capitalist Expansion, Ideology and 
Intervention," The Review of Radical Political Economics 
4(Spring 1972):36-58. 
MacLean, Doughlas and Claudia Mills, eds. Liberalism 
Reconsidered. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanfield, 1983. 
----------- and Peter G. Brown, eds. Energy and the Future. 
Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983. 
MacPherson, C.B., The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. 
Magdoff, Harry, The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of 
U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1969. 
Malinowski, Bronislaw, Argonauts of the Western Pacif"ic. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922. 
Malthus, Thomas Robert, An Essay on the Principle of 
Population. London: Ward, Lock and Co., 1890. 
Mandel, Ernest, Marxist Economic Theory. Vol. I. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1968. 
260 
Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Economics. 8th ed. New York: 
Macmillan, 1948. 
Maquet, Jacques, The Premise of Ineguality in Ruanda. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1961. 
Margolis, J., "The Rights of Man," Social Theory and 
Practice 4(1978):423-44. 
Marx, Karl, Wages, Price and Profit. Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1947. 
---------- The Poverty of Philosophy. New York: 
International Publishers, 1963. 
---------- Theories of Surplus Value. Vols. I, II & III. 
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963. 
---------- Capital. Vols. I, II & III. New York: 
International Publishers, 1967. 
---------- Grundrisse. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973. 
---------- and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto. 
New York: International Publishers, 1948. 
---------- Selected Works. Vol. III. Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1969. 
Mayhew, Henry, London Labor and the London Poor. New York: 
Dover, 1968. 
McBride, William, "The Concept of Justice in Marx, Engels 
and Others," Ethics 85(1975) :204-18. 
McGowan, Patrick J., "Economic Dependency and Economic 
Performance in Black Africa," Journal of Modern African 
studies 14(1976):25-40. 
261 
McLellan, David, ed. Karl Marx: Selected Writings. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977. 
Meek, Ronald L., Studies in the Labor Theory of Value. New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. 
Meeropol Michael, "Towards a Political Economic Analysis of 
Underdevelopment," The Review of Radical Political 
Economics 4(Spring 1972):77-108. 
Meier, Gerald M., ed. Leading Issues in Economic 
Development. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1984. 
Melotti, u., Marx and the Third World. Trans. P. Ransford. 
London: Macmillan, 1977. 
Merritt, Richard and John Freeman, "The State and Dependent 
Capitalism," International Studies Quarterly 25(1981):99-
118. 
Miliband, Ralph and John Saville, eds. The Socialist 
Register. London: The Merlin Press, 1975. 
Munck, Ronalda, Politics and Dependency in the Third World: 
The Case of Latin America. London: Zed Books, 1984. 
, Munoz, Heral do, ed. From Dependency to Development: 
Strategies to overcome underdevelopment and ineguality. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. 
Murgal, Antonio F., "Dependency: A Latin American View," 
NACLA Newsletter 4(February 1971):1-13. 
Myers, David B., "Ethics and Political Economy in Marx," The 
Philosophical Forum (Boston) ?(Spring-Summer 1976):246-
59. 
Myrdal, Gunnar, The Challenge of World Poverty: A World 
Anti-Poverty Program in Outline. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1970. 
Narveson, Jan, "Marxism: Hollow to the Core," Free Inquiry 
3(Spring 1983) :29-35. 
New African, March 1980. 
Nicholas, T., ed. Capital and labor: studies in the 
capitalist labor process. London: Fontana Paperbacks, 
1980. 
Nicos, Mouzelis, "Modernization, Underdevelopment, Uneven 
Development: Prospects for a Theory of Third World 
Formations," The Journal of Peasant Studies ?(April 
1980):353-74. 
262 
Nkrumah, Kwame, Towards Colonial Freedom. London: Heinemann, 
1962. 
Neve, Alec, "On Reading Andre Gunder Frank," Journal of 
Development Studies lO(April-July 1974):445-55. 
Nozick, Robert, Anarchy. State and Utopia. New York: Basic 
Books, 1974. 
Nubour, K.A., "Towards a National Democratic Revolution," 
Legon Observer 12(January 1980):11-17. 
O'Brien, Rita Cruise, ed. The Political Economy of 
Underdevelopment. Beverly Hill: Sage Publications, 1979. 
Okolo, Amechi, "Dependency in Africa: stages of African 
political economy (history of the relationship between 
Africa and the West: based on Conference paper), 
Alternatives 9(Fall 1983) :229-47. 
Owen, R. and B. Sutcliffe, eds. Studies in the Theory of 
Imperialism. London: Longman, 1972. 
oxaal, Ivaar, Tony Barnett and David Booth, eds. Beyond the 
Sociology of Development. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1975. 
Packenham, Robert, "Latin American Dependency Theories: 
Strengths and Weaknesses," World Development 26(May 
1974):16-54. 
Palma, Gabriel, "Dependency: A Formal Theory of 
~ Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of 
Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?" World 
Development 6(1978):881-924. 
Panichas, George E., "Vampires, Werewolves and Economic 
Exploitation," Social Theory and Practice ?(Summer 
1981):223-42. 
Parkin, Frank, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois 
Critique. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1979. 
Patel, Surendra J., "The Technological Dependence of 
Developing Countries," The Journal of Modern African 
studies 12(1974):1-18. 
Petras, James, ed. Latin America: From Dependence to 
Revolution. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. 
Phillips, Anne, "The Concept of 'Development,'" Review of 
African Political Economy 8(January-April 1977):7-20. 
Pingree, Elizabeth E. and Caroline Myers Reyers, eds. 
Humanities Index. New York: H.W. Wilson, 1980. 
Poster, M., "Alienation, not exploitation, was Marx's 
central point," Center Magazine 12(January 1979):32-35. 
263 
Przeworski, Adam, "The Ethical Materialism of John Roemer," 
Politics and Society 11(1982):289-313. 
Quijano, Anibal, Nationalism and Colonialism in Peru: A 
Study in the Nee-Imperialism. New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1971. 
Ragin, Charles and Jacques Delacroix, "Comparative 
advantage, the world division of labor, and 
underdevelopment," Comparative Social Research 
2(1979):181-214. 
----------- "Structural blockage: a cross-national study of 
economic dependency, state efficacy, and 
underdevelopment," American Journal of Sociology 
86(1981):1311-47. 
Rattansi, A., Marx and the Division of Labor. London: 
Macmillan, 1982. 
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971. 
Ray, David, "The Dependency Model of Latin American 
Underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallacies," Journal of 
International Studies and World Affairs 15(February 
1973):7-9. 
Remmer, Karen L. and Gilbert w. Merkx, eds. New Perspectives 
on Latin America: Political Conflict and Social Change. 
New York: MSS Information Corporation, 1976. 
Rescher, N., Distributive Justice. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1966. 
Resnik, S.A., "State of Development Economics," Ainerican 
Economic Review 65(1975):317-22. 
Rhodes, Robert I., ed. Imperialism and Underdevelopment: 
A Reader. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. 
Ricardo, David, The Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation. London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1912. 
Rich, E.E. and C.H. Wilson, eds. The Cambridge Economic 
History of Europe, Vol. IV. The Economy of Expanding 
Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
264 
Robinson, Joan, "Piere Sraffa and the Rate of Exploitation," 
New Left Review 31(1965):28-34. 
----------- "Capital Theory Up to Date," Canadian Journal 
of Economics 3(1970) :307-17. 
----------- "The Relevance of Economic Theory," Monthly 
Review 33(January 1971):29-37. 
----------- Aspects of Development and Underdevelopment. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
Rodney, Walter, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington 
D.C.: Howard University Press, 1972. 
Roemer, John E., Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economic 
Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 
1981. 
----------- "Property Relations vs Surplus Value in Marxian 
Exploitation," Philosophy and Public Affairs ll(Fall 
1982):281-313. 
----------- "Exploitation, Alternatives and Socialism," 
The Economic Journal 92(March 1982):87-107. 
----------- "New Directions in the Marxian Theory of 
Exploitation and Class," Politics and Society 
11(1982):253-87. 
----------- "Reply," Politics and Society 11(1982):375-95. 
----------- A General Theory of Exploitation and Class. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
----------- "Should Marxist be interested in Exploitation?" 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 14(Winter 1985):30-65. 
Roemer, Michael, "Dependence and Industrialization 
Strategies," World Development 9(May 1981):429-34. 
Rothstein, R.L., "Inequality, Exploitation and Justice in 
the_International System: Reconciling Divergent 
Expectations," International Studies Quarterly 21(June 
1977) :319-58. 
Rostow, Walt Whitman, "The Take-Off into Self-Sustained 
Growth," The Economic Journal 66(March 1956) :25-48. 
265 
----------- The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960. 
Rowthorn, Bob, "Nee-classicism, Neo-Ricardianism and 
Marxism," New Left Review 86(July-August 1974) :63-87. 
Said, A., ed. Human Rights and World Order. New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978. 
Saigal, Jagdish c., "On the Theory of Unequal Exchange," 
(mimeo), United Nations African Institute for Economic 
Development and Planning. Dakar, 1973. 
Samuelson, Paul A., "Marxian Economics as Economics," 
American Economic Review 57(May 1967):616-23. 
Sautter, Hermann, "Underdevelopment through isolationism? 
Dependency theory in retrospect," Intereconomics 20(July-
August 1985):180-87. 
Scanlon, Thomas, "Nozick on Rights, Liberty and Property," 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 6(1976):3-25. 
Schweickart, David, Capitalism or Worker Control? An Ethical 
and Economic Appraisal. New York: Praeger, 1980. 
----------- "On Robert Paul Wolff's Transcendental 
Interpretation of Marx's Labor Theory of Value," Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 14(September 1984):359-74. 
----------- "What is Exploitation? A Comment on Sensat, 11 
An Unpublished Paper. Loyola University of Chicago, 
February 1984. 
----------- "Unequal Exchange: Roemer and Emmanuel," 
Journal of Inquiry forthcoming. 
----------- "A Review of Robert Paul Wolff's Understanding 
Marx: A Reconstruction and Critique of Capital," The 
Journal of Philosophy forthcoming. 
Schumpeter, J.A., "The •crisis' in Economics," Journal of 
Economic Literature 20(September 1982):1049-59. 
266 
Seers, Dudley, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development 
Economics (Revising a Manchester Conference," Development 
and Change lO(October 1979):707-719. 
----------- ed. Dependency Theory: A Critical Assessment. 
London: Pinter, 1981. 
Sensat, Julius, "Exploitation," Nous 18(March 1984):21-38. 
Shaw, Timothy M., Towards a political economy for Africa: 
the dialectics of dependence. New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1985. 
Sherman, Howard, Radical Political Economy: Capitalism and 
Socialism from a Marxist-Humanist Perspective. New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1972. 
Smith, Adam, An Inguiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations. Vol. I. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1976. 
Smith, Anthony A., "Robert Nozick's Critique of Marxian 
Economics," Social Theory and Practice 8(Summer 
1982):165-88. 
Smith, s., "The Idea of Samir Amin: Theory or Tautology?" 
Journal of Development Studies 17(0ctober 1980):5-21. 
Smith, T., "Underdevelopment and development: the case of 
dependency theory," World Politics 31(January 1979):247-
88. 
Spencer, Herbert, Social Statics. London: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1910. 
Spiegel, H.W., The Growth of Economic Thought. Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 
Sraffa, P., The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo. 
Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951. 
Staley, Eugene, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries: 
Political Implications of Economic Development. New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. 
Stallings, Barbara, Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin 
America. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 
1972. 
Steedman, Ian, Marx after Sraffa. London: New Left Books, 
1977. 
267 
Stein, Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein, The colonial 
heritage of Latin America: Essays in economic dependence 
in perspective. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 
Steiner, Hillel, "The Structure of a set of Compossible 
Rights," Journal of Philosophy 74(1977) :767-75. 
----------- "The Natural Right to the Means of Production," 
The Philosophical Quarterly 27(January 1977):41-44. 
----------- "A Liberal Theory of Exploitation," Ethics 
94(January 1984):225-41. 
Steinvorth, Ulrich, "Marx's Theory of Value," Philosophy of 
the Social Sciences ?(December 1977):385-96. 
Stepan, Alfred, ed. Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies 
and Future. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. 
Street, James H. and Dilmus D. James, "Institutionalism, 
Structuralism and Dependency in Latin America," Journal 
of Economic Issues 16(Summer 1982) :673-89. 
Sunkel, Osvaldo, "Big Business and 'Dependencia': A Latin 
American View," Foreign Affairs 50(April 1972):517-31. 
----------- "Transnational Capitalism and National 
Disintegration in Latin America," Social and Economic 
Studies 22(1973):135-36. 
Sweezy, Paul M., The Theory of Capitalist Development: 
Principles of Marxian Political Economy. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1942. 
----------- and Charles Bettelheim, On the Transition to 
Socialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. 
Tawney, R.H., Equality. London: Unwin Books, 1964. 
Taylor, John G., From Modernization to Modes of Production: 
A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and 
Underdevelopment. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 
1979. 
Taylor, Overton H., The Classical Liberalism, Marxism and 
the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1960. 
The Budget of the Republic of Ghana. April 1983. 
268 
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. 
The Philosopher Index. Ohio: Bowling Green University.Press, 
1973. 
Thomas, Clive Y., Dependence and Transformation: The 
Economics of the Transition to Socialism. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1974. 
Tormey, Judith, "Exploitation, Oppression and Self-
sacrifice, 11 The Philosophical Forum (Boston) 5(Fall-
Winter 1973):206-21. 
Turner, L., Multinational Companies and the Third World. 
London: Allen Lane, 1973. 
Tyler, William G. and J. Peter Wogart, "Economic Dependence 
and Marginalization: Some Empirical Evidence," Journal of 
Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 15(February 
1973):36-45. 
Umbeck, John, A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation into 
the Formation of Property Rights. Iowa: University of 
Iowa Press, 1981. 
Urquidi, Victor and Rosemary Thorp, eds. Latin America in 
the International Economy. London: Macmillan, 1973. 
Vaitsos, Constantine, Intercountry Income Distributions and 
Transnational Enterprises. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974. 
Van De Veer, Donald, "Marx's view of Justice," Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 33(March 1973):366-86. 
Vengroff, Richard, "Nee-Colonialism and Policy Outputs in 
Africa," Comparative Political Studies 8(1975):234-49. 
----------- "Dependency and Underdevelopment in Black 
Africa: An Empirical Test," The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 15(1977):613-30. 
Vernon, Raymond, Storm Over the Multinationals: The Real 
Issues. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. 
Villani, Jose J., ed. Transnational Capitalism and National 
Development. London: Monthly Review Press, 1976. 
Wallace, Don and Helga Ruof-Koch, eds. International Control 
of Investment. New York: Praeger, 1974. 
269 
Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Modern World System: Capitalist 
Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy 
in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press, 1974. 
----------- "Dependence in an Interdependent World: T.he 
Limited Possibilities of Transformation Within the 
Capitalist World Economy," African Studies Review 
8(1974):1-26. 
----------- "The Rise and Future demise of the World 
Capitalist System," Comparative studies in Society and 
History 16(September 1974):381-415. 
----------- "Class and class conflict in Africa," The 
Monthly Review 256(February 1976):34-42. 
Walton, P., From Alienation to Surplus Value. London: Sheed 
and Ward, 1972. 
Ward, B.N., The Ideal World of Economics: Liberal, Radical 
and Conservative Economic World Views. New York: Basic 
Books, 1979. 
Warren, Bill, "Imperialism and Capitalist 
Industrialization," New Left Review 8l(September-October 
1973):3-45. 
----------- Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism. London: New 
Left Books, 1980. 
Weeks, John, "Employment, Growth, and Foreign Domination in 
Underdeveloped Countries," The Review of Radical 
Political Economics 4(Spring 1972):59-70. 
----------- Capitalism and Exploitation. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1981. 
Weisskopf, Thomas E., "Capitalism, Underdevelopment and the 
Future of the Poor Countries," The Review of Radical 
Political Economics 4(Spring 1972):1-35. 
West Africa. April 5, 1980 - June 4, 1984. 
Wiarda, Howard J., and Harvey F. Kline, eds. Latin American 
Politics and Development. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1979. 
Wilber, Charles K., ed. The Political Economy of Development 
and Underdevelopment. New York: Random House, 1979. 
Wolff, Robert Paul, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction 
and Critique of A Theory of Justice. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1977. 
----------- "A Critique and Reinterpretation of Marx's 
Labor Theory of Value," Philosophy and Public Affairs 
lO(Spring 1981):89-120. 
----------- Understanding Marx: A Reconstruction and 
Critique of Capital. Princeton: Princeto~ University 
Press, 1985. 
Wood, Allen, "The Marxian Critique of Justice," Philosophy 
and Public Affairs l(Spring 1972) :244-82. 
270 
----------- "Marx on Right and Justice: A Reply to Husami," 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 8(1979):267-95. 
Woodis, J., Introduction to Neo-colonialism. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1967. 
Wright, Erick o., "The Status of the Political in the 
Concept of Class Structure," Politics and Society 
11(1982) :321-41. 
Wynia, Gary w., The Politics of Latin American Development. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Young, Gary, "Justice and Capitalist Production: Marx and 
Bourgeois Ideology," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
8(September 1978):421-55. 
Yuan-Kang, Shih, "Nozick on Marx's Labor Theory of Value and 
Exploitation," Philosophical Forum (Boston) ll(Spring 
1980):244-49. 
Zimbalist, A., "Synthesis of Dependency and Class Analysis," 
Monthly Review 32(May 1980):27-31. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Paul Otubusin has been read 
and approved by the following committee: 
Dr. David Schweickart, Director 
Associate Professor, Philosophy, Loyola 
Dr. Thomas Donaldson 
Associate Professor, Philosophy, Loyola 
Dr. David T. Ozar 
Associate Professor, Philosophy, Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies 
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated 
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the 
Committee with reference to content and form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfill-
ment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. 
